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ABSTRACT
COMPOSITION AS A MODE OF BEING:
POLITICS, ETHICS, AND HISTORY IN
THE WRITING CLASSROOMS OF POSTMODERNITY
by
Lance Michael Svehla
University of New Hampshire, September, 1997
Henry Louis Gates Jr. once commented that while he did not
"deny the importance, on the level of theory, of the [postmodern]
project," such a project did not help him when he was "trying to get a
taxi on the corner of 125th and Lenox Avenue" (Loose Canons 3738).

The postmodern project lacked what Gates calls "practical

performative force."

The purpose of this dissertation is to establish

postmodernity's practical perfomative force for the composition
classroom.

It addresses four central questions:

What is

postmodernity? What is its relationship to composition? Why should
composition teachers and students care about this relationship? How
might composition use postmodernity to create new classroom
practices and deal with reoccurring classroom problems?
I believe that postmodern theory, if it can be refigured to
match our current historical moment, offers composition two
powerful discourses for creating practice and crossing disciplinary
boundaries:

an epistemological frame that allows for a plurality of

diverse and even contradictory pedagogies in one classroom, and a
theory of culture(s) that can help teachers negotiate the academic,
political, and ethical challenges of today's classrooms.

Postmodernity

viii
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is not. as Lester Faigley’s work implies, an abstract theory or
research method that composition teachers apply to composition but.
as Louise Wetherbee Phelps argues, a cultural condition in which we
live.

ix
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IN TRO DUC TIO N

D A R K N ESS M ADE VISIBLE

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we can
take. We have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the
one . . . . Let us wage war on totality. —Jean-Francois Lyotard The Postmodern
Condition
The political challenge is to articulate universality in a way that is not a mere
smokescreen for someone else's particularity.
We must preserve the
possibility of universal connection.
That's the fundamental challenge.
Let’s
dig deep enough within our heritage to make that connection to others . . . . The
quest for knowledge without presuppositions, the quest for certainty, the quest
for dogmatism and orthodoxy and rigidity is over.
—Cornell West "Diverse New World"
[W]hat I sense at the present moment is a shift in the critical mass toward
commitment, vocation, social responsibility. For us as scholars, teachers, and
students, this shift has meant a growing legitimacy (once again) for questions
of ethics and politics, of agency and action, of intention and meaning. It has
meant the insistent return of urgency, of a sense that our intellectual work
matters—or at least that it should matter, must matter, in the arena of cultural
production and social change.
—Susan Stanford Friedman "Post/Poststructuralist Feminist Criticism"

It has become almost a cliche amongst scholars, intellectuals,
and pundits of the popular culture to write that we are living in a
postmodern age.

From MTV. to the United Nations, to the hallowed

halls of academia, there is a sense that things are fragmented, devoid
of overarching meaning, and ultimately beyond our ability to control;
that our agency is an illusion and perhaps even culpable in our
impotency.
station

In the South a young mother drowns her children in a

wagon

Hertzogovina

but

blames

Muslims

it

suffer

on

a black carjacker;

genocide

while

Western

in

Bosnia-

diplomats

negotiate with the engineers of ethnic cleansing; in L.A. cheering
spectators wave signs reading "Go O.J. Go!" as Simpson’s previously
1
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blood stained Bronco slowly flees down the freeway.

Everywhere we

turn the media betrays and portrays the crumbling metanarratives
that once offered at least the hope of meaning, progress, and justice.
We

w atch —literally —as

the

once

institutions of modernism fall apart.

sacred

program s

and

The rule of law fades under the

light of courtroom cameras as Mark Furhman swears he never used
the "n-word."

The sanctity of family drowns in Susan Smith's TV

generated tears as she begs the carjacker not to harm her children.
The promise of Western civilization and the utopia of Marxism are
mutually

stripped

of credibility

as journalists

graves of the former Yugoslavia.

uncover

the

mass

From Rodney King's beating, the

L.A. riots, the burning of Malcolm X's widow, and the Menendez
brother's

trails

for

resistant

viruses,

murder

massive

to

the

massacres

deforestation,

and

in

Rwanda,

overpopulation:

drug
the

world, more than ever, seems "a darkling plain . . . where ignorant
armies clash by night"—the "confused alarms of struggle and flight"
(Arnold 649) made visible this time, however, not by a poet's pen
but by the light of a CNN camera.

The technology that was supposed

to increase our ability to control the world has instead left us feeling
overwhelmed.
And yet, what exactly all this fragmentation means and, more
importantly, what we are supposed to feel and do about it is not
clear.

Indeed, there are almost as many views on the postmodern

condition,
postmodern

as

many

theory,

opinions

on

as there are

the

usefulness

theorists.

or

futility

For Baudrillard

of
and

Derrida the inescapability of our condition becomes license to "play
'with the pieces' of the deconstructed universe" (Faigley 210), to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

embrace postmodernity as "neither optimistic nor pessimistic" but as
"a game with the vestiges of what has been destroyed

. . . .

an

attempt to rediscover a certain pleasure in the irony of things, in the
game of things"

(Baudrillard B a u d r i l l a r d 95).

We are either to

endlessly deconstruct, defer, and pun with meaning and presence as
Derrida

would have

us do or accept, as

Baudrillard

does,

that

pleasure in irony is more "sane" than a search for meaning in a world
where simulacrums, where images of the real, are realer than real.
For other theorists like Foucault, whose language of power and
confession belies any attempt to play with our condition, there is a
hesitancy

to

theorize any large

plan of action,

any

politics

of

consensuality, any universal form of agency for fear that "any global
political theory of resistance . . . would inevitably reproduce what it
set out to eliminate" (Faigley 44).

While for theorists such as Fredric

Jameson and Jean-Francois Lyotard, theorists who helped establish
the

postm odern

critique,

postm odernism

represents

eith er

challenge to be contained or a hope for a new kind of justice.
Jameson,

belief in a postmodern condition and adherence

a

For

to classical

Marxism is not a contradiction but a kind of theorizing that sees
postmodernism as a transitional stage from which we have not yet
e m e r g e d .1 Despite postmodernism's devastating critique of Marxist
theory, Jameson is "convinced that this new postmodern global form
of capitalism will now have a new class logic about it, but it has not
yet completely

emerged

because

labor has

not yet reconstituted

itself on a global scale" (Hall and Jameson 31).

His attempt,

therefore, to create an overall theory of differentation is "little more
than

the

making

of

connections

between

various

phenomena"

3
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(Jameson

"Afterward"

376).

Lyotard, on the other hand,

sees

postmodernism not as a transitional stage but as an "overarching"
(and in that sense paradoxical) condition of heterogeneity in which
certain

notions

Postmodern
arguments"

of universal

justice

are

still

possible.2 In T h e

Condition, Lyotard calls for a "multiplicity of finite metaover "grand narratives"

because the former are more

receptive to heterogeneity and unassimilated otherness (65).
within these multiple "little narratives"

Justice

is not based on truth or

consensus but on an "invention . . . born of dissension" (xxv).
Postmodernism becomes a frame for a unity of contradictions.
For

still

manifestation

other

theorists,

postmodernism

and

its

specific

as poststructuralism3 represent a questionable attempt

to remove notions of agency, social justice, and identity just at the
moment when marginalized groups have attained the power to use
them.

For example, Terry Eagleton initially rejected postmodernism

as nothing more than another "bourgeois mystification."4

Barbara

Christian sees postmodernism as the "production of a theoretical elite
at precisely the time 'when the literature of peoples of color, of black
women, of Latin Americans, of Africans, began to move to 'the
center"’ ("The

Race"

229).

And Ann duCille's critique

of the

camouflaging effect of postcolonialism echoes the fear many theorists
have about postmodernism.

duCille believes that "False universals

such as 'the postcolonial woman,' 'the postcolonial condition,' and
even 'the postcolonial critic' camouflage the variety of neocolonial
circumstances in which masses of people live, work, and theorize"
("Postcolonialism" 33).

In a similar way, it could be argued that

terms such as "the postmodern condition," "postmodern theory." and

4
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"the postmodern critic" camouflage the hunger, color, and gender
inequalities

that

make it

impossible

or

unpalatable

for

the

marginalized to fully enter the postmodern discursive universe.

In

short, there is a required level of privilege necessary to play with the
pieces of the deconstructed universe.
Jurgen

Habermas

postmodernism

Finally,

for

theorists like

is not simply endlessly critical,

paradoxical, or a mark of privilege but an abandonment of the goals
of the Enlightenment:
understanding

and

truth, rationality, and social justice.
appreciating

the

postm odern

Fully

critique

of

modernity, Habermas, nevertheless, believes that it "is made at the
expense of any beneficial concept of reason" (Faigley 41).

However,

rationality for Habermas is no longer the product of an inner logic or
unified
subject but the potential of a "pragmatics of language use" (41).

He

maintains that a just society must be based on a comprehensive
notion of rationality relocated in our "potential for communicative
action" (41).

In direct contrast to Lyotard, Habermas does not see

the horrors of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the result of
the Enlightenment but as the result of leaving the Enlightenment an
"incomplete project."5
Clearly,

whatever

one's

feelings

on

the

phenomenon

of

postmodernism, on its usefulness as a project for political change, or
on the extent

o f the postmodern condition,

the

previous center

modern project—"the domination

of nature, the

provided

by

the

primacy

of

method,

(Borgmann

C r o ssin g

and

the

sovereignty

of

5)—no longer holds,

no

the

individual"

longer persuades

theoretically or pragmatically, no longer provides a common

5
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life.

And yet, as Albert Borgmann argues, the postmodern theory that has
arisen to describe our condition offers little comfort and even less
direction:

"the idiom we have favored since the beginning of the

modern era fails to inspire conviction or yield insight; the language of
those

proclaiming

a new

endlessly prefatory"

(2).

epoch

seems

Borgmann

merely deconstructive

believes,

therefore,

"language of postmodernism has crucial critical force.

or

that the

But much of it

seems idle; very little of it gives us a helpful view of the postmodern
divide

or o f w hat

postmodern

lies

critiq ue

beyond

reveals

it

(3-4).

previously

In other

words,

unproblem atized

the

power

relations, offers the grounds for critiquing those relations, but leaves
no way to move beyond those insights.

It has produced no theory of

agency that might lead to political action and change.
to

"articulate"

Patricia

Bizzell's

call

for

"a

It cannot seem

positive

program

legitimated by an authority that is nevertheless non-foundational"
("Beyond" 671).

In essence, postmodernism seems like the great

furnace in Milton's hell.

It casts flames "on all sides round . . . I yet

from those flames / No light, but rather darkness visible / Serv'd
only to discover sights of woe, / Regions of sorrow, doleful shades,
where peace / And rest can never dwell, hope never comes" (Milton
qtd. in Masello 36).
Yet this cliche, the now casual, commercial, and controversial
use of the term postmodernism, still marks a very real sense that
something important has changed in the understanding of ourselves
and

the

world--a

change

found

not

so

much

in

our

fear

of

fragmentation and incoherence but in our fear of powerlessness in
the face of that fragmentation, in the relationship of our agency.

6
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individually and collectively, to that incoherence.

From philosophers

like Nietzsche,

Rousseau, and Kierkegaard to artists

Arnold,

and Joyce,

Kafka,

identified before.
and society

feelings

like Camus,

o f fragmentation

have

been

Indeed, the ultimately fragmented state of nature

is a fundamental conceit of high modernism.

The

difference between their state and the postmodern is their belief in
the ability of the artist, the agent, the individual to resist, as a moral
project, this fragmentation, to stand in opposition to it, to form within
one's self a consciousness that derives its wholeness from its ability
to critique.

This lack of faith in or concern with the ability of the

individual

to

postmodern

resist,

theory.

perhaps
As

more

David

than

Harvey

anything
argues,

else,

marks

"postmodernism

swims, even wallows, in the fragmentary and the chaotic currents of
change as if that is all there is" (The Condition 44).
I would argue, however,
destroyed

in theory

may

be

that what has been abandoned or
found

in our lived

lives.

While

resistance or agency may no longer emanate from a distanced self
and

may

monolithic

no

longer

power

be

leveled

structures,

against

it can

easily

still exist,

discernible

and

individually

and

collectively, in the multiple and fractured things we do:
book, protest clear cutting, raise a child.
resistance

that

has

passed

retains many of its insights.

through

write a

It is a theory of agency and
the

postmodern

critique

yet

It is a theory that does not hold out

hope for a unified self but examines actions to see how a multiple,
fractured,

and

fluid self might be

manifested effectively.

Like

Friedman I believe that we have moved beyond the hegemony of
postmodern theory but not its formative influence.

Friedman, as my

7
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epigraph implies, sees us as having moved into a post-poststructural
period.

Concerns for "ethics and politics, agency and action, intention

and meaning" are once again legitimate, but now must be seen and
performed

in the presence of a feeling that poststructuralism

historically past yet still crucially, if differently, present.

is

She writes:

A f t e r suggests . . . that we are beyond poststructuralism , that
p o s rs tr u c tu ra lis m is p a s t , still inevitably part o f our present, but
present different than it was before, present as a significant vestige
o f our immediate past, but fundamentally altered by its new context
in the present.
("Post/Poststructuralism” 465-66).

This new context is one in which postmodernism must either help us
to fulfill a desire for a new kind of self, resistance, ethics, and history
or get out of the way.
We

live in a moment when many of us want to reclaim

important yet theoretically discredited ideas from modernism.
we want to reclaim them as vastly different practices.

But

It is a time

when "Agency involves action that is not separate from, but also not
reducible

to,

language"

(Friedman

472);

when

autonomous but still exists as dialogic and

the

self

intersubjective;

is

not
when

resistance is not limited to the domain of subjectivity but must take
other forms as the situation demands; when ethics is not seen as
above ideology but somehow before it; and when, above all else,
history is not seen as rationally progressive but still provides a sense
of pattern, a sense of meaning rendered from experience, a sense of
communicative

possibility.

For

it

is

ludic

postmodernism's

abandonment of historical consciousness that cripples our ability to
move beyond the postmodern divide.

In surrendering history we

surrender not only what we have been, what we are, and what we
might be, but the struggle over who gets to decide those questions.

8
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Itis historical consciousness

that allows

us

to see our present

condition, to alter that condition, and to place ideology itself within a
larger frame.
Moreover, it is a moment, a time, when the implicit morality of
postmodern theory is pushing to the fore. As

Kate Sopher does,

I

find in much of postmodernism a covert desire to make the world
and our students' lives better, but it is a desire that has been down
played due to postmodernism's initial role as critic of supposedly
moral systems.

She writes:

Why, for example, lend ourselves to the politics of "difference” if not
in virtue o f its en lig h ten m en t—what is permits in the way o f
releasing subjects from the conflations o f im perializing discourse
and the constructed identities o f binary o pp ositions? Why lend
ourselves to the deconstruction o f liberal-humanist rhetoric if not to
expose the class or racial or gender identities it occludes? . . . Why
call science into question if not in part because of the military and
eco lo g ic a l
c a ta s tro p h e s
to
w hich
the b lin d
p u rs u it
o f its
instrumental rationality has delivered us?
Why
problem atize the
artistic canon and its modes of aesthetic discrimination if not to draw
attention to the ways in which art can collude with the values o f the
establishment and serve to reinforce its pow er elites.
(qtd. in
Faigley 21)

Presently, therefore, I would argue that postmodernism need lead
neither to an impasse nor a "wallowing” but, instead, could lead to
new ethical ways of teaching and evaluating writing, new ways of
relating to our students and colleagues,

new ways of using the

classroom to help interpenetrate divergent politics,

new ways of

sensing history that enable us to see that where we stand in the
present is constituted by the past.
offers

us

the

possibility

of

In short, the historical moment
using

the

moral

potential

of

postmodernism to create composition studies as an ethical space in
which

multiple

and

new

ways

of

being

are

enacted

to

immediate problems in specific situations.
9
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solve

The purpose of this dissertation, therefore, is to help map this
sense of a new post-postmodern identity, ethics, and "e x p e rie n c e of
history"--not by ignoring or embracing the postmodern critique but
by engaging it (Friedman 469).

In my first chapter I will examine

the problems involved in trying to use postmodernism in such a way
for the field of composition.
theorists

such as James

Patricia

Harkin,

constructed

Susan

the

Specifically, I will review the ways that

Berlin, Lester Faigley,
Miller,

relationship

Victor

of

Vitanza,

com position

Maxine
and

to

Hairston,

others

have

postm odernity—

constructions that either enable or harm composition's ability to use
postmodernism in the manner I hope for.

In chapter two. I will

show that the postmodern impasse of agency is more a problem of
theory than an actual condition.
writing

resistance

resistance.

nor

for

The impasse is neither a barrier to

using

postmodernism

to

explain

that

The chapter focuses on the writing of a lower caste,

Indian, woman immigrant who confronts both caste prejudice and
sexism

through

agency

for

refiguring

the

Malathi
object

technology.

anonymity
are

status

not

of the

matters

through

internet.
of

w riting,

subject

Resistance
position

personal

and

but of

history,

and

Malathi will show us that the historical grounds for

resistance, and thus the preeminent need for subjectivity to resist
oppression, have changed or at least become more complex.
Chapter three is the first of two chapters that will focus on the
issue of politics in the classroom.

Having established the possibility

of resistance, I begin to examine how composition tries to both deal
with and encourage student resistance in the classroom by teaching
the political.

In this

chapter

I critique

the critical

democracy

10
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pedagogy
Patricia

advanced
Bizzell,

by

Alan

such

diverse

France, Karen

theorists

as

Fitts, Charles

James

Berlin.

Payne, James

Laditka, C. H. Knoblauch, Ira Shor, John Clifford, and Donald Morton to
name a few.

Disturbed

by the authoritarian approach that

some

critical pedagogues take yet dedicated to the idea of the classroom as
a place for social progress, I use postmodernism to reject the false
choice of either having to leave one's politics at the door or using
one's authority to try and force ideological change.
current pedagogy on the

Having critiqued

use of politics in the classroom,

I use

chapter four to offer a postmodern ethics of the political
substitute.

as a

Borrowing from the works of Michel Foucault, Gerald

Graff, Patricia Harkin, and Mikhail Bakhtin, I construct an ethics of
the

political

based

on

answerability, and respect

experimentation,

pragmatism,

Bakhtinian

for the incommensurability of the

other.

Then, in the spirit of Foucault, I put this ethics to the test against
examples of offensive student writing.

It is my contention that

offensive writing is often an act of legitimate resistance and should
be treated as such.
Finally, in the last chapter I try to recapture a notion of history
that acknowledges

the postmodern critique

history

a pattern that,

as

connections

having
and

resist

inequities.

o f teleology yet sees

if traced,
I

allows

reject

both

us to
the

forge
radical

postmodernists who claim that we are living in a post-historical era
and the Hegelian or Marxist historians who refuse to see that history
is not marked by an inherent plan or progression.

Specifically, I try

to recapture a sense of history and community through the concept
of intertextuality.

I examine the strange echoes I hear between the

I I
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work of Michel Foucault

and the work of Plato—echoes that make

Plato relevant and Foucault useful to the projects of social progress.
My belief is

that while texts do not represent a space outside

of

cultures from which to judge practices, they do represent a shared, if
conflicted,
politics,

space

and

among communities

aesthetics

where

can be debated

and

standards

of ethics,

altered, a web

of

connections for dialogue.
in general, the project can be summed up in a quote from
Henry Giroux:
Rather than proclaim ing the end o f reason, postm odernism can be
critically analyzed for how successfully it interrogates the limits of
the p ro je c t o f m odernist rationality and its universal claims to
p ro g ress, h ap p in ess, and
freedom. In stead o f assum ing that
postm odernism has vacated
the terrain o f values,
it seems more
useful to address
how it accounts for how values are constructed
h isto ric a lly and relation ally . . . .
instead o f claim ing that
postm odernism 's critique o f the essentialist subject denies a theory
o f subjectivity, it seems more productive to exam ine how its claims
ab out the c o n tin g e n t ch a ra c te r o f id e n tity , c o n s tru c te d in a
multiplicity of social relations and discourse, redefines the notion of
agency.
("Slacking O f f ’ 350-51)

I believe composition, more than any other field, has the capacity to
use postmodernism in the way Giroux recommends.

Composition is,

in some sense, both within and larger than postmodernism.

It is a

mode of being, a way of writing self, resistance, ethics, experience,
and history into tangible, alterable, communal existence.
with learning, literacy, knowledge making, and critique.

It deals

It is literacy

as a material action in the world that has real effects on real bodies.
After all,
condition

the putting together of parts preceded
and

will

outlive

it (though composing

through the altering of postmodernity).
have

to be

restrictive

or destructive.

the postmodern
too has passed

Still, this altering does not
The

altering

caused

I2
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by

postmodernism should result in more not less—more ways of writing,
more ways of creating practice and play, more ways of making
connections, and more ways of negotiating the academic, cultural,
p o litica l,

and

e th ic a l

c h a lle n g e s

of

to d a y 's

classro o m s.

Acknowledging the failure of subject-centered rationality does not
necessitate

nihilism

or

relativism

nor

does

destruction of all notions of truth or justice.

it

necessitate

the

Instead, it represents

the need to enter a relationship of respectful listening when trying to
forge a relationship, a politics, an ethics, or a history of self to other.
The

influence of postmodernity

could be the celebration

of the

failure of the Enlightenment and of modernism to banish, destroy, or
assimilate the incommensurability of the other.
Before I turn to the first chapter though, I feel compelled to
make a small
wrestled,

digression.

painfully

at

critique of that tradition.

A devoted

times,

with

liberal

humanist,

postm odernism 's

I have

devastating

In this struggle I have not been alone.

For

many the theories of postmodernity represent a persuasive body of
knowledge but also a serious threat to hard won advances in human
rights,

academic

freedom,

humanist principles.

the

rule

of law,

and

other

"sacred"

This dissertation represents my attempt to ally

my own and others' fears concerning the worth of the postmodern
project for the teaching of writing and the writing of social change.

I

still deeply believe in concepts such as truth, subjectivity, human
rights, history, and the importance of the relationship of words to
things and actions.

I have merely come to believe that truth is

negotiated within historical and institutional moments, that subjects
who write are also written, that history is often written

13
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by the

winners, and that discursive signs are unstable and institutionally
specific.
More importantly, I have come to learn that I will not and
cannot sacrifice a vision of a better world simply because it has
become theoretically difficult to justify notions of progress, justice,
and

universal human rights.

My response

to

the

most radical

postmodernists, trapped as they are in a world of discursive illusions,
is that they do not understand that language does not determine the
experience of the world but constitutes it; that other things, often
more

important things

such

as the body,

language to neatly package experience.

rupture

the

ability

of

As Elaine Scarry argues in

The Body in Pain, "physical pain does not simply resist language but
actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a state
anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes
before language is learned" (4).

It is these things which radical

postmodernism often tries to "flick" away—the story of those who
cannot

argue using

parts

of

the worth o f good will

in

attempting to construct universal justice—that I will try to recover.

I

end my introduction, therefore, with a poem by Allen Ginsberg.

I

experience

the technology

that overwhelm

language,

of the present,

think that sometimes in our discussions of power,

the

language, and

politics we forget the responsibility, the necessity, of love.

We forget

that in our relationships with others the burden is not only political,
economical, and pedagogical but emotional.

We must, in some sense,

love those whom we would teach, argue with, and live amongst.

For

in

our

that

love

it

is

im possible

to

remove

hum anity

and

responsibility to it.

14
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The weight o f the world
is love.
U nder the burden
o f solitude,
under the burden
o f dissatisfaction
the weight
the weight we carry
is love
Who can deny?
In dreams
it touches
the body,
in thought
c o n stru c ts
a miracle,
in im agination
a n g u ish es
till born
in h um a n —
looks out of the heart
burning with p u rity —
for the burden of life
is love,
but we carry the weight
w e a r i ly
and so must rest
in the arms o f love
at last,
must rest in the arms of love.
No rest
without love,
no sleep
w ithout dreams
o f love—
be mad or chill
obsessed with angels
or machines,
the final wish
is love
—cannot be bitter,
cannot deny,
can n o t w ithhold
if denied:
the weight is too heavy
—must give

I5
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for

no

return
as thought
is given
in solitude
in all the excellence
of its excess.
The warm bodies
shine together
in the darkness,
the hand moves
to the center
o f the flesh,
the skin trembles
in happiness
and the soul comes
joyful to the eye—
yes. yes,
that's what
I wanted,
I always wanted,
I always wanted.
to return
to the body
where I was born.
SanJose, 1954
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INTRODUCTION NOTES
1. See Bizzell’s "Marxist Ideas in Composition Studies" pages 55-57 and 67-68 for
a further discussion o f how Jameson attempts to maintain both a classical
Marxist hope for the future and a postmodern sensibility o f the present.
2. Lyotard admits in J u st G am ing that his "justice of multiplicity" (100) rests on
the c o n tra d ic tio n
o f a u n iv e rs a l
p rin c ip le
that la n g u a g e
gam es
are
incommensurable and singular.
In effect, he admits that his theory against
meta-narratives rests on a meta-narrative.
This contradiction, however, does
not bother him because it is itself emblematic o f the postmodern c o n d itio n living with frag m en tatio n and con tra d ictio n without feeling the need to
assim ilate it.
He argues that postm odernism "refines o u r sen sitivity to
differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incom m ensurable.
Its
principle is not the ex p ert’s homology, but the inventor’s p a ra lo g y ” ( T h e
Postmodern Condition x x v ).
3.
Though c o m p o s itio n often uses po stm o d e rn ism
s y n o n y m o u s ly
for
p o s ts tru c tu ra lis m
and p o s tc o lo n ia lis m , I recognize that th e re
are key
differences among these terms.
Yet because of current parlance and the
legitimacy o f seeing postm odernism , in its broadest sense, as a critique of
modernism in which both poststructuralism and postcolonialism participate. I
feel comfortable in using the quotations o f these authors to discuss the larger
phenomenon o f postmodernism.
See Kwame Anthony A ppiah’s "Is the Post-in
Postm odernism the Post-in P ostco lo nial?" for a discussion o f differences
between the two terms.
4.
5.

See James Berlin’s Rhetorics. Poetics, and Culture page 64.
See Jurgen Habermas' "Modernity—An Incomplete Project."
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C H A PTER I

STRANGE BEDFELLO W S?: CO M PO SITIO N A N D
PO STM O DERNITY

Critics o f postmodernism are
fond o f pointing out the disparities of
usage in the term and that any concept of postmodernism is itself
contradictory.
Both caveats should be kept in mind. There is no way
o f w o rk in g quickly
th ro u g h
th e c o n tra d ic tio n s
d escrib e d
in
discussions o f postmodernity
as a cultural condition.
Indeed, the
assertion that there is no satisfactory definition o f postm odernism is
a positive expression of postmodernism.
When it can be defined, the
provocativeness o f postmodernism will have long since ended.
Lester Faigiey Fragm ents o f R a tionality
The shepherd, qua shepherd,
acts for the good of the sheep, to
protect them from discomfiture and harm.
But he may be identified
with a project that is raising the sheep for market.
—Kenneth Burke
Rhetoric

If
complex,

the

larger

then

relation ship

culture’s

the specific
to

relationship

cultural

postm odernism

is

site
even

to

postm odernism

of composition
more

so.

and

is
its

Indeed,

composition's relationship to postmodernity may be more convoluted
than any other discipline's relationship given our intimacy with that
most postmodern nexus of language/writing/self.

In response to this

complexity composition has developed multiple ways of defining its
relationship with postmodernity—each with distinct ramifications for
how useful the theories of postmodernity can be for solving the
dilemmas of our field.

In general, composition seems to have defined

five ways of using or relating to postmodernism:

epistemological,

cultural, utilitarian, radical, and adversarial.

I 8
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The

first

way

of

understanding

postmodernism

and

its

relationship to composition is encapsulated nicely by Lester Faigiey.
In Fragments o f Rationality Faigiey argues that "The disruptions of
postmodern

theory

that

have

caused

major

upheavals

in

other

disciplines in the humanities and interpretative social sciences have
had far less effect on composition studies" (xi).

Faigiey explains this

lack of upheaval by pointing to "the conservatism of composition
studies in the face of postmodern theory" (xi).

Composition as a

discipline, according to Faigiey, has been reluctant to surrender its
modernist "belief in the writer as an autonomous self" (15).

This

reluctance has caused composition to lag far behind other fields in
reaping

the

epistem ological

postmodern theory.

and

p edag og ical

challenges

Faigiey is, therefore, "ambivalent about claims

that we have entered an era of postmodernity" (21).
believes

that

of

"while composition studies

Instead he

is concurrent with

some

characterizations of an era of postmodernity, it has by and large
resisted the fragmentary and chaotic currents of postmodernity" (xi).
For Faigiey, then, postmodernism is a theory that composition
teachers and scholars must appropriate and apply to their research
and teaching, even if they have lagged behind their colleagues in the
social sciences and humanities in doing so.

Postmodernism is seen as

something outside composition, something that "coincides" with it,
but that can only be fully incorporated into composition through a
shift in composition's epistemological assumptions.
continues

to refuse

If composition

to surrender its belief in the writer as

an

autonomous self, then postmodernism will continue to have only a
marginal effect on teaching, evaluation, and research.

Much like
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Stephen North's

view of composition as a discipline

marked by

incompatible research communities due to different epistemological
assu m p tio n s,

F a ig le y 's

p o stm o d ern ism

r e p r e s e n ts

an o th er

incompatible epistemology that must compete with already existing
composition epistemologies.
But other theorists, most notably Louise Weatherbee Phelps.
Patricia

Harkin,

John

Schilb,

and

Susan

M iller,

contend

that

composition studies is always already postmodern, is already and has
always been "fragmented" in the ways Faigley's metaphor suggests.
For these theorists postmodernism is a cultural condition in which we
live and not a theory that we apply.

Phelps, for example, introduces

her book Composition as a Human Science with the observation that
"composition awakens in the initial moment of its disciplinary project
to

find itself already

cultural

field

situated,

prereflectively,

within

of meaning—that

of postmodern

thought,

characteristic preoccupations and world vision" (3).
to

Foucault,

claims

that

composition

studies

a specific
with

its

Harkin, alluding
is

more

properly

understood as "post-disciplinary," a cultural practice rather than a
discipline or even an interdisciplinary field of inquiry and teaching
(“The

Postdisciplinary"

Harkin, argues

that

126).

"the

comprises diverse topics

field

not

a

theory

that

[of composition

and methods and has

disciplines"("Cultural Studies"
is

And Schilb, while not going as far as
studies]
ties

currently

to numerous

176).' For Phelps et al, postmodernism

composition

teachers

and

scholars

must

appropriate but an intellectual movement in which they have always
already participated (albeit with varying degrees of awareness) by
virtue of composition's subject(s). so that composition is leading the
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way

for

postmodern

inquiry

and

teaching

in

other

academic

disciplines.
Postmodernism is not "out there," not a theoretical abstraction
to

explain our condition;

postm odernism
practices,

has

therefore,

it is our

condition.

not resulted

in

The reason why

acknow ledged

classroom

is not because we cling to a previous

and

incompatible epistemology, as Faigiey contends, but because we need
to

make explicit

a condition that wealready implicitly live.

The

problem of turning theory into practice is not one of translation but
of awareness.

Thus, despite Faigley's ambivalence, composition's

multiplicity of research methods and methodologies, epistemologies.
and practitioners are themselves manifestations of postmodernity.
A

third

view,

or

in this

case

I should

postmodernism, began

with theorists like Kenneth

LeFevre

Bazerman

and Charles

and

culminated

stress

use.

Bruffee,

of

Karen

in the work of

theorists like Patricia Bizzell, John Trimbur, John Clifford, and James
Berlin.

These theorists employed and employ, to varying degrees,

aspects

of

postmodern

theory

to

critique

previous

composition

epistemologies and rhetorics in order, ultimately, to advance more
ideologically "enlightened" ones.

In the late 70's and early 80's

Bruffee, influenced by the work of Richard Rorty, Thomas Kuhn, and
Clifford Geertz, developed a pedagogy of "collaborative learning" for
viewing

and

teaching

writing

as

socially

negotiated

knowledge.

Rather than seeing writing as the individual act of an autonomous
self, Bruffee attempts to locate writing and the self within Rorty's
normal

and

abnormal

discourses.

He

argues

that

"entities

we

normally call reality, knowledge, thought, facts, texts, selves, and so

2I
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on are constructs generated by communities of like-minded peers”
("Social Construction" 774).

Crucial to Bruffee’s pedagogy of writing,

therefore, are the ideas of community and collaboration as ways of
forming consensus and writing critique.
Karen LeFevre, influenced by George Herbert Mead, continues
this line of reasoning by arguing that invention itself is a social act.
the

"symbolic interactions of a group of people" (I n v e n t i o n

I).

LeFevre believes that too many theorists, influenced by Plato, see
invention "as the private act of an individual writer" (I).

While

LeFevre acknowledges the usefulness of this view for encouraging
self

expression

and

self-confidence

in

writers,

she

nonetheless

maintaines that it sketches "an incomplete picture of what happens
when writers invent, and it may unduly constrain the development
of processes of invention"

(l).2

Teaching writing, according

to

LeFevre, is not merely a matter of allowing an innate self to speak or
of developing mental models for problem-solving but of a communal
negotiation of social spaces.3

Hence, community and collaboration

are once again of crucial importance.
These
postmodern
discrete

early

social

in that

individual

they

constructionist

pedagogies

down-play

romantic

notion

of

"communitarian

notion

of the

and advance

a

the

would

seem
the

subject . . . [located] in terms of the shared discursive practices of a
community"

(Faigiey

17).

However,

postmodernism

"works

unravel existing categories rather than to reify them" (17).
social constructionists restrict

their use of postmodernism

to

These
to the

discursive yet shared nature of language, knowledge, and writing.
They explode the romantic and cognitive conceptions of individuality
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but replace it with an equally idealistic shared community, ignoring
the more disruptive and power laden aspects of postmodern theory.
In

short,

their

theories

of

writing

slight

the

more

contested,

conflicted, and competing aspects of the writing classroom.

It is an

ideal use of postmodernism that does not remain unchallenged for
long.
The best critique of the early social constructionist ideas of
community and writing is made by Joseph Harris.
more

disruptive

elements

of

Influenced by the

postmodernism,

Harris

argues

that

"recent theories have tended to invoke the idea of community in
ways at once sweeping and vague:

positing discursive utopias that

direct and determine the writings of their members, yet failing to
state the operating rules or boundaries of these communities" ("The
Idea"

12).

In essence,

Harris

believes

that

social

construction

theories conflate the idea of a linguistic speech community (speakers
in close

geographical

location)

with

the

idea of an interpretive

community from literary theory (diverse readers
ideas

concerning

texts).

As

Lester Faigiey

linked by shared

further argues,

this

conflation results in "the uncritical use of community for suppressing
the conflicts that exist within any social group."

It is a "holistic and

closed notion of community [that] encourages a simplified view of a
discursive
multiple
minimal."

field,

where

discourses
Further,

that

the

influences

one

of

encounters

the
in

contradictory
everyday

life

and
are

the social constructionist "subject becomes a

participant within a language game on a contained field of play.
Postmodern theory, on the other hand, would situate the subject

23
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among many competing discourses that precede the subject” (22627).
Into the space opened by this critique will walk the critical
democracy pedagogy

of such

theorists as James

Bizzell, John Clifford, and John Trimbur.

Berlin,

Patricia

They will keep the ideas of

community and subject but stress their ideological, competing, and
even contradictory

natures.

Rather than trying

to erase

social

differences, these theorists want "Representation of any kind . . .

to

be viewed as implicated in social and political relations" of power
(Faigiey 15).

As John Clifford argues, "Our beliefs about rhetoric,

finally, do not originate in an authentic, voiced consciousness: do not
exist primarily in enlightened cognition; and are certainly not the
cumulative result of consensual, transcendent scholarship, research,
and intellectual will" ("The Subject" 51).

However, the inescapability

of power does not mean that critical democracy theorists see all
ideologies and structures of power as equally just.

Indeed, they see

the classroom as a place to aggressively reform the social inequities
caused by the larger culture's unjust structures and applications of
power.

What teachers must do in classrooms is "the intellectual

work" they "know best:

helping students to read and write and think

in ways that both resist domination and exploitation and encourage
self consciousness about who they are and can be in the social world"
(Clifford 51).
Consequently, these theorists borrow ideas from Paul de Man,
Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser, and others to advance a socioideological and rhetorical view of the individual, the act of writing,
and the purpose of the writing classroom.

It is a view, they feel.
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previous

rhetorics

have

ignored

reasons"

(Clifford

51).

For

"For

example,

perhaps

obvious

Berlin

argues

political
that

the

"expressionist" rhetoric of theorists like Donald Murray and Peter
Elbow "is inherently and debilitatingly divisive of political interest
. . . .

[and] easily co-opted by the very capitalist forces it opposes"

("Rhetoric" 491).

Patricia Bizzell criticizes the "inner directed,"

cognitive

rhetoric

of Flower and

directed"

rhetoric

of theorists

Hayes as slighting

who

maintain

that

the

"outer

"thinking

and

language use can never occur free of a social context that conditions
them" ("Cognition" 217).

Difficulties in writing, Bizzell argues, should

not be seen as signs of cognitive deficiencies but "as difficulties with
joining an unfamiliar discourse community" (227).4

She believes, in

essence, that cognitive rhetoric, to the detriment of the students,
dismisses the ideological why of how students must write.

Hence, in

her later work she argues that "We must help our students . . .

to

engage in a rhetorical process that can collectively generate . . .
knowledge and beliefs to displace the repressive ideologies an unjust
social order would prescribe" ("Beyond" 670).

Finally, John Trimbur.

influenced by Jurgen Habermas and Jean-Francois Lyotard, criticizes
the social constructionist rhetoric of Bruffee as relying too heavily on
consensus.

For Trimbur collaborative learning can only effectively

locate students within social

structures by holding a rhetoric of

consensus in dialectic tension with a rhetoric of dissensus.

Only then

can consensus "be a powerful instrument for students to generate
differences, to identity the systems of authority that organize these
differences, and to transform the relations of power that determine
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who

may

speak

and

what

counts

as

a

meaningful

statement"

("Consensus" 603).5
These critical democracy theorists, then, use postmodernism to
construct writing courses as places for open ideological

conflict,

critique of the dominant culture, and as potential sites for liberation
from that unjust culture.

Previous rhetorics are not criticized for

being ineffectual at the teaching of writing but for not fulfilling the
potential of the classroom as a place, in the spirit of Paulo Freire. for
social reformation.

They are, therefore, more postmodern in that

they embrace the more disruptive aspects of postmodern theory and
have a more ideological and discursive understanding of the subject,
but they

break with postmodernism

and rational pedagogy.

by retaining an authoritative

Postmodernism is used as a way o f turning

the writing classroom into a site for reasoned, critical, participatory
dem ocracy.
Consequently, these critics will soon find their own use of
postmodernism

the

postmodern theorists.

subject

of

criticism

by

even

more

radical

For theorists like Thomas Kent and Victor

Vitanza, the very "notion of 'participation' itself becomes problematic
in its implication that the subject can control its location and moves
within a discourse" (Faigiey 227).
radical

aspects

of

These theorists stress the more

postm odernity—sheer

heterogeneity,

continual

flux, anti-pedagogy, anti-rationality—that theorists like Berlin back
away from.

For example, in Paralogic Rhetoric:

C om m unicative

Interaction,

Thomas

Kent,

A

Theory of

influenced by

Donald

Davidson, rejects expressivist, cognitivist, social constructionist, and
critical democracy pedagogies on the grounds that they all construct
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the mind and external reality as separate entities by creating a gap
in which interpretation stops and advocacy begins.

Instead. Kent,

like Rorty, believes that "interpretation goes all the way down" ("The
Hope" 427).

Interpretation does not stop.

There is no space outside

the flow of interpretation from which we can critique its rules of
behavior or advocate new ones.

Thus, any rules we find through

interpretation are only authentic and applicable to the immediate
situation.

But the other theorists, according to Kent, do not see this

inescapability.

Instead, they create a Cartesian gap and then attempt

to negotiate this gap through mediating structures such as universal
forms

or

experiences,

cognitive

processes,

the

discursive communities, or enlightened ideologies.

conventions

of

However, these

mediating structures ultimately disable our mind's effort to make
contact with other minds; we cannot bridge the gap because the
structures

themselves

are

in

the

way.

Hence,

these

theorists

condemn us, according to Kent, to live either in a state of unrelenting
subjectivity and/or a mode of colonization of the other.
Indeed, Kent finds it hypocritical and authoritarian, as Vitanza
does, to argue that all teaching and writing is ideological and then to
privilege

writing

that

defies

the

"unjust

social

o rder"—two

determinations, the privileging and the unjust order, that themselves
would have to be the product of ideology.

Any critique of ideology is

merely another interpretation based on a cultural situatedness that
is also understood through interpretation.

Therefore, any pedagogy

that pretends to be more than that, more just or more ethical, is for
Kent, as it was for Nietzsche, the imposition of the ideology of the
powerful on the weak.

Kent rejects these dualistic models in favor of
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seeing communication as a triangulated process

in which people

enter a conversation based not on shared discursive practices but on
shared sensory impressions.

We communicate by using the "data" of

the sensory impression to try and guess what is in the mind of the
other person.

This guessing game does not ensure communication,

but it offers the hope of communication.

How well we communicate

depends on how well we guess and how open we are to listening to
the reactions provided by the other.

Kent "jettisons" both language

and discourse community, as these are currently

understood,

but

keeps rhetoric as a practice, a form of play, that also interprets all
the way down and so forces us to remain in the immediacy of the
moment.
Kent's theory has radical implications
evaluating of writing.

for the teaching and

Neither writing nor any other communication

process can be taught because there are no rules to teach.
guessing game is paralogical rather than logical.

The

Indeed, Kent's

critique of other rhetorics is that they all try to follow some form of
preexisting

rules,

be they transcendent,

cognitive,

discursive,

or

ideological, and so block out the hope of communication and impose
the terror of abstraction.

Further, evaluating

minefield of potential oppression.

writing becomes a

Since we cannot apply preexisting

rules, we must search for them dialogically with the student and the
text.

We must simply be as open and present to the immediate

situation as we can be.

We can only practice and play together and

hope to communicate.
However, as radical as Kent’s postmodern theory is for the
teaching of composition, Victor Vitanza, influenced by Lyotard, is
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perhaps the most radical of all current theorists.

As Faigiey says.

"Vitanza finds a great reluctance among composition

theorists to

acknowledge the radical questioning and deferral of a course of
action

in

postmodern

theory.

He

places

nearly

everyone

in

composition, ranging from Berlin to Flower, in the same leaky boat of
modernism" (244 n. 8).

In other words, Vitanza thinks we make the

mistake of desiring and enacting closure based on reason.
problems of our classrooms are largely self-imposed
refusal to give up reason—be it individual or social.

Thus, the

through our

For example, he

writes that "Berlin is never suspicious enough; for he never simply
’drifts' far enough" ("Three"

142).

Berlin still tries to use reason,

albeit a social reason, to guide actions and determine outcomes.
Vitanza sees Berlin as having merely shifted the site terror off the
individual and onto the social and ideological.
Vitanza

suspects

as

"both

dangerously

It is a move that

utopian

and

blindly

ideological, it is, as Stanley Fish says, 'nothing more or less than a
reinvention of foundationalism'" (143).

Therefore, Vitanza rejects

"'rational' thinking and acting, especially about language."

He feels

that it "only further remystifies and disempowers students and us
all...Why? Because as Lyotard says, 'Reason and power are one and
the same thing.

You may disguise the one with dialectics . . . .

you will still have the other in all its crudeness:

jails, taboos, public

weal, selection, genocide"’ (qtd. in Vitanza 142).
agrees with "Berlin and Company"

but

Although Vitanza

in being "against founding a

pedagogy on capitalism," he is "still unequivocally contra to these
social-consensual

theory-hopeful

rationalists,

who

through
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social

reengineering and instrumental reason . . . want to cure society and
make the world into a great, good place" (143).6
Thus, these radical postmodern theorists would eliminate both
the

validity

of

rational

pedagogy

and

the

desire

reformation--at least as these are usually conceived.
what Vitanza calls "pedagogy hope":

for

social

They abandon

the belief that we can construct

a pedagogy in theory that will not brutalize our students in practice
(143).

Instead,

heterogeneity,

they

sheer

want

our

difference,

classrooms
and

to

stress

radical

continuous

play.

They

encourage us not to fall into the "traps" of skills, self-expression,
cognitive

processes,

or social

causes

but to simply drift

in the

classroom as a means of "finding" new ways of writing tied to the
imm ediacy

of

the

situation

and

the

irreducibile

difference

of

s tu d e n ts.
These theorists have, as I have written, the most radical view
of composition's relationship to postmodernity, and this radicalism
helps explain why, as Faigiey argues, so many composition theorists
are frustrated with postmodern theory.

He writes:

By divorcing the subject from prevailing notions of the individual,
e i th e r
the
freely
ch o o s in g
in d iv id u a l
o f c a p ita lis m
or
the
interpellated individual of A lthusserian Marxism, postmodern theory
understands subjectivity as h etero g en eo u s and constantly in flux.
The present frustration of those who have followed the course of
theory . . . —those who have used notions o f community as a critique
o f the autonomous individual, but then have had these notion of
community unravel into complex sets o f power relations—is where to
locate agency in a postmodern subjectivity.
(227)

For Vitanza the desire for rational agency, individual or communal, is
itself part of the problem.

It represents composition's inability to

differ a course of action.
Vitanza's

drifting

sounds like

Yet
his

for many other compositionists.
own

form of hegemony.
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As

Friedman says of the poststructuralists, Vitanza has "made taboo . . .
terms . . . such as self, author, work, experience, expression, meaning,
authority,

origin, and reference" ("Post/Post structural" 473).

This

tainting of so many important terms helps to explain the resistance
so many compositionists have towards radical postmodern theory.
seems to take away the very

It

things that give us authority, purpose,

and hope and so helps to explain why the final way composition
constructs its relationship to postmodernity is adversarial.
Some have conceptualized the relationship of composition to
postmodernism

not as useful, problematic, or

dangerous and bogus, as the
literary theory.

composition studies by

Maxine Hairston e n c a p su la te s this argument with

the most feeling.
C o n n e c tio n s ,"

colonization of

even frustrating but as

In "Breaking Our B onds and Reaffirming Our

H a irsto n

warns

c o m p o s it io n

teach ers

about

"politically active literary critics . . . 'full of p a ssio n a te intensity'"

(276).

To Hairston these critics represent an "intimate enemy."

The

incorporation of their postmodern theory would turn the classroom
from a student-centered, low risk, safe place for exploring writing
"into a forum for debate on social issues" ("Required Writing" Bl).

It

would harm composition's authority, according to Hairston, to decide
for itself what students need in order to write and think critically—
critically being defined outside the domain of ideology.
force

us

understand
chastises

to
or

share

our

appreciate

com positionists

classrooms
writing
who

with

theorists

process.

bring

in

who

Hairston,

"the

magic

It would
do

not

therefore,
names"

of

postmodern literary theory in order to "signal that they have not
abandoned

the

faith"

("Breaking"

274).

Instead,

according
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to

Hairston, they have abandoned their own discipline and surrendered
their students’ educations to the "academic elite."

"If we are going to

hold our own against them," Hairston writes, then we must "rally our
forces against"

their influence ("Breaking" 277).

Ironically,

like

Vitanza, but for diametrically opposed reasons, Hairston also sees
many of compositions' current problems as stemming from our own
inability

to trust

incorporated

into

ourselves

and

composition

our students,

studies

and

something

from

that

having

does

not

belong.
I do not share Hairston's view of literary theory as the enemy:
I do not see the philosophers of postmodernity as belonging solely to
literary studies in the first place.
over

what

postmodern

theory,

However, I do share her concern
as

it

has

manifested

itself

in

composition, is doing to the teaching of writing or, more specifically,
to writing teachers.

With the exception of the cultural position, the

positions I have outlined do not, in my opinion, present postmodern
theory

as

a

practitioners.

very

attractive

Practitioners,

body

according

of
to

w ork —especially
Stephen

North,

for
are

interested in practice, in what writing does, in techniques, in what he
calls lore:

"the accumulated body of traditions, practices, and beliefs

in terms of which
learned and taught"
include:

Practitioners understand how writing is done,
(The

Making 22).

Some of these traditions

workshops, journals, the valuing of voice and revision,

exploration and discovery, authenticity and community, clarity, and
getting the job done.

Practitioners have a strong sense of community

and of writing as a way to resist dehumanizing structures of power.
All these characteristics add up to a pragmatic ethos that not only
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doesn't mind contradiction but thrives on it.

"Literally anything."

North writes, "can become part of lore," and "nothing can ever be
dropped

from

it

therefore, with

either" (24). Practitioners
hard and

are

not concerned,

fast rules or with theoretical abstractions,

and they dislike rigidity.
Some of these characteristics, obviously, would seem open to
or,

if Phelps

sensibility

is right,

that

reflective of a postmodern

would run

counter to

sensibility,

much

of

postmodernism has been presented to practitioners.
critical

democracy

postmodernism
classroom;

theorists

offer

that discredits

radical

theorists

practitioners

much
offer

of

what

teachers

the

way

For example,
an

authoritarian

they do
a

a

dense,

in

the

jarg o n y

postmodernism that rejects many things—authorship, self expression,
authentic

voice,

intention,

meaning—that

practitioners

hold

dear:

adversarial theorists offer practitioners a postmodernism that they
should

fear

postmodernism

and

avoid; and
that, if the

theorists like
practitioners

supposedly foreign to their constitution.
have

outlined

either

use

parts

of

Faigiey

refuse

to

present
change,

a
is

In short, the theorists I
postmodernism

to

advance

authoritarian classroom practices, reject postmodernism outright and
so leave practitioners defenseless to its critique and bereft of its
potential, or wallow

in a kind of postmodernism that does

not

recognize the current situation as one of trying to pick up rather than
play with the pieces of the deconstructed universe.

None of these

views, in other words, make postmodernism seem a very credible or
useful body of knowledge for teachers who want the classroom to be
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student-centered, craft based, socially critical, and process oriented
all at the same time.
Indeed, of all the positions I have outlined, only Phelps et al's
com es

close

to

acknowledges,

at

knowledge.
which

presenting
least

postm odernism

implicitly,

importance

a

way

that

of

practioner

Presenting postmodernism as a cultural condition

we

have

always

already

participated

legitimacy to practioner methods.
already

the

in

After all,

gives

in

immediate

if we have always

been postmodern, then practioner knowledge as the

first

way of making knowledge in our field would reflect an intimacy with
postm odernism

rather

than

an

incom patibility—an

intim acy

of

practice that most of the acknowledged postmodern pedagogies lack.
Therefore,

Phelps

et

al's

position

forces

the

lettered

class

of

composition to reevaluate the postmodern potential and complexity
of what composition teachers have always already been doing in the
classroom.

Instead of dismissing practioner knowledge as naive,

co nserv ative,

or

devoid

of

political

co nscio usness,

Phelps'

postmodernism forces us to reconsider practitioners as the field’s
first postmodern teachers.7
However,

I think that we must now acknowledge

that the

cultural condition of which Phelps writes has changed in character.
This historical moment suggests
th a t
a f te r
n e a rly
two
decades
o f the
g ro w in g
pow er
of
poststructuralist theory as the most
authoritative and prestigious
discourse o f the profession, this d ev elo ping hegem ony is being
called into question by a wide range o f c ritic s —from those who
advocate a return to an ideal realm o f canonical classics and fixed
meaning; to those who attack intellectual elitism and exclusionary
pow er relations endem ic in the sheer difficulty o f poststructuralist
discourses: to those who insist that what Barbara Christian calls "the
race for theory" involves a retreat from the insistent and grow ing
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presence o f women, people o f color, and Third world people on the
literary
and c ritic a l scen e; and to th o se w riting w i t h i n a
p o s ts tr u c t u r a lis t
fram e w o rk
who
are
in c re a s in g ly
c r itic a l
of
p o ststru ctu ralism 's tendency tow ard ahistoricism , indifference, and
disengagement on the one hand and. on the other hand, to totalizing
orthodoxies and master-disciple psychodynamics.
(Friedman 466)

Therefore,

we

cannot merely

postmodern condition.

claim

that

composition

inhabits

a

We must define what that condition is, the

impact it has on practice, what we agree and disagree with in the
condition,

and

how

the

especially

for practitioners

condition
who

changes

have

been

and

has

changed—

locked out

of

debates on what postmodernism is and what it is worth.

most

In short,

postmodernism as a theory of our cultural condition is too vague to
win

over and empower composition's

practitioners.

As

Patricia

Harkin argues, "we need to have models of knowledge productionconcrete accounts of proposed changes

in institutional procedures

that tell us what kind of knowledges teachers make, how they make
it, and why it should count" ("The Postdisciplinary" 125).
p ractitio n ers

to

a

vague

con d itio n

of

To assign

postm odernity

only

disempowers them further by removing them from the details and
debates over that condition that gives it meaning and practical force.
For example, for Friedman the postmodern condition, or in this case
the more specific postmodern manifestation of poststructuralism, has
itself become a hegemonic "orthodoxy" that we should regard with
suspicion due to its lack of commitment to social causes, yet which
has

forever changed notions of self, agency, and community.

hardly

think

that

a

postm odern

hegem ony

is

the

kind

I
of

postmodernism with which practitioners would like to be associated.
But

they

may

postmodernism.

want

to

be

associated

with

Friedman’s

post

We must now, therefore, neither reject or accept
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postmodernism but rather work to understand how it has constituted
our view of writing, the benefits and limitations of that view, and
how our historical moment has changed that constitutive effect.

We

must be willing to update the "specific cultural field of meaning" in
light of the situations in which we now find ourselves.
If so updated, we could use postmodernism to create a frame
that would be attractive to practitioners and helpful for solving or at
least

enriching

problems:

our

understanding

o f composition's

most

vexing

student resistance, the introduction of politics into the

classroom, the recapturing of history, and perhaps most importantly,
why composition practitioners resist a body of thought in which they
may already be participants—at least when it comes to practice.

For

despite all the well known theorists in composition who have written
volumes on the postmodern condition, little awareness of it. except
perhaps as something hostile, has filtered down to the composition
classroom, to the hallway discussions among teachers at conferences,
or to the lives of our students.

In this regard, I think Faigley’s view

of composition’s relationship to postmodernism has some validity.
Composition practitioners have, by and large, resisted the influence
of postmodernism.

However, they have resisted it not because of a

modernist sensibility but because of the way postmodern theory was
introduced into composition studies, the way postmodern theory is
written, and the way postmodern theory problematizes the notion of
agency.

These "ways" have robbed composition of practioner input

in discussions on postmodern theory.

It is to these issues, therefore.

I would now like to turn.
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T he

A rrogan ce

of

P ostm od ern

T h eo r y

Henry Louis Gates Jr. once commented that while he did not
"deny the importance, on the level of theory, of the [postmodern]
project," such a project did not help him when he was "trying to get a
taxi on the corner of 125th and Lenox Avenue" (L oose

Canons 37-

3 8 ). The project lacked what Gates called "practical performative
force."

I believe Gates' observation echoes the current relationship of

composition's practitioners to postmodernism.

Postmodernism has

not persuaded them nor have its advocates worked very hard to do
so.

Postmodernism has remained a largely elitist and theoretical

pursuit by tenured professors at large institutions.

It has captured

the minds and works of many of our best theorists, but an awareness
of its potential usefulness has not penetrated into the hearts of our
classrooms, teachers,
penetration

is

the

or students.
divisive

and

One

reason

for this lack of

condescending

way

in

which

postmodern theory was introduced into composition studies.
As I've already written, in the early eighties the theories of
Clifford Geertz, Thomas Kuhn, and Richard Rorty became widely
influential

in composition

studies

LeFevre, Bazerman, and others.

through

the

work of Bruffee,

These theorists used "postmodern"

figures to help solidify the social turn of process theory, but, more
importantly,

they opened

the way

applications of postmodern theory.

for more

radical and critical

One of the

first and most

influential of these applications was James Berlin’s "Rhetoric and
Ideology in the Writing Class."

In it Berlin criticizes Linda Flower's

problem-solving rhetoric as "the rationalization of economic activity.
The pursuit of self-evident and unquestioned goals in the composing
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process parallels the pursuit of self-evident and unquestioned profitmaking goals in the market place."8

Then, as I've already discussed.

Berlin criticizes Peter Elbow’s and Donald Murray's "expressionist"
pedagogy as "inherently and debilitating divisive of political protest .
. . . [and] easily co-opted by the very capitalist forces it opposes.
After all, this rhetoric can be used to reinforce the entrepreneurial
virtues capitalism values most:

individualism, private initiative, the

confidence for risk taking, the right to be contentious with authority
(especially the state)" (491).

As can be imagined, Berlin's article

caused quite a lot of controversy but also quite a lot of anger.
Besides

attacking

beloved

composition

figures

and

practices,

he

privileged his own work as somehow not paralleling the capitalist
structure—a claim I find rather dubious.9

Further, his charge that

expressionist and cognitivist rhetoric supported the fragmenting and
dehumanizing forces of capitalism did not sit well with a number of
composition practitioners/theorists.

For example,

Maxine

Hairston

called his paralleling of expressionist and cognitive rhetoric with the
forces of capitalism "a facile non-Iogical leap" ("Diversity" 25), and
Donald Stewart countered charges against expressivism with charges
that

collaboration

can

lead

to

conform ity

and

totalitarianism .

Unchecked, Stewart argued, collaboration leads to "the police state,
the group mentality to the point at which it eliminates 'non-social'
types as the Jews in Nazi Germany" ("Collaborative" 7 4 ).10
Whether Berlin was right or wrong, and I happen to think his
reading of Murray and Elbow
tone

for

how

com position

postmodern

theorists.

is reductive,11 his argument set the

theory

Further,

was
it

to

be

marked the

used

by

many

way

in

which
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postmodern theory was to be seen by many composition teachers—as
an

unnecessarily

practitioners

and

hostile

ca ricatu re

practices,

as

of

beloved

representing

the

com position
interests

and

authority of the tenure-line, intelligentsia of composition over the
interests and authority of the "workers in the trenches," and, perhaps
most damaging, as having little to do with how the process classroom
is run, how process writing is taught, and how process teachers relate
to students.

In short, postmodernism was seen or felt as the final

colonization of composition by a newmly minted class of Ph.D.’s,
scholars,

and

researchers,

a

process

that

had

begun

with

the

displacement of practioner authority in the 1960's.12
And Berlin wasn't the only one to use postmodern theory in
such a divisive way.

Some of the harshest criticism of process

teachers came within a few years span of Berlin's article.

For

example, in "The Silenced Dialogue" (1988), Lisa Delpit accuses child
centered,

low-risk,

process-oriented

instructors of sustaining

both

classism and racism by keeping the rules and conventions of writing
instruction

im plicit—thereby

privileging

the

middle

conventions represent.

class

mystifying
situatedness

In Textual

and

at

which

the
those

same

time

rules

and

Carnivals (1991) Susan Miller

argues that "teaching process for its own sake" promotes "as an
article of faith that he or she [the student] is 'independent' and 'free'
to choose within the controls the society establishes" (89).

Miller

believes that students are never so free, and to act as if they are
places students in "an infantile and solipsistic relation to the results
of writing" (100).

Miller further accuses process teachers of making

composition the replacement for literature studies as the dominant

39

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

culture’s mechanism of ideological

reproduction.

Process

theory.

Miller believes, severs writing from the sites in which it is produced,
understood, and critiqued.

She writes:

It is tem pting to infer that contem porary composition has gone
literature one better in creating the sensitivity for its own sake that
literary studies has required of students.
It has, that is.
removed a
can o n o f ideolo gically jo in e d w o rk s that instill e th n o c e n tric ,
logocentric, or any other congruent set o f values and has substituted
for them an almost entirely form alistic and intransitive vision of
writing.
(97-98)

Once

again process teachers are accused of masking preexisting

conditions of power and authority to the detriment of the students.
Regardless

of

the

worth

of

these

arguments,

and

I am

particularly persuaded by Delpit's, the way in which the arguments
were made seems unnecessary.

For example, although LeFevre is

critical of teaching invention as the act of an autonomous individual,
she

nevertheless

recognizes

intentions for doing so.

the

pragmatic

reasons

and

good

Under the more hostile applications of

postmodern theory, this pragmatism becomes naivete and good will a
mask that suppresses the benefits of conflict--the possibility of social
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . 13

The

more hostile and condescending stance

of

later theorists also goes a long way in explaining that while
composition studies coincides with the era of postmodernity, there is
seem ingly little in the short history o f composition studies that
suggests a postmodern
view o f heterogeneity and difference as
liberating forces, and there are very few calls to celebrate the
fragmentary and chaotic currents of change.
(Faigley 14)

But I would argue that this lack of call to celebrate heterogeneity
resulted not solely from a modernist ethos but also from the way in
which these forces of heterogeneity were presented to or perceived
by practitioners as the hostile voice of the "reigning academic elite"14
(Christian "The Race" 227).
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T he

O p aq u en ess

Second,

of

th e

postmodern

T e rm in istic

theory is

S creen

often

badly

w ritten.15

It is

difficult to read, filled with jargon and torpid—all qualities which
practitioners abhor.

For example, Baudrillard's claim that "quotidian

reality in its entirety . . . incorporates the simulatory dimension of
(S i m u l a t i o n s

hyperrealism "

147) is hardly the clear, open, and

inviting prose of Donald Murray or Peter Elbow.

While Murray,

Elbow, and other early theorists write about issues and write about
them in ways that resonate with instructors' classroom experiences
and aesthetic

values, postmodern theory, while it

could also echo

those experiences, is written in such a way that a true connection
cannot be made to it without considerable institutional support.

As a

fellow instructor once said to me while we were trying to decipher
an especially

difficult

portion

"postmodern

writing

represents everything

students' writing to be:
convoluted."

of Derrida's

On Grammcitology.
I

don't

want my

long winded, jargony, dense, private, and

My colleague's reaction was not an example of anti-

intellectualism but of professionalism.

We don't teach writing like

that, so we doubt that it could have anything useful to say about
what we do.
read,

and

com m unity.

And yet, Dewey and Bakhtin are also very difficult to

they

are
I

accepted

think,

and even

therefore,

that

loved

by

while

many

in our

resistance

postmodernism on the grounds of jargon is legitimate,

to

it masks a

larger fear caused by inequities of power.16
Most instructors do not have the institutional training, support,
or time necessary to unpack the density of postmodern theory.

4 1
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Yet

mastery of or, at least, familiarity with postmodern discourse is one
of the

markers of professionalism

in our

field.

Therefore,

the

difficulty yet influence of postmodern theory highlights and furthers
practioners'

feelings

of

m arginalization

within

the

academy.

Postmodern theory is seen by practitioners as a mechanism designed
to exclude
pedagogy.

them

from

discussions

on

writing

and decisions

on

It both mystifies our field's discourse and makes concrete

practioners' positions as "outsiders."

Its language does not open up

topics for discussion but closes them down through discursive codes
and rituals.

Like Barbara Christian, practitioners see "the language it

[poststructuralism ]

creates

as

one

which

mystifies

rather

than

clarifies our condition, making it possible for a few people who know
that particular language to control the critical scene" (229).

Given

the workload of our teachers, the way their knowledge and practices
are treated by much of current theory, their innate respect for clear
writing,

and

discourse,

it

their

learned

should

postmodern theory.

be

suspicion
no

of academics

surprise

that

and

academic

practitioners

resist

Resistance is a mechanism of survival.

The C r isis o f A gen cy
Finally, although I will analyze the postmodern impasse of
agency more fully in the next chapter, the idea of the impasse in
general is extremely troubling to most composition teachers.
Donald Jones writes,
In th eir critique o f the autonomous individual of foundationalism,
postm odernists have rejected the epistem ological assumption that a
know er directly perceives reality in thought then expresses these
perceptions through language.
Yet as these theorists have asserted
the influence o f language upon an individual's thinking, they have
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As

been unable to explain an individual's ag en c y ~ th e ability to create,
assert, exam ine, and maintain/or modify a belief.
(B e y o n d vii)

This explanation is required if writing teachers are going to take
postmodernism

seriously.

After all,

how

do

we

teach writing,

process, invention, revision, resistance, collaboration, voice, audience,
and a host of other composition mainstays without a self with the
agency to alter behavior and be held accountable for action? The self
and

its

agency

contradictory

may

and

be

even

socially

constructed,

conflicting

discourses,

a

site

but

of often

it

seems

necessary site if one is to write within our cultural structures.

a

From

our economy, to our popular culture, to the rewards granted by the
academy, a strong sense of self and agency seems inescapable.
the

postm odern

critique

of

agency

seems

antithetical

Thus.
to

the

conditions in which the teaching and doing of writing must exist.
Further,
professional

to

embrace

suicide

on

this

critique

the part

would

seem

of practitioners.

an
The

act

of

limited

institutional authority they have rests mainly on their expertise as
professional writers and teachers, as experts in the very areas of
agency,

intention,

proclaims dead.
the

practitioners

and

authenticity

that radical

postmodernism

No wonder the death of the author is a proclamation
find

incredulous

and

suspicious.

As

Barbara

Christian argues, "Now I am being told. . .that authors are dead,
irrelevant, mere

vessels through which narratives ooze, that they do

not work nor have they the faintest idea what they are doing; rather,
they produce texts as disembodied as the angels" (229-30).
Christian's

portrayal

accurately

represents

theory—it

is a

of the death
how

of the

practitioners

threat to their identity and

author
feel

While

is extreme,

it

about

postmodern

authority.

Without a
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notion

of a writer who makes

meaning,

be that writer’s nature

individual or social, they see no grounds upon which to base their
authority in the classroom, their place in conference discussions, or
their role in curricular decisions.

To practitioners, the death of the

author also .signals the death of the author as writing authority.
course. I am not asking practitioners to embrace this critique.
asking

them

to

engage

it

to

see

performative force for the classroom.

if

it

can

provide

Of
I am

practical

Nevertheless, the notion of the

impasse without the time and support to investigate, engage, and
critique it is enough in itself to cause composition’s practitioners to
resist postmodern theory.
If we then add to these

practioner doubts

the doubts that

minority theorists, feminist theorists, conservative theorists, Marxist
theorist, and a host of others have about postmodern theory, then
why bother to engage it at all? First, because as Jameson argues "for
good

or

ill,

we cannot

not

use

it"

Postmodernism is where we currently

(P o s t m o d e r n i s m

xxi).

find ourselves and so not

understanding the theory robs us of an understanding of the present
and ensures that those who do not understand it will not be able to
defend themselves against those who do.

Second, I also believe that

postmodernism does have something to offer the teachers of writing.
N am ely,

p ostm odernism

incommensurability,
pragmatic,

has

fluidity,

experimental,

and

and

have been doing all along.

the

ab ility ,

in

heterogeneity,

creative

practices

its
to

that

love

of

support

the

practitioners

Third, it can provide new insights and

new directions on old problems.

Specifically, it can be used to create

a notion of resistance that relies on the powers and skills of personal
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narrative—skills

composition's

practitioners

know

well:

an

anti

dogmatism and love of incommensurability that critique the use of
politics in the classroom in authoritarian or disrespectful ways; an
experimental, pragmatic, and answerable ethics

that maintains the

possibility o f our classrooms as places for social transformation: and
finally, a view of history that makes it approachable by, relevant to.
and dependent upon the personal and communal "texts" that a l l
compositionists bring to the understanding and teaching of writing.
If the post postmodernism Friedman describes is to achieve the
potential I believe it has for composition, then composition's teachers
must see postmodernism as having practical performative force for
the classroom and themselves as part of, perhaps experts in, that
force.

Why?

composition.

Because the teachers in the classrooms are the heart of
They were there before we were a field, and they will

still be there if composition as a distinct field disappears.

The rift

between theory and practice has never been greater in our field—
which is ironic considering that much of the theory currently being
advanced

blurs

postmodern

distinctions

theory

between

is important,

theory

if it has

and

practice.

something

lasting

If
to

contribute to the teaching of writing, then it must bridge that gap by
winning over the practitioners.
but the practitioners remain.

Theories and theorists come and go,

If we, the lettered class of composition,

want to add something permanent to the teaching of composition,
then we must do it through the one constant in our ever changing
field—the

teacher

in

the

classroom.

To

repeat

Stephen

North.

"Literally anything can become part of lore," and "nothing can ever
be dropped from it either" (24).

Postmodernism, therefore, must
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enter that lore if it is to impact and remain part of composition
teaching.

We must dedicate ourselves to helping practitioners gain

the institutional support necessary for making a connection to the
postmodern
members.
connection
postmodern

condition—a condition o f which

they

were

the

first

I would now. therefore, like to begin helping to make that
by turning to the question o f resistance in the post
era.
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CHAPTER ONE NOTES
1.
Indeed, Schilb more than the others in this category sees the postmodern
ethos o f composition as more a potential than an actuality.
He writes:
"In
d e sc rib in g
ways
co m p o sitio n
m ig h t
address
c u l tu r a l
stu d ie s
and
postm odern ism , I am underscoring the potential o f the field rather than it
present sense o f mission.
We are far from realizing that potential, because of
in stitu tio n al and ideological factors em bedded in com position’s p a s t” (177).
S om e o f these in s titu tio n al and id eological factors include c o m p o s itio n ’s
invention as a field designed "purely to train students in the mechanics o f
language,” a "belief that it exists only to serve the ’real’ disciplines, which are
b e s t serv ed when co m p o sitio n fo cu ses on stud en ts'
'basic s k ill s .’” and.
borrow ing the idea from Richard O hm ann’s English in A m erica , "the habit of
f r a m in g social issu es
in a p r o b le m - s o lu tio n
form at that b e lie s th e ir
com plexity" (177, 178).
2.
I think this qualification is the most powerful moment in LeFevre’s work.
She does not discredit the Platonic view of invention.
She does not disparage
the w riting process model.
She argues that the Platonic con ceptions o f
in v e n tio n is incom plete, and that this incom pleteness is harm in g process
movement.
LeFevre believes that "a Platonic view alone is inadequate, chiefly
because it promotes an oversim plified view o f what an individual is and
because it is
not sufficiently co m prehensiv e to account for w hat happens
when writers invent" (23).
Moreover, she believes that it "leads us to favor
in d iv id u alistic approaches to research and to neglect studies o f writers
in
social contexts." (23) that it "depicts inventions as a closed, one-way system."
(24) that it "abstracts writers from society.” (25) and that
it "assumes and
promotes the concept o f the atomistic self as inventor” (26).
3.
It is not just the individual or the just the society that invents.
Invention is
the interaction
of a in d iv id u al/so cial being with the larger
society in a
distinctive
way. The word distinctiv e stresses the creativity of social
in v e n tio n —an
aspect th a t many so cial c o n s tru c tio n theories
do w n play.
L e F e v re ’s social invention "neither denies an individual the p ossib ility o f
c re a tin g som ething original nor frees her from personal respo nsibility for
what she writes” (2).
4.
At this point in her career Bizzell’s work echoes that of David Bartholomae
w hose poststructural d o u bting o f ind iv id ual authority runs th ro u g h o u t
his
work.
See especially, inventing the University," "A Study o f Error."
And
"Facts, Artifact, and Counterfacts.’’
5.
I should note that Trimbur is also critical o f the "post-process” and "postc o g n itiv e” theory of theorists like Jam es Berlin and Patricia Bizzell.
He sees
them as having "walled out" too o f much o f the complexity o f writing process
theories.
See T rim bur’s "Taking the Social Turn:
Teaching W riting PostProcess" pages 108-10.
6.
T hough Vitanza does not give enough credence to the conflicted and
rhetorical nature o f Berlin's consensus, he is, I believe, correct in arguing
that Berlin still sees consensus as possible and beneficial and that ideology can
be correct.
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7.
See Donald Jones’ B eyo n d th e P o stm o d ern Im passe o f
C o n te m p o ra ry
C o m p o sitio n pages 75-80 for a discussion o f how Donald Murray’s and Peter
Elbow’s process pedagogies predate, predict, and reflect many o f the themes of
p o stm o d e rn ism .
8.
Berlin might have considered the more post-fordian cognitive theory of
Mike Rose in W riter's Block:
The C ognitive D im ension. In it. Rose criticizes
the hierarchical and goal oriented cognitive rhetoric o f Flower and Hayes in
favor o f a more opportunistic cognitive rhetoric.
9. Capitalism also values com petition, debate, team
work, and innovation—all
characteristics implied in Berlin's critical dem ocracy pedagogy.
10.
See Mara Holt’s "Toward a Democratic Rhetoric:
Collaborative Theory and Practice” for a reply to Stewart.
1 1.

Self and

Society

in

See Donald Jones pages 6-17.

12.
See Robert J. Connors' "Overwork/U nderpay:
Labor and the Status of
C om position Teachers since 1880” and "Rhetoric in the Modern U niversity:
The C reation o f an U n d e rc la ss,”
Susan M iller's "The F em in ization o f
Composition" and Textual Carnivals: The Politics o f Composition, and Stephen
M.
North’s The M aking o f Knowledge in Com position: Portrait o f an Em erging
Field.
13.

See Susan Jarratt's "Feminism and Composition:

The Case for Conflict."

14.
Not all incorporations of postmodern thought into composition have been
hostile, however.
For example. Edward White argued as early as 1984 that
teachers would embrace "poststructuralism as if it were and old friend” (184).
White believed this because "once we strip away the jargon." poststructuralism
"has an alm ost eerily fam iliar s o u n d ”—the sound o f writing as an ever
spreading process to be endlessly revised (190).
I agree with White and can
only conclude, therefore, that the ja rg o n w asn’t strip and the co nn ection
wasn't made to practioner knowledge for ideological reasons.
The neo-M arxist
agenda that the critical pedagogues wanted to advance through postmodernism
was more important than either the postmodernism or the goals, careers, and
values o f those who were teaching in the classroom.
15.
I must admit that I exclude Foucault from the charge o f bad writing.
Though Foucault can be difficult, he can also be quite eloquent and moving.
M oreover, Foucault's density is often designed to protect him from erroneous
interpretations, from being held acc ou ntab le for rhe interpretations readers
make o f work.
16.
O f course, com positionists also have open ideological conflicts with
postm odernism .
For example, in "Collaborative Learning and Com position:
Boon or Bane,” Donald Stewart criticizes Richard Rorty’s "abnormal discourse"
as in no way capable of explaining exceptional creativity.
He writes:
"The
person who has learned the conversation o f mankind, we are told, learns how
to challenge the status quo, to sniff out the stale and no longer viable.
How?
This is a completely unsatisfactory explanation o f Mozart’s ability to transcend
the influence of Haydn, of Beethoven's to transcend Mozart, of B rahm ’s to
transcend Beethoven" (67).
Thus. Stew art not only privileges the unified
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individual’s consciousness but the ideology and cultu ral tastes o f "high"
culture.
It is this appeal to high culture that many theorists such as James
Berlin find questionable at best and supportive o f an oppressive status quo at
w o rst.
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CH A PTER H

C R Y IN G TH E TEARS O F M Y ANCESTORS:
REFIG U R IN G TH E SU BJECT OF RESISTANCE
Resistance is Futile,

—the Borg.

Physical Pain has no voice, but when it at last finds a voice, it begins
to tell a story.
—Elaine Scarry The Body in Pain
In the end. all figures o f otherness boil down to just one: that of the
Object.
In the end, all that is left is the inexorability of the Object,
the irr e d e e m a b ility o f the O b ject.
—Jean B a u d rilla rd
The
Transparency o f Evil
Look at the c o lo r o f your
suprem acist R o bert Shelton

The

most

famous

catch

skin—that

is

phrase

of

y our

uniform . —white

"Star Trek:

the

Next

Generation"—the Borg's Ominous "Resistance is Futile"—supplies an
apt popular culture understanding of the postmodern impasse.
now

common

Enlightenment

argum ent
and

is

that

Modernist

in

the

conceptions

postmodern
of self,

The

critique

language,

of
and

agency, the ability to resist has become difficult to explain (Berlin
"Poststructuralism"
291-302;

Howard

18, Rhetorics 57-68; Faigley xii, 3, 226-7; Harvey
349;

Jones

11-13;

Miller

10-23;

Spellmeyer 724; Szkudlarek 42-57; Yagelski 203-05).
roughly, goes like this:

The argument,

To paraphrase Lester Faigley.

postmodernism "rejects the primacy of consciousness."
consciousness

50;

the self (or the subject as some prefer1 ) is an

effect rather than a cause of discourse.

seeing

Smith

as

prior

to

or

distanced

from

Instead of
language,

postmodernists see "consciousness as originating in language."

This

reversal of self and language necessitates that human action does not
50
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arise out of a unified and removed consciousness "but rather from a
momentary identity," a temporary and shifting site of multiple and
even conflicting discourses (9).
fragmentary

condition

participates

in

and

of

Resistance, therefore, reflects the

life

rather

m ultiplies

this

than

defies

fragm entation

it;

resistance

rather

than

overcomes it, because resistance, due to the selFs relationship to
language, is itself an example and product of fracture rather than a
cure for it.
This view of resistance's relationship to the fragmented world
is very different from the modernist view.
such as Dostoevski.
fragmented,

they

For while modernists

Rousseau, and Joyce also see

believe

that the self's distance

the world as

from the world

enables it to critique the social conditions in which it is forced to live.
The distance allowes for actions and thoughts not composed of or by
those fragmentary conditions.
our refuge and our salvation.

Our subjectivity, therefore, could be
As Faigley explains,

the world [of modernist writers) is no
than in descriptions o f the postmodern
is granted the p o ssib ility o f being
formation from a distan ced viewpoint
course for human em ancipation.
(16)

The

postm odern

critique,

however,

less fragmented and transitory
condition, but the individual
able to critiq u e that social
and to d isco v er a potential

removes

that

distance

by

changing the selfs/subject's relationship to language, leading to an
impasse from which agency and effective socio-political action are
difficult to explain.
But I don't want to focus too much on this well worn argument.
Instead,

I would

like

to

question

the

insurm ountability

and/or

importance of this impasse as it relates to writing and understanding
resistance.

I would suggest that having a theory of subjectivity and
51
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language that adequately explains how it is possible that we resist is
less important than empirical evidence that we do.

Resistance is the

ability to challenge, critique, support, modify, and change structures
of belief and power in documentable ways,

ways

happier with who we are and how we live.
potentiality

to

subjectivity.
practices
and

be justified

through

that make us

It is not only a

a discursively

substantiated

It is an empirically documentable action, a series of

performable,

understandable,

from a contextual,

and

teachable

by,

against,

material, and historical object status—the

worth a culture assigns to material and corporal traits.

Specifically,

resistance is a form of critique, but it also larger than that.

Whereas

the postmodern critique is often seen as futile in that it shows the
conditions

of

oppression

but

offers

no

way

to

change

those

conditions, post postmodern resistance alters the constitutive effects
of oppression by rewriting the cultural stereotypes that enable or
justify that oppression.

It re figures the worth of the object status

that a person carries by rewriting its perceived value.

In short, post

postmodern resistance attempts to transform the derogatory images
of

being

that

the

dom inant

culture

produces

marginalized assimilate as part of their identity.

and

that

the

Such resistance

does not require a distanced and unified subjectivity but rather the
study and performance of actions through historical consciousness.
As I wrote in the introduction, while resistance may no longer
emanate from a distanced self and may no longer be leveled against
easily discernible and monolithic power structures, it can still exist,
individually and collectively, in the multiple and fractured things we
do:

write a book, protest clear cutting, raise a child.

It is a theory of
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resistance

that

has

passed

retains many of its insights.

through

the

postmodern

critique

yet

It is a theory that does not hold out

hope for a unified self but examines actions to see how a multiple,
fractured, and fluid self might be effectively manifested.

However,

in my analysis of documents to find traces of this resistance, I will
focus

on

object

status

rather

than

subjectivity—not

because

a

postmodern subjectivity is invalid but because the role that object
status plays in the creation of that subjectivity and in the creation of
the ability to resist is often ignored.

Subjectivity is our recognized

status as human beings within the power structures of society.

It is

the recognition that we feel, think, desire, hurt, and are human.
Object status is the value, manifested in material attributes, that
subjectivity is assigned.

In other words, subjectivity is the threshold

of our recognition and rights within a society, while object status is
our horizon—the culturally determined value of our material body
that constitutes what a society allows us to do and be.
The question of the impasse, while important, can focus too
heavily on the epistemological possibility o f authentic subjectivity
instead

of

on

u nderstanding

the

prag m atic,

m aterial,

and

psychological activity of rewriting cultural stereotypes as a means of
resistance.

To question whether this activity and its effects are

really evidence of true resistance or merely a discursive delusion can
be profitable if that question is oriented toward helping us achieve
greater freedom (see Foucault's "The Ethics" 282-85), but such a
question can also be a mystification that removes writing from the
very sites in which its resistance actually occurs and its effects can
be understood.

It suppresses the primacy and validity of our lived
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experience underneath theories for sanctifying the possibility of that
experience (ironically, reducing written resistance to the very unified
and distanced self postmodernism is critiquing).
Consequently, I will argue in this chapter that we do not have
to have a unified and distanced self or even a fractured and fluid
postmodern

subjectivity to write, examine,

resistan ce.2

understand,

and teach

Where once marginalized groups needed to fight merely

to be recognized as human beings, now they must fight over the
value their human status is assigned.
shift in what is needed to resist.

There has been a historical

Currently, marginalized groups, at

least in the democratic countries of the world, suffer as much or
more from the material effects of being labeled inferior objects and
from the psychological effects of internalizing that inferior status as
from a denial of subjectivity.

What needs to be resisted now is not

the denial of subjectivity but the cultural system of representing and
valuing that subjectivity.

For example,

the struggle of African

Americans to resist racism is no longer over basic human rights, but
what

bell

hooks

( Killing

Rage

reminds

us

black

folks

pattern was

calls

"the psychic

impact of white supremacy"

119), the valuing of whiteness over color.

that
better

"racist
than

white folks
their darker

mirrored in black social

often

treated

counterparts
relations"

Hooks

lighter-skinned
and

(120).

that

this

In other

words, African Americans have internalized, to the detriment of their
social relations and psychological health, the "racist stereotypes that
had always insisted black was ugly, monstrous, undesirable" (120).
For example, hooks tells of a black mother in an interracial marriage
who "was shocked when her four-year-old girl expressed the desire
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that her mom be white like herself and her dad."

The little girl "had

already learned to negate the blackness in herself" (129).

Hooks tells

of other little black girls who the media have taught to "prefer white
images over black ones . . . white dolls better than black ones" (125)
and of black children "psychological wounded

in families

and/or

public school systems because they were not the right color" (122).
These

children werenot denied a subjectivity; they were not

from

attending

fountains.

the

school

or

from

drinking at

banned

certain water

Instead, they faced a "color caste" system that assigned an

inferior worth to the color of their skin, the texture of their hair, the
sex of their bodies.

As hooks writes, "To be born dark was to start

life handicapped, with a serious disadvantage" (121).
To resist this internalized racism and white supremacy, hooks
calls for "establishing a politics o f representation which would both
critique

and

integrate

ideals

of personal

beauty

and desirability

informed by racist standards and put in place progressive standards,
a system of valuation that would embrace a diversity of black looks"
(119 my emphasis).

This "politics of representation" or "system of

valuation" is what I call the resistance of the object.
to

resist the

material

negative stereotypes.

and

It is the attempt

psychological oppression

Having attained emancipation,

inflicted

by

the right to

vote, the right to education, and all the other rights of a recognized
humanity,

the

struggle

for

hooks

is

no

longer

for

recognized

subjectivity but over the worth that subjectivity is assigned—a worth
embodied in our object status.
To prove this claim of object status resistance, I will examine
the internet writings

of a lower caste,

female,

Indian

immigrant
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named Malathi Raghavan.

Malathi’s writings against upper caste

bigotry will show that if we cannot resist as subjects, then we can
resist as objects, or that if we can still resist as subjects, we can also
resist as objects.

Resistance, identity, and agency for Malathi are no

longer matters of an authentic, unified, and distanced subjectivity or
even of a postmodern multiplicity but of using writing to refigure a
culturally constituted and discriminatory object status.

Malathi uses

writing to challenge the beliefs that dark brown skin, lower caste
features, and female genitalia are signs of inferiority.
In

making

this

argument,

I

am

aware

of

the

negative

connotations being an object carries, the belief that objects cannot act
but are acted upon.
question

many

More importantly,

feminist,

I am sympathetic to the

A frican-A m ericanist.

and

non-Western

theorists ask, namely, why is subjectivity disappearing at the very
moment so many groups that have

been denied its benefits

are

attaining the power to occupy its space? However, my project and
the critique of the "disappearance" of subjectivity are not mutually
exclusive.

I am not claiming that subjectivity does not exist, nor am

I claiming that resistance through one's subjectivity is impossible.
What

I am questioning is the fetishization of the self by both

modernist "theory hope"3 and many postmodernist critiques.
am questioning

is the

importance

resistance,

and

I wonder

importance

subjugates.

what

that
other

subjectivity
forms

I am suspicious

of

of why

What I

is given

for

resistance

that

subjectivity

is

privileged as the only authentic site of resistance in our culture,
especially
privileged

when

white

corporate

subjectivity.4

males

have

our

culture's

most

More important than the question of the

56

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

disappearance of subjectivity is
irreplaceable. If modernist

the question of why subjectivity

subjectivity

dies,

have

we lost

is
an

irreplaceable form of resistance? Possibly, but who is this we, who
does this we serve, and what other forms of resistance would the
"death" of that we's subjectivity open up for those who have been
defined as questionable subjects
These

questions

do

not

transform subjectivity or find

within its structure?
preclude the

modernist

notion

internalization
culturally

of

our

determined

of self, then
object
worth?

of groups

to

new ways to conceive of it; they

merely shift the focus of our attention.
no

work

For if there is no innate self,
what

status—the
To

refigure

is subjectivity but

the

internalization o f

our

that

status,

therefore,

would also transform subjectivity, would also be an act of resistance,
a form of agency.

I am simply putting forth a way of resistance that

is not dependent on a modernist notion of self or a postmodernist
critique of subject for its functioning.

I am trying to break the

hegemony of subjectivity and those it privileges by offering object
status, especially for the marginalized, as an alternate and legitimate
site of resistance.
Friedman's

post

I am, in short, trying to place resistance with
postmodern

historical

moment—a resistance

that

recognizes the deconstruction of the modernist self but maintains the
need for some way to change the oppressive structures of society.
As

Malathi

theoretical.

will

teach

us,

resistance

is

not merely abstract

or

It is not solely an epistemological question, nor the

exclusive domain of the powerful and

their discursive practices.

Resistance is about blood and bones, scars and ruptures, stereotypes
and taboos inflicted on docile bodies labeled inferior but that now
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refuse to remain either docile or inferior.

It is about the pain caused

from internalizing one’s own features, ancestry, race, or gender as
inferior.

Resistance is not only a question of discourse but of a lived

body manifested within a political representation.

It is a matter of

object status.
I would now, therefore, like to turn to an examination of the
writing Malathi did on the internet, comment on that writing, and
then give her a space to comment on my comments.

I will end the

chapter by exploring object based resistance through the work of
Jean Baudrillard.

Baudriliard's work is not necessarily the best or

only theoretical lens through which to focus on resistance, but it
stresses our status as objects more than other posmodern theories —
a status and a potential that, as I have argued, are neglected in most
theories of resistance.

A

S h o rt

B iograp hy

I first met Malathi Raghavan while we were graduate students
at the University of New Hampshire.

She was the R.A. (resident

assistant) on the floor of the graduate dorm in which I lived.
the course of a few semesters, I got to know

Over

Malathi quite well.

Besides my incessant questions on where the floor mop was, where
the trash bags were, and why I couldn't have a dog, Malathi, despite
her fluency in English, often wanted my opinion on what she was
writing for the

India Discussion Digest. The India Discussion Digest or

IDD is an internet discussion group, an "OPEN and FREE forum for
discussion

of issues related to India and the

(Ramamurthy

I).

These

issues range

Indian community"

from politics,

to arts and
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entertainment, to immigration, to general interest.

Though open to

all, the IDD is dominated by well-educated, English using, uppercaste, middle-class Indians.

And though stating that "No personal

attacks and insults will be allowed on the Digest," and that "Attacks
on

a

c o m m u n ity ,

orientation

groups

(Ramamurthy

I),

I i n g u is ti c /r e l ig io u s /e th n ic /g e n d e r / s e x u a lor

n atio nalities

the writing on the

will

not be

perm itted"

IDD can be quite

vicious.

Malathi. a member of a lower caste, knew, therefore, that her writing
was more than an expression of her ideas.
demonstration

of

her

sometimes days, on her

worth.

Consequently,

writing.

It was a test and
she

spent

She wrote draft after

hours,

draft, did

outside research, and agonized over how it would be received.

Not

surprisingly, considering the upper caste dominance of the IDD, it
was not often received well.

It was under these circumstances that I

got to learn a little about Malathi and the Indian caste system.
Malathi was born in the south Indian city of Madras to a
middle class but lower caste family.

However, Malathi’s home life

was anything but typical for an Indian family~at least not publicly
typical.
and

She was the first child of a civil engineer named Raghavan
a

h o m e m a k e r - tu r n e d - c o tt a g e - in d u s t r y

Manimegalai.

Malathi's

ow ner

n am ed

sister Manessa was born some

nineteen

years after her, making Malathi more of a second mother than a big
sister.

When Malathi was a child, her parents did not get along.

father was

some thirteen years older than her mother

proposed (Manimegalai was only eighteen).

when

Her
he

Thinking that marriage

would allow her to escape the restrictions placed on Indian women,
especially in that era. Malathi's mother accepted the proposal.
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It was

a mistake.

Manimegalai soon found she had simply exchanged one

prison for another.

The house was filled with mental abuse, power

struggles, and an unwanted child.
unthinkable in Indian society.

So, Malathi's mother did the

With a thirteen year old daughter, no

job, and no support from either her family or her society, she left her
husband.

The shame of this separation, once it was publicly known,

severely

scarred

Malathi's

a

when

remembers

day

sense of
her

complained about his wife to
humiliating.

father

worth.

She particularly

came

to

her teachers.

her school

and

It was. in a word,

Eventually, Malathi’s mother and father reconciled.

She

started a small cottage industry—a dress shop—as an outlet for her
creativity, and he provided the financial support for that shop.

But

Malathi never forgot the stares, the unkind remarks, the feeling of
being of less value than other children.
own words,

"opened my eyes

injustices of India."

It was an time that, in her

to the terrible public

and private

The dowry burnings, the spousal abuse, the

exploitation of

children, and, most importantly,

the hierarchy of caste

were all made

visible to her once veiled eyes.

It was an awakening

that she carried throughout the rest of education—the knowledge of
what it feels like to "be an outsider within one's own culture."
Though Malathi was a Hindu, she attended Vidyodaya Girls
Christian school for grades one through ten, and, though an ethnic
Tamil, she attended Adarsh
eleven and twelve.

Vidyalaya Punjabi school

for grades

While in school, Malathi was a voracious reader.

She read anything and everything she could get

her hands on but

was especially drawn to books on atheism, ecology, feminism, and
Marxism.

She

even had a poem read at aninternational women's
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conference

in

the

Philippines

when

she

was

seventeen.

After

finishing high school, Malathi scored extremely high on her college
entrance exams and got into Anna University where she studied
production engineering.

But she soon grew bored with engineering

and, against her parents wishes, decided to pursue her first love—
animals.

Malathi applied for and received a scholarship from the

Ministry of Higher Education to study veterinary medicine in the
U.S.S.R.

Having never been out of the country and speaking no

Russian, Malathi traveled to Kiev where she not only earned her
degree but became fluent in the Russian language.

Indeed, Malathi is

fluent in three languages (Tamil, Russian, and English)

and has a

reading or speaking ability in four more (Hindi, French, Spanish, and
Ukrainian).

During

her time in

aftermath of Chernobyl,

Kiev,

Malathi

Gorbachev’s Perestroika,

experienced
the

the

fall of the

Berlin wall, and the coming to power of Yeltsin.
After finishing her degree, Malathi felt the "call of America"
and decided to apply to Environmental Studies programs in the U.S.
Once here she majored in Environmental Education at the University
of New Hampshire.

Having seen the horrors of Chernobyl first hand,

she felt her veterinary training "was too technical, too removed from
the environment."

She needed some "context to round off" her

"content in animal welfare."

She excelled in the program—receiving

scholarships, summer research funding, and a teaching assistantship.
In September of

1996,

she won an

internship

Nation's Division of Sustainable Development.

with

the

United

Currently, she is

enrolled in the Academic Review program at Purdue's School of
Veterinary Medicine.

She hopes to pass the American Veterinary
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Board Exam by early next year.
formal

and

inform al—has

Obviously, Malathi's education—both

been

a

rich

religious, ethnic, and cultural influences.

mixture

of

intellectual,

Equally obvious, she is an

incredibly accomplished, intelligent, and goal oriented young woman.
Yet because of her lower caste status, Malathi is, in the eyes of some
Indians, inherently inferior.
away

as

either

an

Her apparent success can be explained

aberration

or

as

the

result

of

preferential

tre a tm e n t.
Understanding the intricacies of the caste system could take a
lifetime for a non-Indian.

The system is thousands of years old and

has a history so complex it could easily fill a library of books.

It is a

little like combining the issues of race, class, and gender and then
justifying that creation through religious doctrine.

I make no claim,

therefore, to be an expert on the caste system.

The little I know

about the history and current status of the caste system I learned
from Malathi, and she is quite forthright in admitting that her view
is based on her experience.

However, while Malathi's perspective is

just that, a perspective, it is a legitimate perspective.

After all, it is

based on lived experience.
According to Malathi, the caste system has four major divisions:
the Brahmin, the Kshatriya, The Vyaishyas, and the Sudra.

Each

caste has a place and a role in society with predetermined privileges
and restrictions.

The Brahmins are the highest caste.

They, at least

the males, were the culture's priests and intellectuals.

While allowed

education and religious authority, they were denied material wealth.
The Kshatriya are the warrior caste.

Though not as high as the

Brahmins, the warriors were and are also considered upper caste
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people and have been and are treated as such.
of India.

They were the rulers

If they were denied anything, it was only the higher

religious status of the Brahmins.

The Vyaishyas were the peasants,

farmers, and merchants of India.

Allowed to prosper monetarily, at

least to a degree, they were denied education (this, of course, is no
longer the case).

Finally, the Sudra were the lowest caste.

They

were and are the sweepers, cleaners, laborers, and morticians of
India.

The Sudra, especially those who handled the dead, were often

labeled as untouchable, the very bottom of the social and economic
hierarchy.

What they supposedly received from the system was an

occupation,

a skill,

a

trade

that

could

be

handed

down

from

generation to generation, and a potential for rebirth into a higher
caste if they did their work well.
Malathi and her family are mainly Vyaishyas.
were

farmers,

weavers,

petty

landowners,

and

Her ancestors

traders.

These

occupations were not simply something Malathi's ancestors did; they
were

something

Malathi’s

ancestors

were.

Their

"occupations"

reflected their soul’s closeness to god, how they would be seen and
treated by others, and the limits of what they could hope to be.
Acceptance of this status was the only path to spiritual, social, and
psychological
unthinkable.

harmony.

To

reject

one’s

caste

was

literally

Without a caste status one had no place within Indian

society.
Though the untouchable caste was officially outlawed,

that

caste and the larger caste system are still alive in the minds and
hearts of many in India.

The current status of caste oppression is

similar to that of black oppression.

Though slavery in the United
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States

has

been

outlawed

since

Emancipation

and discrimination

since the Civil Rights Act, the fight against institutional racism and
white supremacy continues.

The lingering prejudice of the caste

system, however, does not mean that all upper caste Indians are pro
caste

or

that

conditions that

current

lower caste

people

live

India has more

the

same

their ancestors did. For example, Malathi maintains

that she has never been denied a subjectivity.
treated, at least

under

legally, as a human being.

She has always been
Indeed, in many ways

honestly tried to deal with the atrocities of its past

than the United States has.

Before and after independence there

were attempts to reform the caste system.

For example, in the spirit

of the democracy that swept the country after Independence and
through the leadership of Gandhi, a series of caste reforms were
enacted:

the untouchable caste was outlawed, discrimination based

on caste at temples, schools, and by the government was outlawed,
and a system of reservations was set up.

The reservation system

was and is a government program in which those who come from a
caste

that

has

suffered

discrim ination

are

given

treatment for government jobs and school admissions.

preferential
Each year a

certain percentage o f spaces are set aside in both the government
and the schools for people

from the backward castes,

scheduled

castes, and scheduled tribes (often abbreviated as BC, SC, and ST).
For example, Malathi's ancestry "qualifies" her as a backward caste
person in the state of Tamil Nadu.

The stigma of this "qualification"

represents the social marker of "inferiority" that Malathi has fought
against her whole life.

Malathi has never faced, as her ancestors did.
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the denial of her humanity.

Instead, it is the value of her humanity

that has been in question.
The

system

of reservations

also

partly

helps

current diaspora of upper caste Indians in America.

explain

the

Many Brahmins

consider the reservation system a form of reverse discrimination.

To

escape it. they have gone international, enrolling in schools and
getting jobs in the U. S. and all over the world.

Consequently, a large

portion of the Indian population in the United States represents a
very educated, economically successful, and politically powerful class
of people.

The upper caste domination of the IDD, therefore, is not all

that surprising.

The upper castes are, after all, the most literate and

worldly members of India's caste system.

The IDD is a place where

that dispersed group can stay in contact with other Indians. Indian
culture, and themselves.
This painfully brief description of the caste system does not
come close to capturing its dizzying complexity.

For example, each

caste is itself divided into multiple mini-castes (not all Sudras are
untouchables and not all Brahmins are at the top of the hierarchy).
Moreover,

there

are

millions

of

Indians

whose

religion—Islam,

Buddhism, and Christianity—removes them from the caste system—
though millions of these same people still participate in it.
I hope

this

brief

description

provides

at

least

the

However.
basis

for

understanding the terms and issues under debate in the writing that
I am now going to examine.
The following is the text of an exchange

that took place

between Malathi and two upper caste Indians on the IDD.

The

exchange is an argument over how Indians should view each other.
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the caste system, and the government's attempt to erase the harm
caused

by that system.

It represents only

a small fraction of

the

voluminous writing Malathi did and does on the IDD and other
internet sites.5

However, I believe it clearly shows how Malathi uses

writing to refigure the value of her object status.

In short, she writes

not only to make an argument but to show that someone from her
caste can make an argument.

The very act of being able to write, in

addition to its quality and content, refigures her value.
As much as possible, I have attempted to present each entrants
writing

exactly as it appeared on the IDD.

Representation o f the

Other is always ethically problematic but especially so in this case.

I

am. after all, dealing with considerable ethnic, gender, and cultural
divides.
have

Consequently, errors in spelling, grammar, and punctuation

not

be

altered,

bracketed

clarification of terms,

comments

and e-mail addresses,

always

represent

except for Malathi's

which is reprinted with her permission, have been eliminated
protect

the

privacy

of

the

participants.

my

I

will

participants' writing first and my commentary second.

present

to
the

I will then

follow this section with Malathi's comments and a general discussion.

A Fire Burning in M y H eart
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 96 II: 08: 51 EST
From Raghu Gotur
Subject:
Satire on Reservations
We all know (the 'forward' and 'reserved' nomenclatured citizens of
India) that the reservations do not contribute in any way to the
progress and development of the nation.
Imagine

the

following

scenario:
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A B C /S C /S T [backw ard ca ste , scheduled caste, scheduled tribe]
minimum pass
marks MBBS [a medical degree] graduate becoming a
N eu ro su rg e o n
using a 's o p h is tic a te d ' c o m p u teriz ed m edical
tool
designed and developed by a BC/SC/ST min. pass mark Computer
Engineer w orking in a hospital constructed by a min pass mark
BC/SC/ST Civil Engineer with a BC/SC/ST min. pass mark Nurse
assisting the Surgeon!
And the patient happens to be a forward class
person who lost all the above said career positions with fairly high
pass marks to min.pass mark BC/SC/STs (any other possible worse
nig htm are than this?)
Looks like we have a parallel 'reserved' govt, social system for a
B C /S C /ST right from c h ild h o o d to the h ighest position in the
co u n try .
How about this solution
Let a BC/SC/ST go to a school run and
taught by BC/SC/ST teachers, work in a factory constructed
by a
BC/SC/ST, go to a BC/SC/ST doctor for treatment, eat food prepared
and processed by a BC/SC/ST and so on.
Under these circumstances,
do you think any BC/SC/ST would survive to raise the question of
re se rv a tio n s?
I am not sure
if the following quote works as a good analogy:
"Its
like giving a typewriter to a chimp and hoping that someday it will
type out a Shakespeare's quotation."
R agh u

A key word in this entry is nomenclature--a system of naming.
I would argue that is exactly what is at stake in this entry—the
question of who gets to decide who is what, who gets to be what, and
on what basis.

In the first few lines there are a number of things

which strike me as important in determining who wins this struggle.
First, I’m confused about the subject line:

"Satire on Reservation."

This entry is obviously not a satire and yet Gotur labels it as such.
My feeling is that the satire he is referring to is the idea that the
reservation system is a legitimate way of addressing the problems of
India.

He obviously does not think it is.

who the reservation system might help.
pronoun

"we"

is

interesting.

"We"

Indeed, Gotur never asks
Second, the use of the

connotates

a community,
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a

plurality unified in an organic way (his use of the words "citizens"
and "nation" strengthen this feeling of community).
feels the tension o f using such inclusive terms.

Yet even Gotur
Immediately after

writing "we all know," he qualifies that "we" with a parenthetical
digression:
India."

"the ’forward’ and 'reserved' nomenclatured citizens of

His use of quotation marks around the words "forward" and

"reserved" denote a sense of these words being false in some sense.
The

"we"

he

writes

of

is

both not yet

achieved and

already

p re d e te rm in e d .
If we ignore the ugliness of Gotur’s argument in the second
paragraph, we might notice his interesting use of labels.
is the BC/SC/ST label repeated again and again.
classes,

the

scheduled

classes,

and

the

First, there

The backward

scheduled

tribes,

while

actually representing separate people, are not worthy of distinction.
This conflation can be seen in the very construction of the label
BC/SC/ST.

BC/SC/ST is one "word," one group of people, separated

only by slashes.
as

what

government
BC/SC/ST

binds

Any distinctions between them are not as important
them

treatm ent.
label—are

to g e th e r—inferio rity
Set

m arkers

against
of

high

this

and

preferential

cultural

marker—the

social

standing:

the

Neurosurgeon, the Computer Engineer, the Civil Engineer, and the
Nurse.

Gotur believes that the BC/SC/ST cannot really occupy these

social

spaces.

L ow er

Neurosurgeons, Computer
Surgeons.

caste

people

are

only

"min.

pass"

Engineers, Civil Engineers, Nurses, and

Their inferior natures do not make them fit for these

socially prestigious roles.
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By the third paragraph a pattern comes into focus as to the reason
why BC/SC/ST cannot be true professionals.

Allowed out of their

spiritually preordained station, the BC/SC/ST, like a virus, (even the
lettering reminds me of AIDS or HIV) will destroy the nation (the
first paragraph),

the

forward castes (the second

themselves (the third paragraph).

paragraph),

and

Thus, to contain them is not

oppression but patriotism, self defense, common sense, and or even
compassion.

The BC/SC/ST label is repeated so often in the third

paragraph that it becomes almost a chant, each repetition driving
home the cultural worth of the people this label manifests.

Further.

Gotur's

of

use

of the

word

"solution"

within

the

context

the

paragraph's musings on the survivability of the lower castes echoes
frighteningly with the tragedy of Nazi Germany.

The final "you" of

the paragraph, the "you" he is asking the question of, represents the
higher caste.

The lower caste are not consulted as to the potential of

their survivability.
The
reservation
universe.

final

passage

of

system defies

the

the

entry

speaks

for

natural and spiritual

itself.

The

order of the

The BC/SC/STs are not. by definition and design, capable of

being Neurosurgeons,

Engineers, and the like—except through the

"nightmare” of the reservation system.
giving a chimp a typewriter.

It is, as Gotur writes, like

If this natural order was recognized, if

the false forward and backward labels were abandoned for the true
nomenclature of caste, then the greater "we" Gotur writes of could be
a reality.

In fact, it should be stressed that Gotur is not denying the

BC/SC/ST a subjectivity; he is defining the kind of social status they
are capable of having, the worth of BC/SC/ST object status.
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Gotur

does not argue that BC/SC/ST are chimps with typewriters; he argues
that it is "like giving a typewriter to a chimp."

The BC/SC/ST are

human beings; they just aren't worth very much as human beings.
The next entry appeared a little later that same day.
"pro-caste" argument.

It is also a

Only this time it is in direct response to

another netter who has mocked defenders of or apologists for the
caste system.
* * *

Date: Fri, 22 Mar 1996 12:55:13 -0500
From:
"Sukanya Chakrabarti"
Subject:
Misconceptions about caste system
This is in response to Sendil Nathan's letter about the ’garbage in
philosophy” allegedly caused by Hindu customs.
Nathan seems to
identify the caste system as the ultimate culprit.
What he, and many
others have failed to realize is that the caste system was developed to
prevent oppression and enhance social productivity.
Consider the
capitalist system, where a minority o f the population has both social
prestige and power—this essentially enables this small minority to
dominate society. The caste system, on the other hand, is based on a
system o f checks and balances—certain castes are accorded social
prestige, but denied w ealth, w hile other castes are trad itio nally
allowed wealth, and a smaller share of social prestige.
To wit:
the
Brahmins were the most respected members o f the caste system, but
they lived in sheer poverty (this is supported by statistics)
If they
had been accorded both social prestige and power, they could have
ty ran n ized society.
F urtherm ore, the caste system enco u ra g es
specializatio n, leading to great social productivity.
Indians and
W e ste rn e rs
should reev a lu ate
the p e rp e tu a te d
stereo ty p es and
negative images o f the caste system —for this is by far the greatest
e v i l —ou r ignorance.

The subject line of the entry is again interesting, but this time
easier to understand.
ignorant

Those who

of their history.

The

criticize the
supposed

caste system are

oppression

casteism is "alleged," a "stereotype," a "negative image."

caused

by

Hence, the

experience of caste oppression is actually the experience of one's own
ignorance.

Chakrabarti's use of the inclusive pronoun "our" at

end of the entry is interesting as well.

Like in

the

Gotur's entry, our
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connotates a greater unity.

This time, though, the unity seems more

a collective and inclusive responsibility than a natural order.
closely,

however,

it

becomes

apparent

that

this

maintained by ignorance and not by responsibility.
people

together

is

what

they

do

not

know,

Read

community

is

What ties these
and

what

keeps

Chakrabarti out of this community of ignorance or at its top is that
she does know.

Chakrabarti's "authentic knowledge" allows her to

dismiss as illusion the suffering caused by casteism.

Her will to truth

enables her to make such specious arguments as "the caste system
was

d ev elo p ed

to

prevent

o p p ressio n

and

enhance

social

productivity" and to embrace such half truths as "the caste system
encourages specialization."

Nowhere is the pain and suffering caused

by this system of "checks and balances" acknowledged; no where is
the fact that lower caste people never volunteered for their position
admitted.

Upon first reading the entry, I had half hoped it was some

kind of Swiftian "Modest Proposal."
It is also interesting to see how Chakrabarti tries to bolster her
argument with

the trappings of stronger arguments:

the very real

exploitation of people in capitalist societies, the Western notion

of

checks and balances, the parenthetical aside to statistics that "prove"
the poverty of the Brahmins.

These are, of course, half truths,

rationalizations, deflections, and logical fallacies, but they reveal the
lengths to which defenders of the caste system will go to defend it—
for they are really defending themselves.
can no longer
casteism.

Many in the upper castes

see themselves, the lower castes, or the

effects

They need someone to teach them how to read.
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of

Malathi

Raghavan wrote the following two responses in an attempt to do just
that.
* * *

Date: Wed, 27 Mar 1996 19:07:26 -0500 (EST)
From:
M alathi Raghavan < mr@ christa.unh.edu>
To: editor@INDNET.BGSU.EDU
Subject: The prevailing caste talk. . .(I)
I have been an "active " listener, consciously listening
and not just
waiting for my turn to talk.
The recent comparison o f the likes of
me to chimps :-) by Raghu has prompted me to voice my thoughts.
However, I have nothing against chimps.
I think Jane Goodall has a
much more rewarding and rich life than most o f us do.
Sukanya's high regard for the caste system is scary.
Can we justify
social order and prosperity to those unique and troubled individuals
who might have wished to choose their own way of life and not to
take the burden thrust
upon them in the name
o f conform ity?
Conform or be cast(e) out? I am not just talking about rebellions for
the sake o f rebelling.
I am talking about fundamental rights to
education, c h o ice o f livelihood, healthy living q uarters, respect,
gratitude
for doing yo ur
dirty job for you etc.
System levelled
different com m unities by keeping checks & balances? I d o n ’t think
so!
You are only thinking about power and wealth.
One community
had pow er to make decision s, another co n tro lled eco n o m y , yet
another had social standing
maybe.
So maybe traders, courtiers,
some warriors etc other than brahmins had it a little better.
What
about all the people responsible for b eh in d -th e-scen es’ activities:
su b sisten ce fa rm e rs, w eav ers, dhobi [laund ry people]
fam ilies,
sweepers, ja n ito r s , people who worked with leather, grave yard
workers and so on. . . .
Also, you are comparing apples & oranges when you compare class
system with caste system.
A person from the lower end o f the
economic ladder
can at least theoretically work their way out o f it.
However, since the caste is a "birthright" how does one even dream
o f shedding the stigma, or the privilege, as the case maybe? And
don’t you turn it around and tell me that I consider it a
burden
because o f M Y
" in ferio rity com plex"! (C an ’t rem e m b er
netter’s
name)
Personally, I consider myself priveleged because I am a third
generation school
goer and a second generation university
degree
holder.
If I had been born a few centuries ago, or in a remote
village today, I wouldn't have had the opportunity to arm myself
with similar markers o f "social standing".
Boy, am I glad that I can
atleast chalk out
my own life, fight my own battles and owe it all to
the fact that som ew here along the line someone in my ancestry
changed for the better.
Not yet perfect but we'll all
get there
som eday.
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On a lighter tone, how many o f us have heard the cliches "the
nouveau riche”, "breeding show s” etc? Bottom line being that "the
nouveau riche may have made the money but fail to see the fine line
that separates us from them”, (hint hint) to be continued...............
Ciao.
M a la th i.

Malathi begins her response with a very interesting subject
line.

"The prevailing

caste talk part. . .(I)" is a reference not only to

the upper caste's dominance of the IDD but to their privileged
position in Indian society.

It also reveals the Brahmins attempt to

make their view of caste ecumenical.

The subject line is, in other

words, a tweaking of the upper caste's discursive hegemony.
tweaking is important.

This

The upper castes are rarely challenged on the

IDD by anyone except other upper caste people.

Malathi is letting

them know that the space is not as safe6 as they think, that she is not
going to let what they write pass in silence.
She starts the actual response with an interesting description of
what her participation or role on the IDD has been to this point.
Malathi has been "an 'active' listener, consciously listening an not just
waiting my turn to talk."

Malathi knows that many lower caste men

and women read the IDD but rarely contribute to it.
by them as hostile territory.

She consciously attempts, therefore, to

write not only for herself but for others.
from

passive

acquiescence

The IDD is seen

to active

herself and those she embodies.

Her refiguring of listening

resistance grants

dignity

to

She is letting the upper caste know

that the lower caste are present and judging.
Her next line—the one which refers to being compared to a
chimp—has three very important aspects.

First, Malathi uses the
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phrase "likes of me."

I find in this phrase a level of solidarity.

Malathi conceives of herself as a we.

This solidarity points to a very

important aspect of resisting as an object—it is communal.

Gotur

never specifically refers to Malathi or anyone else in his analogy.
What he refers to is an entire class or caste of people.

Consequently,

by using the phrase "likes of me," Malathi accepts this categorization
but refigures its worth.
"we" consciousness.

Her resistance is a group effort inspired by a

She is insulted not just as an individual but as a

cast(e) of people stretching back into India’s antiquity.
earlier

that

resistance

perspective and strategy.

as

an

object

necessitates

I think here is some proof.

I argued

a

historical

Malathi is not

refiguring a single, ahistorical subjectivity but a larger group marker
that she and others have inherited and must live within.

And if

Malathi is successful in changing how she is viewed, then others,
including those of the past, are successfully refigured

as well.7

Second, Malathi softens the bite of her response with her use of
the symbol :-).

I believe this reflects her own fear of being labeled

as shrill or unfeminine.

Besides the barrier of caste, Malathi must

deal with what Teresa de Lauretis calls "the technologies of gender."
the

ways

movies,

in

books,

which

gender

fashion,

functions

marriage

in

Indian

society

ads, religion, and elsewhere

constitute "concrete individuals as men and women" (6).
biggest

rules

of female

behavior

through

in

India

passivity—especially toward elderly males.

to

One of the

is decorum

or

even

To defy this rule leaves

one vulnerable to charges of being unfeminine, and that is a very
bad thing for a woman to be in Indian society.

For example, when

Malathi found out that one of the people with whom she had been
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openly arguing was a 60 year old Brahmin male, she literally shook.
It was only the relative anonymity of the internet that allowed her
to withstand charges of being shrill, unfeminine, and masculine.
use of the symbol

:-)

reflects her unease at being

Her

forceful—an

unease, evidently, that Chakrabarti's upper caste status dilutes.
Third, she ends the first paragraph with a playful reference to
Jane Goodall.

This reference is more than just mere name dropping—

though it is that as well.

Malathi wants people to know that she has

read Jane Goodall, that she can read Jane Goodall, and that she can
use Jane Goodall to advance an argument.

She is very cleverly

turning the tables on Gotur’s chimp argument.

She is not like a

chimp: she is like the people who study them (perhaps a veiled
reference to Gotur considering that Malathi first identifies herself as
an active observer of Brahmin behavior on the IDD).

Hence, Malathi's

alienation by Gotur, referring to her people as chimps, provided
Malathi with the agency to resist:
my thoughts."

"Raghu has prompted me to voice

She is, in effect, raising the ante of knowledge

required to enter this debate.

After all, her use of Goodall's name

assumes that the reader knows who Goodall is.
In the second paragraph Malathi consciously brings in those
people left out of Chakrabarti's apology for the caste system.

Those

who were not allowed to "vote" on their place in the system or on the
"gift" of greater specialization.

Her contrasting of the pronoun "them"

with the pronoun "you" is effective at highlighting the difference
between those who have

suffered and those who have benefited

from this system of checks and balances.
hardworking yet oppressed.

"Them" are noble and

"You" represents those who force others
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to do their dirty work for them.

These "dirty jobs" sound like Cornell

West’s "reality that one cannot not know.”8

Yet Chakrabarti is able to

deny that reality—until Malathi reveals the denial.

The upper caste

believers in caste are self-deceived and maintain the "justice" of
their system through self serving caricatures of those it destroys.
The silence of the lower caste, silence that is often taken as assent or
contentment, is, in reality, another sign of their oppression—"conform
or be cast(e) out."
read caste.

In short, Malathi is teaching Brahmins how to

She is refiguring the nomenclature by which Brahmins

decide who is noble and who is inferior.
She continues this project in the next paragraph by revealing
Chakrabarti's faulty logic:

"you are comparing apples and oranges."

She also puns on the word "birthright"—revealing it as the wonderful
thing it is for the upper caste and the horrible curse it is for the
lower caste.

She then

displays an understanding of her audience's

situatedness by predicting and refuting a potential counterargument:
"And don't

you turn it around and tellme that I consider it a burden

because of

MY 'inferiority complex'!"

Malathi knows that lower caste

people who criticize the caste system are often dismissed as suffering
an inferiority complex (and at least partial acknowledgement that
lower caste people have internalized their culturally inferior status).
She deflects this attack by listing her family's accomplishments, by
arming herself with her own "markers of 'social standing.’"

She is a

third generation school goer and a second generation degree holder.
She is not

like a chimp with a type

ancestry is

not something that marks

of which she is proud.

writer who got lucky.

Her

her as inferior but something

She rewrites the cultural interpretation of her
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ancestry, her birthright, and her people, cleansing them of the taint
they carry within the caste system.

Through these acts and through

tieing her personal family history to a larger social history, Malathi
once again displays an understanding

of historical consciousness.

The words "we'll get there some day" should be read in the broadest
possible terms.

They

comes from, where

display an understanding of where Malathi

she is, and where she hopes to go.

Finally. I

would stress that Malathi’s resistance of cultural stereotypes is based
on object status and not subjectivity.

She specifically states that she

already has subjective agency--"Boy, am I glad that I can at least
chalk out [an interesting reference to writing] my own life, fight my
own battles"—what

she is suffering from is an object

status that

configures her as inferior.
In the finalparagraph Malathi will once again turn the

tables

on the upper caste by showing them how the lower caste sees them—
a perspective which

the Brahmins are rarely subjected to.

It is not

the lower castes but the nouveau riche Brahmins of India who have
forgotten

or malformed

Indian

history.

Obsessed

with

material

goods, skin color, technology, and genetics, the lower castes cannot
help but laugh at the Brahmins.

Indeed, Malathi's pun, "on a lighter

tone," tweaks the

upper caste's obsession with skin color and caste

status as it relates

to marriage.9

writing.

However,

It is a deliciously funny little bit of

Malathi hasnot yet developed the confidence to

write these critiques openly.

She uses quotation marks, parenthesis,

and phrases such as "hint hint" to soften the critique.

She still feels

uncomfortable about expressing her opinion among these worldly
Brahmins.

Indeed. Malathi ends with the word Ciao.

This ending is
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not, I think, insignificant.

It shows that this young, brown, lower

caste woman is as cosmopolitan as the Brahmins.

Two days later the

second half of Malathi's response comes out.
* * *

Date: Fri, 29 Mar 1996 11:16:40 -0500 (EST)
From: Malathi Raghavan <m r@ christa.unh.edu>
To: India-D Editor <editor@indnet.bgsu.edu>
Subject:
Re: The
prevailing caste talk...(II)
I am quoting here
from the book "Philosophies o f India" by Heinrich
Zimmer, B ollinger Series/Princeton.
C hapter
"Caste and the Four
Life Stages" p. 152-153.
..."One is not free to choose: one belongs to a species-a family, guild
and craft, a group, a denomination.
And since this circumstance not
only determines to the last detail the regulations for one’s public and
private conduct, but also represents (according to this all-inclusive
and pervasive, unyielding pattern o f integration) the real ideal of
one's present natural character, one's concern as a ju d g in g and
acting entity must be only to meet every life problem in a manner
b e n e fitin g the role one plays.
W hereupon the two aspects of a
temporal e v e n t-th e subjective and the ob jective-w ili be joined
exactly, and the individual eliminated as a third, intrusive factor"....
The reason I preferred to quote rather than recreate
in my own
words the gist o f this passage is to convey the reserved, observernarrator style o f the author.
I know I will never assume his abstract
tone.
My imagination runs wild.
There is a fire burning in my
heart.
I ask m y s e lf’What if there is a trapped soul of my ancestor in
there somewhere?"
"What if she never let anyone hear her cries of
anguish and fear and sadness?"
"What if she consoled herself o f her
lowly status only by watching those weaker, sadder and lower than
her?"
Highly probable.
My rebellion genes are a hand-me-down,
aren ’t they?
"The supreme virtue is to become assimilated-whole heartedly and
without residue-to the timeless, im m em orial, absolutely impersonal
mask o f the classic role into which one has been brought by birth
(jati).
The individual is thus compelled to become anonymous.
And
this is regarded, furthermore, as a process not o f self-dissolution but
of self-d isco v ery ’’....
What if my own path of self-discovery takes me to another abode,
one that the pow er structure thinks is premature.
What if I had
been that exception to Mazlow's principle and didn't wait to find the
road o f excess that (supposedly) leads to the palace of wisdom?
What
if my own humble path turned out to be shortest, surest, and swiftest
way to that palace of wisdom?
—Adios folks. Malathi.
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I find this entry very moving.
without becoming emotional.

In fact, I still can't read it

Malathi is meticulous, perhaps even a

little neurotic, about not making mistakes that could be used against
her.

Notice, for example, that she not only quotes Zimmer but gives

the name of the book, the name of the chapter, the name of the
publisher, and the page number.

Such formality is not the norm on

the IDD, but she understands the stakes of the exchange.

She

understands that the question of her ability to quote and to quote
honestly

and correctly from reputable sources is notsomething she

can take

for granted.

She is showing the upper caste that she is not

afraid of them lookingthese quotations up: in fact, she is
them to

do so.

She also understands the ethos to

challenging

be gained by

quoting not only a source on caste but such an "objective" and
respected source as Heinrich Zimmer.

Malathi will use the Master’s

own tools against him—but she will not become like him.

The upper

caste cannot argue that Zimmer's summary is biased against caste.
Indeed, it may be a little flattering.

Thus, the citation not only helps

her argument but shows that she is fair, well read, and well read in
areas that many IDD members are not.
that her

credibility

is under the

Malathi is constantly aware

microscope,

and

she uses

this

knowledge, her superior knowledge of books, and her fairness to try
and refigure what the upper caste see, can see, and how they can see.
The next paragraph is has layers of complexity.

Her building of

credibility or ethos by admitting that she is not and cannot be distant
in her view of caste; her attempt to persuade through the moving
and

beautiful

passages

on

her

ancestry;

her

refiguring

of

her

ancestors from happy, accepting, "coolies" into tragic figures whose

79

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

potential was stunted and spirit turned mean; her revealing of the
insidious

nature o f casteism—that it maintains

its

hold on

those

lower in the hierarchy by providing them with someone even lower
than they; her line about rebellious genes which mocks the upper
caste obsession with "spiritual eugenics" all contribute to making the
writing very persuasive and educative.
inferiority, Malathi's

Far from being a mark of her

"genes" are a sign of her ancestors' denied

potential and of her responsibility to fight the battles they could not.
to topple the system that robbed them of themselves.

Supposedly

good or neutral terms such as "a species," "a family," "guild and craft."
"integration,"

"real

ideal."

and "natural character"

now all sound

ridiculous, even evil, after Malathi teaches us to read them as those
ruled by them read them.
loses

In

fact, when we read the next citation, it

its descriptive distance.

words "timeless,"

"Virtue" becomes a willto power.

"immemorial," and "absolutely impersonal

The
mask"

are revealed for the historic, subjective, and oppressive privilegings
they are.
Malathi uses her status as an alienated mirror of
castes to change what is reflected.
brought

to

their status

in

the upper

She shows that Indians have been

society

not

through

a

spiritually

determined birth but through a carefully constructed power system
of defined and definers.

"The individual is" not "compelled to

become anonymous," words that now seems horrific, but condemned
or consecrated to live publicly an object status that punishes some
and privileges others.

Caste, in Malathi's writing, becomes, for the

lower castes, not a process of self-discovery but a system of selfannihilation.

Through her use of personal experience, pathos, and
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ethos

Malathi

has

once again

Zimmer's "neutral" passage.

taught the Brahmins

how

to see

They learn to read the passage not for

what it says but for what it does—for the damage these supposedly
neutral, beautiful, and timeless ideas do to those who had no say in
constructing them.

Malathi has become a teacher, and so her object

status must change.

She is not like a chimp with a typewriter.

She is

like a teacher with her students.
The most important part of Malathi’s last paragraph, besides
the reference to Mazlow [sic], is the audacious claim Malathi makes.
She is beginning to grow in confidence as a writer.

Malathi begins

the paragraph with a series of questions designed to open up other
possibilities for viewing these ideas.

She then discredits the "road to

excess" as costing too much for those not allowed to travel it, and the
"supposed" place of wisdom as not seeming all that wise to those it
brutalizes.

Then she asks:

"What if my own humble path turned out

to be the shortest, surest, and swiftest way to the palace of wisdom?"
There are three important qualities to this question:

first, it is a

question and so continues to build Malathi’s credibility as learned yet
nondomineering; second, as a question, it puts Malathi in the role of
the teacher; third, and perhaps most important, Malathi does not ask
whether her humble path is the shortest, surest, and swiftest way to
wisdom for her but whether it is the fastest, surest, and swiftest way
for everyone.

There is no second "me" in the sentence.

what Malathi is asking is:
justice,
woman?

and

wisdom

is

In effect,

what if the way to knowledge, truth,
through

a

lower

caste,

brown-skinned,

If that is is true, then how will the upper caste attain

salvation? They can see neither her nor themselves.

Malathi has lost
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her timidness.

She has rewritten her cultural worth.

castes must come to Malathi. to the lower castes, to learn.
she

The upper
After all.

has shown that she not only understands the "accepted"

or

traditional view of caste, but that she sees the flaws of that view.
She

understands

and

understand and see.

can

see

more

than

the

upper

caste

can

Predictably, many upper caste Indians find this

new relationship to the lower castes threatening.
***
Date: Sat. 30 Mar 1996 16:46:08 -0500
From: "Sukanya C hakrab arti”
Subject: Caste system:
Guarding ourselves against the truth
It must be convenient to live in a shroud of ignorance.
Such a life
inevitably produces the kind o f mentality that can allow one to make
flippant remarks about the flying habits o f ostriches in reference to
a serious social issue, or grossly misinterpret a clear argument.
But
that is the toll that indoctrination has on an impressionable mind.
The A merican media has becom e highly adept at
the art o f
brainwashing: it specializes in propagating stereotypes
that b olster
the American image at the expense o f the truth.
The targets are
usually ideas that threaten traditional ideas, i.e., in America, we are
all equals, there ain't no class distinctions, and certainly not the
kind o f oppression that one experiences in other cultures—namely,
the kind of oppression that is due to the caste system in India.
I have already put forw ard argum ents that dem onstrate that the
caste system was designed to prevent the oppression
that results
when social prestige and power are concentrated in one sector o f the
population, as in the capitalist system.
The gratuitous assertion was
made that my remarks imply that I would support slavery.
Slavery is
immoral; the caste system was formulated to ensure that the moral
rights and interests of the majority of the population would not be
subordinated to the interests o f the minority.
(Consider corporate
interests in the U.S.
If you are unfamiliar with this line of criticism,
read up on Noam Chompsky.)
An analysis of the State of India today
must necessarily be more com plex—social institutions that were once
powerful have been replaced by new influences.
It is ludicrous that
one could think that my arguments would imply that the American
economy has flourished due to the influence of Christianity.
My
arguments were offered in the context on ancient India.
If these
remarks are taken out o f context, one will obviously end with with
laughable statements.
There is no simplistic analysis of
the present
A m e r ic a n
e c o n o m y —g l o b a l i z a t i o n
and
in d u s tr i a li z a ti o n
h av e
widespread effects that cannot be easily understood.
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Finally, we must seriously consider such questions as:
Can there
ever be a classless society? Given the history o f opppresion. shall we
not try to find a solution that minimizes oppression? (for oppression
exists in all forms o f society) Shall we not try to create a system of
checks and balances that accords pow er to one class, and balances
this by depriving it of wealth? Are not social equality and social
mobility mutually exclusive? (If we were all equals, why would we
climb up the social ladder?) Ask yo urself how much o f what you
have been told by the media is true.
It will not be easy to find the
truth—for it is well-guarded.
The victors have the privilege o f
writing history.
But we have a responsibility to know the truth of
our cu lture.

In this entry Chakrabarti is responding to both Malathi and

an

entry by a non-upper caste, non-Hindu Indian named Sendil Nathan.
Nathan accused Chakrabarti of willful ignorance inspired by religious
dogmatism.
"shroud

Thus, Chakrabarti begins her response by writing of a

of

ignorance"—an

allusion

to

C hristianity--

and

disparaging the "kind of mentality" such a shroud produces.
who knock

the caste system are brainwashed,

impressionable.

by

Those

indoctrinated,

and

They are traitors to their culture and traditions,

lower caste dupes incapable of understanding the complexity of her
argument,

not really

We've seen

these

Indians but pawns of the American media.

argument From Chakrabarti

before.

Her first

paragraph is merely an attempt to once again control cultural images.
In

the

second

paragraph

we

again

have

dazzling

mental

gymnastics, a displacement of argument, and this time—perhaps in
direct response

to Malathi—the parenthetical

Chomsky.

fact that the name dropping is done

The

more interesting than the

namedrop of

actual name dropped (although

Noam

as an aside is
it is

ironic

that she relies on a American theorist to advance her argument given
her charge

that

American media).

those

who oppose

her

are

brainwashed

by

the

The off handedness of the remark implies that
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this reference is just the merest fraction of what Chakrabarti knows.
She includes it merely for the benefit of the less informed.
In the
implicit

last

argument

H aberm asian

paragraph
that

public

Chakrabarti

India

is

far

sq u a re—which

Chakrabarti's "we” to mean anything.

simply
from

would

ignores

having
be

Malathi’s

achieved

necessary

a
for

Also, I think the last line—"we

have a responsibility to know the truth of our culture"—corresponds
interestingly with the subject line:
truth."

"Guarding ourselves against the

I would argue that is exactly what Chakrabarti is doing.

never asks whose

culture,

whose

truth

is being

guarded.

She
She

portrays others as ignorant to guard herself against the truth of
lower caste oppression.

It is a defense that Malathi

will soon

p e n e tra te .
***
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 1996 21:14:42 -0500 (EST)
From:
Malathi Raghavan < mr@kepler.unh.edu>
To: India-D Editor <editor@INDNET.BGSU.EDU>
Subject: Noam Chomsky & Caste
N a m e - d r o p p in g can
be
e ff e c tiv e w h en
the
n am e
dro p p er
understands the political beliefs of the name that she is dropping.
Using Noam Chomsky's name to defend the caste system is like using
G an d h i’s name
to defen d bloodshed.
If Chomsky, a dedicated
" an arch ist and lib e r ta r ia n - s o c ia lis t” knew that his h u m a n ita ria n
argum ents ag ain st A m e ric a n /c o lo n ia lis t/c a p ita lis t e x p lo ita tio n were
being used to defend the caste system he'd probably throw up or at
least cry out "the emperor" has no clothes".
That someone should use
C hom sky, a w o rld -ren o w n ed hum an-rights defender, sch o lar, and
cham pion o f the o p p re s s e d to defend a backw ard, o p p ressiv e,
disgusting concept such as caste is ironic in the least and tragically
sad at worst.
M a la t h i

Date: Wed. 03 Apr 96 11:39:57 -0500
From: shl
To:
mr@kepler.unh.edu
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Subject:

Re:

Noam Chomsky & Caste

Well said, indeed!

My favorite response by Malathi—sharp, eloquent, confident,
carnivalesque.

As I’ve already written, Malathi rarely got praise

openly on the IDD.

However, she did often receive private emails

like this one following her Chomsky entry.

These responses were

usually from women and almost always from lower caste people.
Reinforcing Malathi’s awareness that she wrote not only for herself,
but for those who felt they could not write openly on the IDD.
In her Chomsky entry, Malathi catches Chakrabarti as she says-without any clothes on (Chakrabarti's name means emperor).
carnivalesque

moment

in

which

the ruling

destroyed by Bakhtinian laughter.

class's

superiority

In

fact,

she

Chakrabarti.
hegemony.

is

Not only does Malathi also know

Chomsky, she knows him better than Chakrabarti does.
quote him correctly.

It is a

She can

Malathi is not a dupe of the American media.

understands

its

hegemonic

impulse

better

than

After all, she understands Chomsky's critique of that
Malathi has in this one entry shown the corrupt nature

of upper caste knowledge and refigured her own cultural value.

It

was not Chakrabarti's corrupt use of knowledge which revealed her;
it was Malathi’s writing.

If Malathi is like a chimp with a typewriter,

then what does that make someone who is outsmarted by a chimp?
If Malathi is like a chimp, then how can she understand Chomsky
and the emperor does not?

The last line of the entry especially

refigures class status for the members of the IDD.

If they do not

want to look "backward, oppressive, disgusting," then they need the
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information

Malathi

has.

But to get that knowledge,

they

must

change how they see her.
I would now like to turn over this chapter over to Malathi.
do this because

of the political and ethical issues involved

attempt to represent her and the debate among the Indians.

I

in my
As John

Ernest argues,
We cannot escape the labyrinth o f cultural diversity and social
practice to reach the com mon ground o f clarity and understanding,
nor should we want to try.
We can only acknowledge that it is. a
labyrinth, that inevitably we all stand at different points within the
labyrinth, and
that the academy has developed a way o f giving its
section o f the labyrinth the appearance o f independence and order.
Much as I might like to. I cannot build a bridge that will take me
where my students live: I cannot understand them sim ply by
learning more about their backgrounds.
But I can take what I learn
to understand more fully where I live, and the terms o f my life
there. The best way to build bridges between cultures, it seems tome.
is not to start from the other shore, but to explore the geography and
shifting sands o f the shore upon which one stands—to examine and
reveal the assumptions, beliefs, and limitations o f the culture one
knows best.
The acknowledgement of distance, joined with the desire
to reach across that distance, is usually a more effective and
respectful approach to human understanding than is the pretension
of closeness and empathy.
("100 Friends” 23)

In my reading of Malathi's writing I have tried to remember that I
cannot ultimately know her. and that to pretend that I can is a form
of

appropriation.

My

interpretation

of

her

writing

interpretation of a text and, as Ernest implies, of myself.

is

the

I would

like, therefore, to give her a space where she can critique what I
have written.

Malathi, after reading the chapter wrote the following

response.

M a la th i's

Before
imm ediate

C r itiq u e

I write anything,
nuclear

family

let me be clear about this:

and

I

do

not

face

overt
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my
caste

discrimination.

My father considers

himself an atheist,

and my

mother, in addition to being an agnostic, possesses a "westernized"
mind with respect to culture and tastes.

This "colonization" of her

mind has had the salutary effect of breaking the hold caste prejudice
has over many in my extended family.

Also my mother, I believe, is

fairer and prettier than most of her cousins—a very important trait
for an

Indian

woman.

Also,

my immediate

family speaks

and

understands English (while most of my extended family do not), and
we are more middle class, economically, than my extended family.
All these things contribute to making me look (and sometimes feel)
more inherently confident than my cousins, and this confidence buys
me relative immunity to the kinds of discrimination and ridicule
they face everyday.
But this is not to say that there have been or are no effects of
internalized casteism

on both

my nuclear and extended families.

From birth we are taught through the Hindu religion, the images in
our televisions, in our movies, and in our literature that fairer is
more beautiful, that dark is beastial and low, that caste reflects the
worth of the soul, and that acceptance of hierarchy is a virtue.
Moreover, as a woman I face the added oppression of the gendered
image:

domesticity, meekness, purity.

It is not that long ago that a

wife, to prove her love for her husband, threw herself, or was helped
t o , onto his funeral pyre—a practice that is not unheard of today and
that helps to justify the dowry burning that still continue.
Lance’s terms:

So to use

one of the object traits assigned to women in India

seems to be that of kindling.

My mother, sister, cousins, and I all

suffer from this image of the female.

However, the psychological and
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material effects of caste based prejudice—which I think Lance

is

right in looking at as internalized negative stereotypes—are much
worse for the poor in Endian than for the wealthy—a fact Lance
might have mentioned more.

For as in all other things, no money

makes matters worse.
As to what I wrote on the EDD, E am reading my own internet
writings after a long time, and it amazes me how quickly my anger,
emotions, and passions are once again aroused by reading Gotur’s
and

C h a k ra b arti's writing.

The way that they present the caste

system, a very complicated and painful topic for many Indians, in
such a simplistic, cold,

"logical." "factual"

manner infuriates

me.

Indeed, my own relationship to caste is very complicated.

Though

physically

to

1 look

like

a

lower class

person,

E have,

my

embarrassment, learned to mask that appearance by the way I dress,
walk, talk, think, and dream.
internalize

the

inferiority

E have learned, as Lance writes, to
that

others

assign

my

body

and

reexternalize that sense of inferiority through the cosmetic—or what
1 think Lance would call object traits.
another mask that hides
neutral to caste status.
name in the south.

As an aside, E also have

my caste status: my name.

'Malathi' is

But 'Raghavan' is definitely an upper-caste

Et is the name of Lord Rama, who is generally not

the family-God of non-brahmins in the south.
my father's first name.

'Raghavan' is actually

En the Tamil culture, in order to meet the

last name requirement put forth by the British, the first name of
husband/father became the wife's or child’s last name due to the
absence of family names.

The other option would have been to use

the caste name—but every 'non-upper' caste individual knows better
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than to voluntarily expose their ’inferior' caste status.

However.

'Raghavan' is not the name given my father by his parents.

It is the

name that he selected for himself after he completed his B.E. degree
at around the age 20.

His parents had actually given him the name

'Pichandi', which, when translated, means 'one who asks for charity’:
not a very flattering identity

(usually names with such meanings are

used only by the lower-castes).

Therefore, I can quite understand

that my father wanted to change his name.
seems

To uses Lance's ideas it

that he wrote himself a new identity through the act of

renaming himself.

Why he chose the name ’Raghavan’ is intriguing

to me. but I can only speculate because this is a topic that cannot be
touched in my home.
To return to the topic of my relationship to caste, I have often
been, due to my outward cosmetics and middle class status, mistook
as coming from "Brahmin stock" and, consciously, have never tried to
set this straight—except for the moment I "declared" myself on the
internet.

Even then, wrapped in the anonymity of cyber space, it

took everything I had to do it.

I have many times endured the

unpleasant experience of 'eavesdropping' on conversations, the likes
of

which

would

not

have

been

meant

for

my

ears

if

conversationalists had known the truth about my caste status.

the
I

have, in other words, more often than not, been living a lie.
I think, therefore, that what Lance wrote is very true—if a
little flattering of my arguments.

Line by line his analysis of the

writing revealed both motive and purpose.

It amazes and frightens

me about how transparent I must have been.

I was resting the

stereotypes that Indian society imposed on me, that caused me to
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want to live a lie.

I wanted my writing to prove that I am relatively

better read, a better writer, sharper, more logical, more critical than
the brahmins—mainly because they do not believe it could be so.

I

was writing, as Lance says, not only to make an argument but to
show that I can

make arguments, arguments

those put forth by the apologists for caste.
that
skin,

more persuasive

than

I wanted to show

them

I wasn't like a chimp with a typewriter,
my gender,

that my dark brown

and my ancestry weren't something I should be

ashamed of but proud of.
achieve or maintain.

It is a sense of pride that is not easy to

Every message, every image, every form of

story in Indian society portrays, even stresses, the exact opposite.
Brown skinned and lower caste women are to be beaten, worked into
an early grave, set on fire, screwed in dirty hotel rooms because the
fair

skinned brahmin girls
don’t fool
w

around before marriage
and
&

certainly not anywhere but in their own beautiful homes.
right!

Yeah

All of these things make up the oppression of imagery that I

was trying to fight against.
However, there is one thing that I wish to state:
that Lance gives me too much praise.

I would like to think that my

writing indeed isthe reason that Chakrabarti
then

on.

I am afraid

remained silent

from

But even I will not assume that she or anyone else who

believes in the "genius of the caste
change only because of my input.

system" underwent a radical

I am afraid that it is not so easy.

Social leaders have been begging, cajoling, arguing, fighting for so
many years calling for a change in the way we see the caste system,
yet so many things remain undone.

How can my insignificant writing

on the internet, read by a "polished." "educated," and "self-righteous"
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audience, be

any more

powerful

than

the work of major social

re fo rm e rs ?
Still, I also know that there are a lot of non-upper caste people
who are intimidated from voicing their reactions on the IDD.
something

in

our culture

that prevents

talking about their lower-caste origin.

lower class

people

digest itself.

from

I know because I suffer from

this myself, and I received a lot of their personal thank yous.
felt very agitated that I didn’t

There is

receive

Still, I

any open support on the

Where does one draw the confidence to resist as an

object when all the signs of a society degrade that status? So, I
wonder if I need to feel supported to continue writing.

Of course,

Lance does write that resistance as an object is inherently communal.
I think that is a very good point.

The other reason I think that the

writing I did was important even if it didn't "shut up" or persuade
the brahmins

was for my own

mental health.

I write to

purge

myself of this 'sense of inferiority' that I have been carrying around
inside myself.

I feel so much more mature and 'cured' now that I

have opened out to the world about my origins.
and rid of all my baggage.
about the "silencing effect"
netters.

I feel less tortured

But, I wouldn’t be so sure and confident
that all this had on the upper-caste

Still, [ am sure that "resisting as an object"—as Lance calls

it—did a great deal for my own and other lower caste peoples' sense
of identity.

R esp o n se

to

a

R e sp o n se

At first, I was not going to respond to what Malathi wrote at
all.

I was going to give her as much space as possible, but I feel

9 I
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compelled to comment, if quickly, on what she wrote.

There are a

number of things that strike me as interesting in Malathi’s critique.
First. I

think she's right—I did over estimate the

writing had on the Brahmins

effect that her

[it’s interesting to me that Malathi

never capitalizes this word], probably because as a non-Indian I do
not have the same intimacy with these issues.

It seems to me. from

my position in the labyrinth, that those supporting caste have little
credibility.

Yet, I would stress that Malathi did receive many private

e-mails for what she

wrote from other lower caste Indians, and that

Chakrabarti did stop writing on the IDD.

Further, Malathi writes not

only to create space for her subjectivity or to turn herself from
object to subject but to redefine the value and image of her object
status—and

the

mandates.

She tries to teach members of the IDD. through her

intelligence,
brownness,
need

material

pathos,

intelligent, beautiful.
areas.

ethos,

lower caste

to have or at

and

psychological

logos,

status,

least

and

this

autobiography

femininity

understand

effects

as

attributes

valuing

to

desire

that

they

in order to be just,

fair,

I think she did achieve some success in these

Perhaps, therefore, the effect of her refiguring of object status

was greater than Malathi thinks.
Second, it strikes me how that even in her response to what I
wrote Malathi felt it necessary to continue to refine her object status.
She goes to great pains to make sure that I understand that she has
not suffered the discrimination that other lower caste people have,
and that

she is not a typical lower caste person.

words, a
caste

status

She feels, in other

need to both embrace and distance herself from a lower
to

ensure

authenticity.

It's

not

that

Malathi
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is

embarrassed by her lower caste status but
for an upper caste person.
than she is.

by her ability to "pass"

She knows that others are much worse off

She feels some sense of having betrayed them when she

"passed" as

a Brahmin.

Her fight, therefore, is to represent the lower

caste people on the IDD, and herself through them, who have not yet
developed the economic and social level necessary to write as she
does.

She wants to be their voice, but she recognizes the danger of

appropriation.
Third,

and

perhaps

most

importantly,

in

Malathi's

original

entries and in her response to my interpretation, I was struck by the
way

personal

narrative,

political oppression.

family

experience,

was

used

to

resist

I think this is the way to tie what Malathi did

and my notions about resistance through object status to the writing
classroom.

Through our student's personal narratives they have the

power to refigure

oppressive

stereotypes—for themselves

least potential, for those who impose them.

and,

at

The students can use

personal narrative, puns, ethos, logos, pathos, cited authority, and a
host of other techniques that Malathi uses to change the value of
their object status.

Here is the students' means to resist in the post

postmodern world, especially marginalized students.
rhetoric,
being,

writing

to

compose

into an object

greater community.

the

fragmented

that seduces,

teaches,

To use words,

discourses
and

of their

transforms

the

The post postmodern student would not seek

the existential agency of the subject but the existential agency of the
resisting object.

This is not to say that personal narrative is not

without risk when tied to the political, but that personal narrative
has always

already

been

tied

to the politic,

to the

politics

93

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of

representation.

Finally, I am struck with how what Malathi wrote

echoes with the work of Jean Baudrillard.

Baudrillard believes that

we are objects every bit as much as we are subjects, and that this
object status has profound implications
each other.

for how weinteract with

Therefore, I would like to end this chapter with an

examination of his theory—a theory that

inspired my

initial interest

in object status as a site of resistance.

T he Su p rem acy o f the O bject or "M irror M irror on the W all"

Jean Baudrillard, with his disdain for historical consciousness,
political agency, and social progress,

might seem a strange

through

resistance.

which

to

interpret

important

theorists

criticized

Baudrillard's

acts

of

in composition,
work

as

rhetoric,

nihilistic,

and

lens

Indeed,

many

elsewhere

have

dangerously

skeptical,

socially crippling, and oblivious to anything non-discursive.

For

example, Lester Faigley, while admiring the irony and challenge of
Baudrillard's

insights,

believes that "At a time when widespread

misery has become part of the daily landscape even in affluent
centers

of

the

West,

few

committed

[Baudrillard's] nihilistic answer—'to play
left—acceptable (211).
uncompromising
Baudrillard's

to

activism

will

find

with the pieces' of

his

what's

James Berlin, who also enjoys Baudrillard's

attacks on hypocrisy,

nevertheless

maintains

that

work represents the kind of extreme epistemological

skepticism that leads to a "passive acquiescence to things as they
are" (R h e to r ic 57).

Douglas Kellner, one of Baudrillard's harshest

critics,

Baudrillard

warns

that

"has

fantasized

himself

into

a

repetitive metaphysical orbit with no apparent exit, and that, unless

94

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a dramatic reversal appears, his work will become ever more bizarre,
trivial, reactionary and pataphysical" (Jean Baudrillard 217).

Finally,

Cornel West, whose work is representative of the pragmatism that is
becoming more influential in composition, argues that
Baudrillard seems to be articulating a sense o f what it is to be a
French, middle-class intellectual, or perhaps what it is to be middle
class generally . . . . [but] there is a reality that one cannot n ot know.
The ragged edges o f the Real, o f N e c e s s ity , not being able to eat, not
having shelter, not having health care, all this is something one
cannot not know.
The black condition acknowledges that.
(277)

To West's criticism I might add the potential imperialistic impulse in
Baudrillard's work.

When he writes that "It is the Object that is

exciting, because the Object is my vanishing point," and that "The
Other is what allows me not to repeat myself for ever," he risks
endorsing, even through his irony, the colonization or consumption of
the other for one's own identity ("The Object" 173, 174).10
For these critics and others, Baudrillard’s work leaves little or
no room for the impact of the non-discursive on our lives—especially
the lives of the oppressed and the poor.
or

images

are

understanding.

ultim ately

a

His

postmodernism,

lucid

form

Even Baudrillard's simulacra
of

discursive
they

practice

feel,

denies

and
the

possibility of a self and community capable o f effective democratic
politics—at least as these are traditionally understood.

The hungry,

the homeless, those without health care cannot simply float from one
signifying orgy to another.

There is too high a price to pay for not

paying attention to the reality of hunger, cold, and physical threat.
Thus for these critics, Baudrillard's work reflects the situatedness of
the privileged and is, therefore, useful to a limited and exclusive
segment of society.11

While agreeing with these critiques to some
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extent, I wonder if perhaps they are missing a powerful strategy for
resisting social inequities, especially

for the

marginalized,

within

Baudrillard’s work—a strategy he himself neglects due to his love of
irony, skepticism, and strategic caricature.
In Fatal

Strategies

Baudrillard

argues that "We have always

lived off the splendor of the subject and the poverty of the object.

It

is the subject that makes history, it's the subject that totalizes the
world . . . .

In our philosophy of desire, the subject retains absolute

privilege, since it is the subject that desires" (111).

In other words,

as long as the necessity of the subject reigns, then the violence of
history, the privileging of the powerful, the subordination of the
weak remains justified and justifiable by desire.

"But," Baudrillard

continues, "everything is inverted if one passes on to the thought of
seduction.
object

There, it’s no longer the subject which desires, it's

which

seduces.

everything returns to it"

Everything

comes from

(111).

find a powerful potential

I

the

the

object

and
for

resistance and a plan for human emancipation, especially for the
marginalized, within this idea of the seducing object, a power and
plan enabled not by their distance from the fragmentation of the
world but by their situated alienation within it.
Again and again in Baudrillard's work, he reminds us that "we
are objects as much as subjects" (124).

We are not only entities

which think, desire, measure, judge, and feel; we are entities which
are

thought

about,

desired,

measured,

judged,

and

Baudrillard believes that "what we all want as objects . . .

felt.

And

is not to be

hallucinated and exalted as a subject . . . , but rather to be taken
profoundly

as object"

(124).

We

want

to

be

seen

and.
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more

importantly,

treated

as

beautiful,

important, and necessary.

intelligent,

valuable,

cherished,

We want to be treated profoundly as

objects because, as Baudrillard's quotes imply, there are material and
psychological punishments for not being treated so and revolutionary
possibilities if we are.

Since object status is not limited to the non

human in Baudrillard’s work, and since the marginalized carry a
more explicit object status than those with privileged subjectivities,12
the marginalized could possess this power of inversion as well.

If the

marginalized can recognize the condition and potentiality of their
object status, then, potentially, everything must also come from them
and to them.
structures

Included

in this everything would be a culture’s

of representation,

subaltern speak?"

limitation,

and

identity.

"Can

the

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak asks—wondering,

in

effect, if the marginalized can be heard by the privileged within
structures

of discourse

determined

by

relations

of power.

My

answer would be yes but perhaps more as seducing objects than as
desiring

the

dominant

counterfeit,

suspect,

predetermined, or, most condescendingly of all. tolerated.

As the

structures

subjects.
of

As

society,

the

latter,

they

are

at

least

always

within

former they have access to and are a power themselves.

Our object

status has a cultural cash value, if you will, which privileges some
and marginalizes others.
Consequently, our object status marks the clearest and most
social manifestation of the narratives of limitation and definition
which bring us into cultural and political being.
construct us as black,
bisexual, etc.

These narratives

brown, white, male, female, straight,

These definitions

gay,

are evaluative and are tied to other

97

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

fluid,

numerous,

and

evaluative definitions

that

combine

and

dissolve to constitute our identities. In Malathi's

case the markers of

social status include color, gender, and ancestry.

By identifying and

showing

how

and

why

these

narratives

came

into

being,

understanding how they construct the understanding and valuing of
people. Malathi offeres the marginalized a chance to refigure these
narratives and, through that refiguring, themselves.
Why do

the marginalized especially possess

the agency

or

power to do this narrative "remapping''? Because of their status as
alienated objects within the culture.
Object's

power and

Baudrillard explains that "The

sovereignty derive

estranged from itself" ("The Object"

from

172).

the

fact that it

is

The object, unlike the

subject, does not "live off the illusion of its own desire: it gets along
quite well without it" (Faigley 213).

But

for us [the privileged subjectivities of W estern culture] the exact
opposite is true.
Civilization's first gesture is to hold up a mirror to
the Object, but the Object is only seemingly reflected therein; in fact
it is the Object itself which is the mirror, and it is here that the
subject is taken in by the illusion o f himself.
(Baudrillard "The
Object" 173).

The idea that the object, and by extension the marginalized person as
object, is used as a "mirror" in which the subject sees himself or
herself opens up a path of resistance.

If the marginalized

can

understand their role as mirror, how their

object status came

into

being, and the dependency of the subject on that mirror to maintain
its illusions, then they can influence what the privileged see, can see.
and want to see.

For example, if a white male looks into the mirror

of blackness and sees back at least that he is white, that he is not
simply the norm, then blackness has refigured how the white male
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must view his existence and being.

As bell hooks argues.

"As

fantastic as it may seem, racist white people find it easy to imagine
that black people cannot see them if within their desire they do not
want to be seen by the dark Other" (Killing Rage 35).
gain control of what

the

By seeking to

mirror of subjectification

reflects,

the

marginalized have a chance to refigure the norms of society that
keep them oppressed.
the

uniqueness,

hierarchy

on

Further, if the mirror can reflect the beauty,

the

incommensurability

which

white

of

supremacy

blackness,
is

founded

questionable as the only or best way of being.
what Baudrillard calls a strange attractor:
can be for reality:

then

the

becom es

The object becomes

"The Object is what theory

not a reflection but a challenge and a strange

attractor" ("The Object" 173).

In short, the object offers and could

control, through awareness and action, the possibility of new forms
of subjectivity.

Hence, the marginalized, because of their alienation,

have a perspective on society that the privileged, because of their
place at the top of society, cannot get anywhere else.

And the

privileged subject needs this perspective because he or she "know[s]
the subject too well: the subject knows himself [herself] too well"
("The Object" 173).
Resistance, under an extended Baudrillardian
require,

therefore,

a unified

and

distanced

outside of the flow of codes, to function.

lens, does

perspective,

not

a place

Instead, it requires an

understanding of alienated position within the flow of codes and the
means

to

restructure

that

flow—a

means

that

comes

from

the

alienation itself and an understanding that comes from the empirical
examination of the "documents" that create, sustain, and resist that
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alienation.

Resistance becomes a form of educative practice.

The

marginalized become teachers instead of docile bodies, literally and
figuratively

using

the

power

provided

by

their alienated

object

status to resist how they and others are seen, defined, and consumed
as objects.
object

They seek to control not only the means of their own

status's

production

and

consumption

but

the

means

of

producing the privileged subject's identity, becoming an object which
seduces rather than a subject which desires.
This metamorphosis from subject to object is different than
fighting to have one's subjectivity recognized—to be tolerated, if you
will.

Such a fight, even if successful, leaves the one who is granted

the recognition in a subjugated position and the one who grants the
recognition

in

a

dominant

position.

’’While

I

think

your

homosexuality is disgusting. I will tolerate it as long as you remain
within

predetermined

com m unity
Supposed

so

bounds

insightfully

o f behavior."
argues:

As

"tolerance

the

homosexual

equals

death."

"angry, white males" are not angry because they

must

grant subjectivity and tolerance to others, nor are they threatened
by others' calls for subjectivity and tolerance.
reigns

and

As long as subjectivity

"angry, white males" have control of the institutions

which grant it and dispense tolerance, they are still in the dominant
p o sitio n .13
The angry white males are angry because others have begun to
question

the

value

of the

white,

male,

corporate

object

status.

Perhaps, rich, white, straight, males are not the only or best standard
by which things should be judged.
communities

are more

seductive,

Perhaps the qualities of other
more

beneficial,

more

sexually

I 00
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attractive, kinder to the environment, kinder to other cultures.

After

all, William Bennetts' belief that America is losing the cultural war is
not based on a fear of having to tolerate "deviants," but on the fear
that "deviants" are demanding to be seen and are being seen as
legitimate,

perhaps even better, alternatives

to traditional

norms.

The angry white males sense the shift in cultural power contained in
images

of beauty,

reflect back,

intelligence, justice,

and strength

and so reaffirm, their own faces.

changed what it reflects.

that do not

The mirror

has

While still in control of the culture's

dominant economic and social mechanisms, they have at least begun
to feel what it is like to have an object status that is not desired by
all cultural institutions—institutions that have attained the power to
make that undesirability felt.

This is why the arguments of such

theorists as Dinesh D'Souza are so attractive to the conservative right.
As an Asian

immigrant, D'Souza's work puts a new face on old

arguments that help keep minorities within frames that the white
power structure finds more comfortable.

For example, D'Souza does

not argue that African Americans are genetically inferior in the

area

of intelligence and so responsible for their own oppression (although
he

spends

page

after

page

giving

"careful"

and

"thoughtful"

consideration to such arguments), but because past o p p ressio n has
forced them to create an inferior culture.

He writes:

I argue that the main problem faced by blacks is neither deficient IQ
[notice D'Souza doesn’t say that blacks don't have inferior IQs only
that such inferiority isn’t their main problem ], as suggested in the
The Bell Curve, nor racial discrimination, as alleged by Jesse Jackson
and other Civil rights activists.
Rather, the book [his book] contends
that African A m ericans have developed a culture that was an
ad aptation to historical oppression but is, in several important
respect, dysfunctional today. (The End xiii)

10 I
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Under

this argument,

whites do not have to examine their

own

practices nor their role in the history of oppression in this country
because 1) oppression is in the past, and because 2) it's the "blacks”
own fault.14 Hence, calls for tolerance or for a common humanity can
be tolerated because they ultimately legitimate the preexisting social
order.

As

bell hooks explains, white supremacists

"have a deep

emotional investment in the myth of 'sameness,' even as their actions
reflect the primacy of whiteness as a sign for informing who they are
and how they think" (Killing Rage 35).
However, refiguring object status disrupts that order to its very
core.

It works to intervene in and alter those racist stereotypes that

keep the other under the control of the white image.
tolerance

or

but

appreciation.

Black becomes beautiful, positive, generative and not
lack of white.

even

acceptance

do

the opposite or

seek

the

marginalized

merely

not

Suddenly,

Homosexuality

something not to be tolerated but to be celebrated.

becomes
When the

marginalized look into the eyes of the privileged, they do not want to
see condescending tolerance but empowering desire—a desire, if the
marginalized person understands his or her situatedness, that does
not control the object but the one gazing.

This seductive power

constructs the marginalized student as a "pearl of great price."
course,

this

refiguring

power also

represents

the

threat

Of

of the

marginalized, the challenge of which Baudrillard wrote.
Importantly, this seductive power is different from that which
is assigned to the traditional image of the seductive woman, a woman
whose power over men is so great that she must remained masked,
veiled, or kept out of sight.

In that situation the woman does not

10 2
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control her object status but is controlled by it.

The male has

assigned the attributes that are desirable and uses them to control
the female.

Within Baudrillard's frame, or at least my construction of

it. it is the woman who seizes control of the mirror of reflection.
the woman

who decides what the desirable traits

It is

are and through

the refiguring power o f her rhetoric, her argumentation, uses them to
refigure the desire o f the subject.
sexuality is

used to confront,

Like Madonna in a MTV video,

control, and retrain

the male's gaze.

And while the capitalist overtones of object resistance

may seem

distasteful, and while having a student whose "sense of self is set out
exclusively in how she believes she is perceived by others" (Faigley
216) may seem the most profound cynicism or inauthenticity, I am
not arguing that the student's sense of self is or should be set out
exclusively by how others see him or her.

I am arguing

that

understanding one's object status opens up paths of resistance that
are not immobilized in the postmodern impasse.
Though w h a t the

Granted, this resistance is not easy to do.
narratives

are that

constitute

object status

is always

known,

if

sometimes only implicitly, the arbitrary and ideological w h y of how
narratives

are

is

often

invisible.

perversity

of homosexuality

or

the

For example,

the

supposed

of

end

America are presented as "facts" and so beyond
than ideological constructs to be debated.

supposed
racism

in

argument rather

If these explanations do

need to be argued for, then the proof of their validity is presented as
common sense, patriotism, legal precedent, or economic

necessity.

However,

of these

if the ideology,

the

vested interest, the bias

supposedly self-evident facts can be exposed through the refiguring
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mirror of an aware object, then the invisibility becomes visible.

If

the marginalized person as object does not remain passive, docile,
and cooperative

but instead embraces

what

Baudrillard calls

inexorability and irredeemability, then resistance is possible.

its
And

while Baudrillard is right in that we cannot trace the historical,
material,

and

contextual

conditions

of

these

narratives

in

a

progressive or rational way; that we cannot escape the constitutive
an arbitrary role of language; Foucault is right in that there is still a
pattern.

We can trace the genealogy of how these narratives came to

be even if that genealogy is not rational or progressive.

If the

pattern can be traced and the inconsistency, irrationality, and chance
which created it can be revealed, then it looses the power to seem
natural, logical, common sensical, or preordained.
Thus, Baudrillard’s work forces us to consider our being as
more than our subjectivity, to see subjectivity as only one way of
being

in

the

uninteresting,

world.

Subjectivity

at worst a Western

for

Baudrillard

is

at

best

instrument for imposing terror

upon the world, and in either case ineffectual as a site of resistance.
And despite the disdain, the suspicion, and the potential cynicism of
using

object status as a site

for resistance,

Malathi

Raghavan's

writing shows that resisting from a sense of how one is seen by
others does not have to be inauthentic but can be moving, powerful,
and effective.

Of course, resistance can also be dangerous, especially

within the classroom.

How are we to deal with students who wish to

resist our power and authority in the classroom? Conversely, if we
want our classrooms to be places for social progresses, then how can
we encourage our students to see their place within the dominant
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social order and to resist that order? Should the political be allowed
into the classroom or is the question itself politically naive? It is to
these questions I would now like to turn.
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CHAPTER TWO NOTES
1.
Postmodernists use the word subject instead of self because the former
stresses consciousness originating in language rather than preceding it.
See
Sean Burke’s The Death and Return o f the Author page 106 for a discussion of
the problems inherent in the postmodernist's use o f the word subject.
2. See Paul Smith 39; Susan Jarratt 70; Stuart Hall 12-38; Teresa Ebert 887-889;
and Donald Jones 46-69 for attempts to refigure subjectivity, postmodern and
otherwise, in ways that get around the impasse.
3.
"Theory hope" is Stanley Fish's anti-foundationalist argum ent against
trying
to create a m etatheory that can resolve the inh erent contradiction
between theory and practice.
Fish writes that "practice has nothing to do with
theory, at least in the sense o f being enabled and justified by theory.
That
leaves meand you only a few worn and familiar bromides:
practice makes
perfect, you learn to write by writing, you must build on what you already
know; but anti-foundationalism tells us that these bromides are enough, tells
us that as situated beings our practice can make perfect, and that we already
know what we think” ( D o i n g 355).
Trying to impose a theory to "justify”
practice only ensures that we will blind ourselves to
the com plexity of the
situation and subjugate those things that do not fit into or under the theory.
4. ’ Indeed.
I wonder why subjectivity is the only site from which legitimate
resistance can originate.
I w onder whether subjectivity, as it existed in
modernist theory and exists in much postmodern critique, is a Western white,
male, corporate construct.
I Find it more than a little ironic that the ability to
explain resistance and agency has disappeared because those who have always
had it no longer believe in it; that there is a crises of subjectivity because the
dominance of the white, male, theoretical view has been e x p lo d ed —often by
other white males.
But what o f the marginalized groups that have, can, and do
resist with and without this concept of subjectivity? Why is the idea of these
groups being able to resist outside of the frame of subjectivity not taken, by
evidence of the crisis, seriously? I agree with Teresa
de Lauretis.
She is
reluctant to
apply any critical category to women "Because women have been
a colonized population for
so long, I fear that any critical category we may
find applicable today is likely to be
derived from or im bued with male
ideologies . . . . 1 am not suggesting that we ought to clean the slate o f history
and start anew, because I am enough of a historical materialist and semiotican
that I cannot conceive o f a totally new world rising out of, and in no way
connected with, the past o r the present . . . . What I am suggesting is that
theory is dialectically built on.
checked against, modified by, transformed
along with, practice—that is to say, with what women do, invent, perform,
produce concretely and not ’for all time’ but within specific historical and
cultural conditions" ("Gramsci" 84).
5.
See Sawnet
L i te r a t u r e ) .

(South

Asian

W om en’s Network)

and

S asialit

(South

Asian

6. By defining the IDD as a safe place I do not mean to suggest that it is not a
place of confrontation and disagreement.
It is.
But it is also a place, perhaps
due to its relative anonymity, in which the upper caste feels empowered to
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write on certain issues and in certain ways that they
open society.

would never

discuss in

7.
I hope to show in the Baudrillard section of the chapter, that while
Baudrillard has little interest in historical perspective, object status can
provide the sense o f "historical depth" or "historical consciousness" that
Frederic Jam eson b e lie v e s is so lack ing in the p o stm odern
co nditio n
("Regarding" 4).
8.

See the Baudrillard section of this chapter.

9.
Indians often run marriage ads stressing the fairness of their complexion
in order to attract a mate.
10.
To be fair to Baudrillard, I should mention that he often writes of the
colonization or consum ption o f other.
In "The Melodrama o f Difference"
Baudrillard argues that "We are engaged in an
orgy of discovery, exploration,
and
’invention’ o f the Other. . . . Otherness, like everything else, has fallen
under the law of the market, the law of supply and demand.
It has become a
rare
item —hence its im m ensely high value on the p sy cho log ical stock
exchange, on the structural stock exchange" (124).
However. Baudrillard is
not criticizing this orgy so much as describing it.
Still, there is a kind of
ironic disdain rather than an ironic detachm ent in sentences such as "Our
sources of otherness are indeed running out; we have exhausted the Other as
raw material" (125).
11.
Baudrillard is not unaware o f this criticism.
He simply rejects its
credibility.
In A m e r i c a Baudrillard argues that the poor do not figure into his
explanation of America because the poor do not exist in America. He writes:
Reagan has never had the faintest inkling of the poor and their existence, nor
the slightest contact with them.
He knows only the self-evidence of wealth . . .
The have-nots will be co ndem ned to oblivion, to ab a n d o n m e n t, to
disappearance pure and simple. This is "must exist” logic:
"poor people must
exit.” The ultimatum issued in the name o f wealth and efficiency wipes them
off the map. And rightly so, since they show such bad taste as to deviate from
the general consensus" ( I I I ) .
Again, while this passage does not quite count
as a criticism of how the poor are treated, its ironic insights could be used by
those who would level such criticisms.
12.
By arguing that the marginalized have a more explicit object status than
the privileged, I do not meant to suggest that the privileged do not also have an
objectivity.
But the privileged do not often have to be aware o f how they are
figured as objects.
T h eir privileged status protects them from the pain of
internalizing "unattractive” attributes.
In essence, the powerful have turned
their
objective traits into a subjective status which, if
unchallenged, can
isolate them from the view of others.
13.By claim ing this I
am
reaffirming identity—the black
student organizations, etc.
But
so much as embrace them.
identity. I am speaking o f the
dominated by white, corporate,

not denying o ther important institutions for
church, the National Organization o f Women,
these institutions do not tolerate their members
When I speak o f institutions o f tolerance and
governmental, legal, and social institutions still
males.
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14.
For exam ple. D'Souza argues that "drugs and black-on-black crime kill
more blacks in a year than all the lynchings in U.S. history.
Racism is hardly
the most serious problem facing African Americans in the United States today.
Their main challenge is a civilizational breakdow n that stretches across class
lines but is especially concentrated in the black underclass" (The End 527).
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CHAPTER H I

POLITICS IN THE W RITING CLASSROOM S OF POSTM ODERNITY

Truly speaking, it is not instruction, but provocation, that I can
receive from another soul.
--Ralph W aldo Em erson "an address
delivered before the Senior class inD ivinity C ollege, Cambridge,
Sunday evening, 15 July, 1838”
[N]o book is genuinely free from political bias.
The opinion that art
should have nothing to do with politics is itself a political attitude.
—George Orwell "Why I Write," C ollected E ssays vol. I

Louise
Science
initial

Wetherbee

Phelps

Composition

begins

as

a Human

with the provocative claim "that composition awoke in the
moment of its

disciplinary

project

to

find

itself already

situated, prereflectively, within a specific cultural field of meaning—
that of postmodern thought, with its characteristic preoccupations
and world vision" (3).

By this claim she means that composition, as a

field of meaningful practices, is embedded within and indebted to
the

larger "sociocultural matrix" of postmodernity.

and

p u rp o se

through

an

in te rd e p e n d e n t,

It draws identity
c o rre la tiv e ,

and

transactional relationship with the postmodern condition, a condition
"marked

by

themes

of

loss,

decentering, and finitude" (5).
Phelps'
this

illusion,

instability,

marginality,

If, as I have suggested, we add to

argument Friedman's argument

condition has changed so that we

that

the current nature of

once again desire notions of

agency and advocacy along with the instability, then we are in what
I have called a post postmodern condition.
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If my appropriation and extension of Phelps' argument is valid,
then this post postmodern situatedness should be reflected in our
pedagogy on the role o f politics in the writing classroom.

In other

words, we would, on one hand, be preoccupied with indeterminacy,
juxtaposition,

openendedness,

fracture,

and

rupture;

reflect

an

inherent distrust of the notions of progress, universal explanation,
and hegemony; embrace a politics of play that eats away at its own
and others' author/ity; and. generally, favor questions over answers,
displacements over resolutions, multiple finite narratives over grand
narratives.

On the other hand, we would also seek to demarginalize

marginalized

voices,

marginalize

dominant

voices,

present

the

unpresented, and reclaim postmodernized concepts of self, agency,
history, and advocacy. In short, we would try to make explicit what
Lyotard calls the "justice of multiplicity and the multiplicity of
justice"

within

a historical

moment that maintains the

need

for

values {Just Gaming 100).
And sometimes our political pedagogy does reflect this almost
schizophrenic attempt to both critique the current social condition
and

refuse

constitute it.

to

participate

in

the

authoritarian

practices

which

For example, while I have distanced myself from Victor

Vitanza's work because it is too radical for our current historical
moment,

his

attempt

to

embrace

radical

postmodernism

maintain Lyotard's vision of just society is laudatory.

and

Vitanza’s

"Postmodern" or "Anti-body Rhetoric" of critical subversions "is . . .
not

concerned

either

with

attem pting

to

resolve

rhetorical,

interpretive differences or with even accounting for them.

Instead,

it identifies, detonates, and exploits the difference" ("Critical" 42).
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For Vitanza, the "struggle against author/ity" is not to either deny
the political dimension of pedagogy or to move students to a critical
and supposedly ethically superior or liberated social consciousness,
but "to enhance our abilities to tolerate the incommensurabilities
that

make

up

what

cultural

critics

are

calling

'post-m odern

knowledge' (49).
This state of tolerance, this ability to drift is not, however,
mere nihilism, an example of the dubious philosophy that anything
goes.

The goal of this play of contradictory voices is "to bring into

realization what has been d isp la ced—and that is the Sophistic idea of
Kairos"

which Vitanza defines as "many

v o i c e s " (60 ).[

competing,

contradictory

Vitanza's teacher seeks not the progress o f a

particular political agenda (a mask for the violence, subjugation, and
privilege necessary to "make the world a better place"), but the
paralogy—the

rupture,

paradox,

and

discontinuity—of multiplicity.

The students’ different political situatedness is not seen as a problem
but as a resource to be employed against the rise of a hegemonic
discourse. The contradictive and multi-voiced classroom is a political
end in itself and not a means to new world order.
Stephen M. Fishman and Lucille Parkinson McCarthy also offer
what I would call a post postmodern or, at least, an non-foundational
perspective on politics and pedagogy in the classroom.
Dewey's

pragmatism

"as

an

confrontational pedagogy . . . .
conflict

unattractive

("Teaching"

344).2

service

a

of

but who

effective

alternative

They present
to

radical

or

for teachers who find certain kinds of
seek

student critique and

change"

Importantly, this critique and change is not in the

previously

determined

political

end

but
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in

the

development of an intelligence capable of dealing with the "unstable,
uncannily unstable" condition of the world (Dewey Experience
N a t u r e qtd. in Fishman 346).

and

Dewey, they believe, "would oppose

teachers who have static pedagogic ends, for example, particular
political positions which they want students to adopt before leaving
their classrooms.
much

emphasis

experience"

For Dewey, such educational objectives put too
on

(347).

a relatively

minor product of the

educative

Dewey's educational goals focus instead "on the

development of certain habits and dispositions rather than on the
acquisition of a fixed body of knowledge or belief' (346).
These habits and dispositions
conditions of the world echo,

for dealing with the

using Vitanza's

Lyotard’s idea of invention as paralogy.
tolerating

the

instability

'intelligence'—the ability

of the

world.

unstable

terministic

screen.

Both act as a means for
Dewey's

"flexibility

or

to respond to novel situations, access . . .

cultural resources, reshape . . . plans, and take positive residue from .
. . experiences" (346-47)—could be used as the means for dealing
with and acting within Vitanza's state of Kairos.
Fishman

and

effectiveness

M cCarthy

question

of confronting

political end.

students

the

Thus, like Vitanza,

ethics

to achieve

and

pedagogical

a predetermined

Such predetermined ends can never be responsive

enough to the ever changing experience of the world.

A pedagogy

inspired to realize those ends could never develop the intelligence or
flexibility necessary to act and act ethically within such a condition—
except perhaps to act through the violent imposition of theory.
However,

unlike

privilege dissonance as

Vitanza,

Fishman

an end in itself.

and McCarthy do
They

call not
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not
only for

dissonance but cooperation:

"For although Dewey recognizes the

importance of dissonance, he stresses that conflict must always occur
within the context of appreciation for cooperative inquiry and the
virtues

which

sustain

it"3 (344).

In other words, Fishman and

McCarthy seek to create not simply a "'negative liberty,' the don'ttread-on-me-sorts of individual protections . . . .

[but also a ] 'positive

liberty' . . . which encourages students to step out o f their private
realms, find common projects, and, in conjunction with classmates,
make

their

unique

contributions

to

such

projects"

(347-48).

Incommensurability is not ignored by Fishman and McCarthy but
neither are chances for organic collaboration.

And while Vitanza

would also oppose an individualist inspired liberty,

he would be

suspicious of the social orientation of Dewey's pragmatism.
Finally, Judith Goleman’s Foucaudian and Bakhtinian inspired
Working

Theory

political

consciousness

indeterminacy.

also reflects the attempt to foster a critical and
while

maintaining

Goleman argues

an

appreciation

for a "counterhegemonic

project" (106) in which both the teacher a n d

for

writing

student work "the

writing that has been working them" (107 my emphasis).

The stress

Goleman places on the situatedness of the teacher's politics and on
the student and teacher as colleagues separates her work from many
other radical pedagogues.

Goleman argues that in order for students

of composition to work the theories "that are working
them . . . , they would j o i n

their

teachers

in

redefining

what

intellectual inquiry involves and why" (6 my emphasis).
Students' subject positions
must be reterritorialized.

are not the problem,

that which

The authoritative discourses which help to
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construct those subjectivities are.

The teacher does not present his

or her own subjectivity as a superior consciousness so much as
engage student subjectivity and be engaged by it.

"The teacher."

Goleman explains, "is not a master of situation, but a student of it"
(9).

The teacher is within the drama for change and not the source of
The teacher and the student become Foucault's specific

that drama.

intellectual trying to open up spaces in which language can be
reterritorialized from authoritative to internally persuasive.
Goleman's
utopian.

project

is not,

however,

naively or dangerously

The teacher does not pretend to give up his or her authority

or pretend to "leave his or her politics at the door."

Goleman stresses

that "Students who learn from us 'how to write' would learn that we
cannot

offer

alone, but in

them

technical procedures

conjunction

or

interesting

processes

with theworldviews, subject positions and

regimes of truth that they are a part of" (6).

But, this learning 'how

to write' is a j o i n t project instead of an adversarial confrontation.
Agency

for

Goleman's teacher

and

student

comes from

an

Althusserian "critical effectivity" achieved not through a universal
theory of writing but through "a theory o f the contextual" (4).
other

words,

the ability

to act

is reclaimed

In

through a critical

understanding of the effects of specific actions in specific situations.
There is an postmodern indeterminacy, however, as to the specificity
of what these effects will be.

Critical effectivity "cannot be learned

all at once and once and for all.

Rather, this knowledge is specific in

its effects and thus must be learned over and over in it effects" (7).
Therefore,
process.

Goleman's

pedagogy

is

ultimately

a

neo-pragmatic

And while this pedagogy places perhaps too much hope in
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the contextual for Vitanza's taste, Goleman, like Fishman. McCarthy,
and

Vitanza,

indeterminate

sees

education

processes

rather

and
than

critique
as

as an

means to

ongoing

and

predetermined

political ends.
All

of

these

theorists

share

what

I

would

call

a

post

postmodern ethos on the role of politics in the classroom.4 They each
advance writing projects which are counter hegemonic not only in
that they

oppose

pedagogues

could

the

dominant discourse,
make, but

in

counterhegemonic in their practices.

that

a claim

many

they are

radical

themselves

Unfortunately, the question of

politics and pedagogy in our field is often presented instead as a
false dilemma, a "choice” between two positions that, as Richard
Levin argues,

seem "to eliminate the possibility of

space outside

the two warring poles"

position ismost eloquently

("Silence" 173).

andpassionately put

Hairston in her now infamous CCC's article:
Teaching Writing."
politics

In it, Hairston

any discursive

forth

The

first

by Maxine

"Diversity, Ideology, and

argues that the emphasis on

in the classroom is dangerous and ill advised.

We, as

composition teachers, are neither qualified nor justified to deal with
questions of politics in the classroom.

She writes:

I see a new model emerging for freshman writing programs, a model
that disturbs me greatly.
It’s a model that puts dogm a before
diversity, politics before craft, ideology before critical thinking, and
the social goals o f the teacher before the educational needs of the
student.
It's a regressive model that undermines the progress we’ve
made in
teaching writing, one
that
threatens to silence student
vo ices and je o p a r d iz e the p ro cess-o rien ted ,
low risk, stud ent
centered classroom we’ve worked so hard to establish as the norm.
It’s a model that doesn’t take freshman English seriously in its own
right but conceives of it as a tool, something to be used.
The new
model envisions required writing courses as vehicles for social
reform rather than student-centered workshops desig ned to build
students’ confidence and competence as writers.
It is a vision that
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echoes that old patronizing rationalization we’ve heard so many
times before:
students don't have anything to write about so we have
to give them topics.
Those topics used to be literary; now they're
political.
(180)

And in a "Comment and Response" section of College English, Hairston
characterizes
"dominated

the
by

articles w ritten by

name dropping,

radical pedagogues

unreadable,

fashionably

as

radical

articles that I feel have little to do with the concerns of most college
English teachers," and the radical theorists themselves

as "Iow-risk

Marxists who write very badly, are politically naive, and seem more
concerned about converting their students from capitalism than in
helping them to enjoy writing and reading" (694-95).

For Hairston,

we are very definitely to "leave our politics at the door."
she believes, can and should be taught "for its own
primary

intellectual

activity

that

is atthe

heart

of

Writing,

sake, as a
a college

education" ("Diversity" 179).
The critique o f Hairston's position is well known, and I will
spend only a littletime reviewing it.

The critique

is probably best

and most charitably made by Patricia Sullivan and Donna Qualley in
their book Pedagogy in the Age o f Politics.
argue that Hairston

not only "endorses an

In it, Sullivan and Qualley
agenda," picks a political

side, if you will, by "taking a stand against any curricular change that
would insert the local and particular interests of culturally situated
subjects . . . .

but that this stance is premised on an elisive reading of

composition's

history"

(x-xi).

Composition

has

never

had

the

apolitical past Hairston imagines.5
To reveal the politics inherent in Hairston's article, Sullivan and
Qualley point out that in Hairston's argument overtly political terms
such as "dogma," "politics," "ideology," and "the social goals of the
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teacher"

are

pitted

against

supposedly

apolitical

terms

such

as

"diversity," "craft," "critical thinking," and "the educational needs of
the students."

This pairing reflects less a flaw or slyness

in

Hairston's argument and more a nostalgia for "a prepoliticized time in
composition's history when it was possible for us to teach writing
untainted by the social values and institutional conditions in which
our practices and theories are forged" (x).

Or as John Trimbur argues

in response to Hairston's scathing critique of him and other critical
pedagogues,

"the

changed over

the

intellectual
past

five

context of composition
or ten

years

as

studies

teachers,

has

theorists,

researchers, and program administrators have found useful some of
the ideas and insights contained in contemporary critical theory . . . .
the 'mainstream' Maxine refers to isn't quite there anymore" ("John
Trimbur"

700).

If

it

ever

was.

Indeed,

I

think

the

most

disappointing aspect of Hairston's argument is her refusal to argue
for

the

politics

of

her

pedagogy—a

student-centered,

low-risk.

personal narrative based, craft oriented, ideologically indeterminate
classroom.

Instead, she makes the dubious move, at least for our

generation, of presenting her pedagogy as above politics.
The second position we are often offered for explaining the role
of politics in the classroom is what has come to be known as the
critical

democracy

or oppositional

pedagogy.

This

pedagogy

is

associated with such diverse theorists as Alan France, Karen Fitts,
Charles Paine, Laditka, C. H. Knoblauch, Patricia Bizzell, James Berlin,
Ira Shor, Susan Miller, John Trimbur, Donald Morton, and Mas’ud
Zavarzadeh to name but a few.

They argue that it is impossible for

us to leave our politics at the door, and that trying to do so is itself a
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political move that masks

the teacher's

inevitable political

agenda

(making it more insidious

and difficult for the student to

openly

oppose) and privileges the status quo (patriarchal, classist,

racist).

As Karen Fitts and Alan France put it, "we do not believe that writing
can be separated from politics, that there are neutral topics that
students can write about . . . .

[the] insistence that students write

about ’their own ideas’ merely confirms the ideology of privatization"
("Advocacy"

14).

Instead, these theorists, in the name of professional

ethics and teaching for social reform, replace Hairston's "safe and
cooperative
challenging

classroom "
student

and/or homophobic
106,

Morton

79,

with

classrooms

that

deemed

sexists,

subjectivities

(Bauer 389. Berlin
Pratt

39,

favor

directly

classist,

racist

103, hooks 42, Jarratt 105-

Sciachitano

300,

Weiler

144-145).

Consequently, many oppositional theorists call not only for openly
political classrooms but aggressively partisan ones.
In

"Relativism,

Radical

Pedagogy,

and

the

Ideology

of

Paralysis," Charles Paine argues that
equality and dem ocracy are not transcendent values that inevitably
emerge when one learns to seek the truth through critical thinking.
Rather, if those
are the desired values, the teacher must recognize
that he or
she must influence (perhaps
manipulate is the more
accurate word)
stu den ts’ values through charism a or pow er—he or
she must accept the role as manipulator.
Therefore it is of course
reasonable to try to inculcate into our students the conviction that
the dominant order is oppressive.
(563-64)

In "Beyond Anti-Foundationalism to Rhetorical Authority:

Problems

in Defining Cultural Literacy," Patricia Bizzell believes
that we must be forthright in avowing the ideologies that motivate
our teaching and research.
For instance, James Berlin might stop
trying to be value-neutral and anti-authoritarian in the classroom . .
. . Instead, he might openly state that this course aims to promote
values of sexual equality and left-oriented labor relations and that
this course will challenge students’ values insofar as they conflict
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with these aims.
Berlin and his colleagues might openly exert their
authority as teachers to persuade students to agree with their values
instead o f pretending that they are merely investigating the nature
o f sexism and capitalism and leaving the students to draw their own
conclusions.
(670)

And in "Creating Space for Difference in the Composition Class," Karen
Hayes argues that by focusing on "diversity and dispute" instead of
"politeness

and common

students to speak (300).

ground"

teachers

empower

marginalized

In all these examples being critical is not an

end in itself but a means to a particular and predetermined political
end.
The

criticism

of critical

Hairston, has just begun.

pedagogy,

besides

that

done

by

Mainly because it is relatively new, and its

practioners have traditionally assumed the role of critic in the field.
Before I turn to my criticism, however, I would like to strongly state
that I regard the new studies in race, class, gender, ethnicity, and
sexuality

as

having

revitalized

composition

studies,

as

having

brought to the forefront crucial pedagogical issues which were too
often glossed over or ignored altogether.

The current ruptures in

theory and practice are not the result of "tenured radicals" (13) as
Roger Kimball has argued but of shifts in the educational needs and
social demographics of students.

I agree with Gerald Graff that "As

the

has

democratization

of culture

brought

heretofore

excluded

groups into the educational citadel, with them have come the social
conflicts that their exclusion once kept safely distant" (B e y o n d 8).
Indeed, I think Hairston does not see that the impetus for critically
based

classrooms

often

comes

as

much

from

students

as

teachers.
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from

I have

problems

both

with

Hairston’s

oppositional or critical democracy position:

position

and

the

Hairston's because her

pedagogy seems unreflective of her own political privileging, and
critical pedagogy’s because it seems hegemonic and dictatorial.

I

haven't gone to all the trouble to oppose hegemonic discourses only
to

impose a new one—ideologically different to be sure but

functionally and structurally authoritarian.
try

to

"exert

their authority"

coercion has begun.

on

me

still

Indeed, when teachers

persuasion

has ended

and

When teachers become my Socratic adversaries

instead of my Elbowian advocates, my ability to "agree with their
values" has been irreparably damaged.
Nevertheless, I too want my students to do more than play
with the pieces of the deconstructed universe.

I too hope that

classroom is a site for progressive social change.

my

I too hope to

improve the lives of my students in material ways.

And I too

believe

classroom.

that

politics

can

greatly

enhance

a writing

Indeed, it has been my experience that students enjoy writing about
politics given the support, respect, and constructive challenge that
such

investigation requires.

For example, one student wrote the

following in a mid-semester evaluation of a first year writing course
I was teaching:
I think my favorite part o f the class so far has been the discussions
on political
issues from our reader.!6 J I like how we're able to come
at things
like affirm a tiv e action and sexual h a ra ssm e n t from
multiple sides.
For example, one o f the articles we read was from
Rush [Limbaughj but others were totally against him. That
way
ev eryb ody ’s
position is respected, but they still have their views
challenged.
Like me for instance.
I'm a hard line conservative.
I
was always totally opposed to the idea o f affirmative action, but some
o f the things we read and some of the things other people said and

120

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

you said in class really made me think.
stand anym ore.

I’m not really sure where I

I do not, therefore, undertake this critique of the use o f the political
in the classroom lightly.

I do it because I believe critical democracy

pedagogy may ultimately be damaging the very causes it is seeking
to aid and that I hold dear.
I would like to find a discursive place somewhere between the
two options that we have been presented, a rupture where students’
political situatedness is
keep

the

safe,

champions

respected but can be challenged; where we

student-centered,

low-risk

classroom s

Hairston

but invigorate them with explorations of the political:

where the irreducibility of student difference is celebrated but the
pain that privileged subjectivity causes is critiqued.

The purpose of

this chapter, therefore, is to more fully develop a critique of critical
pedagogy.

For critical democracy pedagogy is anything but that—it is

not critical enough of

its own assumptions,

it is not based on

democratic practices, and it is not effective as a pedagogy for change.

A

C r itic a l

V iew

o f C r itic a l

D em o cra cy

P ed agogy

First, the argument that "everything is political"—the rallying
cry for most critical pedagogy—conflates the term political with all
other evaluative terms.
works

well

privileged
decide

the

While declaring that everything is political

in revealing

supposedly

subjectivities they
next

and

perhaps

objective

positions

inherently are, it does
more

important

for

the

not help us

question:

whose

politics should be privileged and why? If, as Laditka argues, "there
simply is no value free pedagogy" ("Semiology" 363), then which
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values do we privilege and how does the idea that everything is
political help us in making that decision? How is something political?
How is politics different from religious, ethical, or moral frames? Is
it? If everything is political, then does that mean all political views
are equally valid? If not, on what non-political basis is this question
decided?

It seems that making everything political

displaces the

more important question and task of deciding which politics should
be allowed in the writing classroom and in what ways.
Further, there
argument

that

pedagogy.

is another unanswered question

everything

is

political

to justify

an

in using the
oppositional

The goal of an "adversarial relation to the student,"

according to Morton and Zavarzadeh, is that such a relationship (if I
can call it that) "helps reveal the student to himself by showing him
how his ideas and positions are effects of larger discourses (of class,
race,

and

gender,

for

example),

rather

than

simple,

manifestations of his consciousness or mind" ("Theory" 11-12).

natural
If we

ignore the potentially condescending nature of such a statement (do
Morton and Zavarzadeh reveal their own positions as effects of larger
discourses?), we still have the question of why the revelation that
ideas are the effects of discourse should cause a student to change
his or her ideas or give up a

privileged position.

Perhaps the

student is happy being in a privileged cultural position-irrespective
of how he or she got there.

What is politically intelligent about

giving up advantage? Why shouldn't the student get defensive about
having his or her subject position attacked when all subject positions
are

equally

the

product

of

discourse?

In

short,

why

knowledge lead to a specific action?
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should

Thus, it seems that this kind of conflation could lead to the
devaluing

of

dogmatism.

intellectual

engagement

and

the

glorification

of

"Well," many students could argue, "it's just my opinion

and all opinions are equal in that all are political."

James Vopat

feared that Ken Macrorie’s work could lead to "the sensational rush
over the considered response" ("U p ta u g h t Rethrought" 42).
that critical

pedagogy

will

lead

to the uncritical

I fear

privileging

political views in the name of all things being political.

of

Bruffee’s

Rortian inspired definition of knowledge as "socially justified belief"
("Social

Construction"

774)

could

become

a

rationalization

for

dogmatism and brutality.
For example, many students in my first year writing course
agreed with Ward Churchill’s overall argument in "Crimes against
H u m a n ity " 7 but decided not to change their opinion on using Native
American tribal names to name sports teams.
C h u rch ill’s

essay

"extremely

"referencing a group of people

thoughtful"

One student found
but

as "Redskins,"

maintained
is simply

that

factual

"because the Native American/Indians [have] red color pigmentation
in their skin as Asian people have a yellow pigmentation."

Another

student argued that while "Churchill makes some great points in his
article . . . .
can

see

It leaves me in a very neutral position . . . On one hand I

how

the

Indians

feel

but on

the

other hand

understand why they're making such a big deal about it."

I d o n ’t
Another

student wrote that while using Native American names "causes many
controversies . . .

I feel that these franchises are not trying to . . .

mock or degrade these Indian tribes.

They are merely names.

In

fact, I feel as though the Indians should be proud of their tribes and
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respect that these teams are using the names to promote their clubs."
Finally, another student wrote that "Before reading the article by
Ward Churchill, I thought the controversy on the names of sports
teams in professional and college sports was absurd.

[ still feel this

way because it is meant to be in good spirit not degrading to the
Indians."
The

changing

confrontation.

It

of

privileged

requires

beliefs

a sustained

requires

pedagogical

more

than

relationship.

Adversarial pedagogies have left out the importance of persuasion,
and their condescending attitude has destroyed the basis on which
persuasion rests—respect.
succeed

only by resorting

As Jay and Graff argue,
to persuasion,

and

"critique can

persuasion

has

no

chance unless it is willing to respect the resistance of those not yet
converted" ("A Critique" 208).

While I was not able to persuade all

of my students as to validity of Churchill's argument, the sustained
respect and engagement I gave each student did have some effect.
One of the above students wrote in the revision of her original
response on Churchill that he showed her
just how much these names offended and hurt people . . . . Churchill
makes one wonder why it is that people are treated in such a cruel
manner, and how we . . . can just back and let it happen. Although I
suppose the media is part o f the reason why people find this so
funny.
It's almost like propaganda to 'sell a product’ at the expense
of other people . . . . I know that I now will try to be more considerate
o f what I say and do.

While I'm not Pollyanna enough to believe that this student's change
in attitude had nothing to do with trying to please me, I must stress
that I never tried to force her to change her opinion.

Like with the

other students. I merely stated my opinion and suggested
reading she might do on the subject.
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further

Second,

some

critical

pedagogues

take

the

belief that

one

cannot "leave one's politics at the door" as license to impose their
political views on students.

They lack respect for opposing ideologies

and cultural perspectives.

For example, David Bleich argues that

"Religious views collaborate with the ideology of individualism and
with sexism to censor the full capacity of what people can say and
write" ("Literacy" 167).
should

treat

student

Morton and Zavarzadeh argue that teachers
resistance

as

"another

example

consciousness to be demystified" ("Theory" 208).

of

false

In quotes already

discussed, Paine justifies manipulation, Bizzell the exertion of power.
Hayes

an

adversarial

resistant to hers.

relationship

to

deal

with

political

views

Is the only legitimate role for resistance? Do

teachers demystify their own authority? Their own consciousness?
Might student resistant instead be a form a Bakhtin's Carnival—a
moment when all that is seen as high and holy, all that is seen as
above the student is brought down through mockery to a level where
the student can—as Bakhtin puts it—finger it? Student resistance is
often

not taken seriously by many critical theorists except as a

problem to be overcome.

Student resistance, if too strongly against

the teacher's ideology, is not seen as a legitimate political act.

The

teacher's political stance is authentic the student's stance is not.
For while

Berlin stresses

that

"The

lessons of postmodern

difference remind us . . . that the individual must never be sacrificed
to any group-enforced norm . . . .

[and that] the worth of the

individual must never be compromised"

(Rhetorics

101-102),

and

while France and Fitts say they "are committed to open democratic
forum, free expression of conflicting arguments, and an empathetic
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classroom ("Advocacy" 14), and while Freire stresses that education
must

"start

program

with

but

the

conviction

must search

that

for this

it cannot

present

program dialogically

its own
with the

people" {The Pedagogy 118), and while Ira Shor advocates a "critical
literacy"

that

"invites

teachers

and

subjects of study" ("Educating" 24),

students

to

problematize

all

Shor, Berlin, France, Fitts and

other Freirean inspired teachers seem rather selective in the subjects
that they problematize and the students who are problems.
example,

all

of

the

students

and

subjects

that

need

For
to

be

problematized or which cause Berlin

problems in Rhetoric, Poetics,

and Culture reflect only one political

position: conservative.

Berlin describes a group of male students who "When pressed
to active dialogue . . . may deny the o b v i o u s
conflicts they enact and witness daily.
male

students

I have

encountered

social and political

For example, the majority of
at

Purdue

have

in our

first

discussions assured me that race and gender inequalities no longer
exists in the United States and do not merit further discussions . . . .
Any

inequalities

that do

remain,

they

insist,

are

only apparent

injustices, since they are the result of inherent and thus unavoidable
features of human nature (women are weaker and more emotional
than men, for example) or are the product of individual failure . . . .
It is at this moment of d e n ia l that the role of the teacher as problem
poser is crucial, providing methods for questioning that locate the
points of conflict and contradiction" (102 my emphasis).

Again, if we

ignore for a moment Berlin's somewhat condescending portrayal of
these students' opposing arguments, his text contains a rather gaping
contradiction.

Berlin opposes the banking model of education in
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favor of teacher as problem poser, yet his language betrays his belief
in an obviously correct pre-existing body of knowledge that he has
and

his

students,

suffering

under

their

mystified

consciousness,

d e n y .8
When Berlin states that "the questions the teacher poses are
designed to reveal

the contradictions and conflicts

inscribed in the

very language of the students' thought and utterances" (102-03), he
must recognize that not only are the meaning and

location of these

contradictions and conflicts and the way they are inscribed opened to
vast ideological disagreement, but that the very idea that there are
contradictions and conflicts and that the

teacher is justified and

qualified in naming them are themselves ideological premises to be
argued.

As Jay and Graff point out, "terms like 'cultural diversity’

and 'empowerment' should denote a set of problems to be explored
and debated,

not a new truth which teachers and students

must

uncritically accept," and, further, that "the definition of categories
such as the disenfranchised and the dominant, oppressed and the
oppressor, should be a product of the pedagogical process, not its
unquestioned premise" ("A Critique" 207).

Even the social inequities

Berlin mentions are not obvious but the recognition of a situated
experience

that

must

be

explored dialogically

with

students—

students who are not seen as in denial but in different situated
frames.

If not, then Berlin's critical agency is really only the moment

when students with different ideologies agree with him.
protestations to the

Despite his

contrary, Berlin's pedagogy must ultimately take

the correct knowledge from his head and place it in the heads of his
stu d en ts.
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Somehow
perspectives, yet
the

teacher's,

all political positions are

the result of situated

the students' perspective, if

different enough from

is

seen

as

lacking, resistant,

uncritical,

or naive.

Students are once again conceived of as neophytes.
developmentally or cognitively inferior,

No longer

now students

have

levels of consciousness or are pawns of the capitalists state.

lower
As Jay

and Graff argue, "Students who are not persuaded by radical politics
cannot, by definition, be expressing an authentic desire.

It cannot be

their true selves speaking but only the internalized voice of the
oppressor" (203).

Conversely, the teacher's perspective, which is

every bit as much a

product of discourse as the students', becomes

inexplicably privileged in critical pedagogy—a privileging which is
often

rationalized in the name of honesty

or

inescapable authority.

For example. Fittsand France are particularly sensitive to the
that they privilege

charge

their own subject positions. They write:

We risk p resen tin g o u rs e lv e s as p riv ile g e d su b je c ts , som eh ow
standing outside culture.
How did o u r understanding o f sexual
difference seemingly escape the dom inant culture that we oppose?
The short answer is—we suppose—that our own subjectivity results
from the accidental confluence of social forces on our lives, which
su bverted to som e d e g re e the d o m in a n t g e n d e r p a tte rn s and
demanded more egalitarian ones.
Thus, the internal contradictions
of our personal histories have situated us at the critical margin.
And
it is from this c ritic a l margin that we engage o u r stud en ts.
("Advocacy” 17)

Notice

that France

and

Fitts do not actually explain

why

their

position is more enlightened, only how it is that they might have
come

by that enlightenment.

assum ption

that

th eir

Fitts

subject

and

p o sitio n

France
is

equalitarian than those who disagree with them.
privileged

because

it

is

superior,

and

begin

with

in h eren tly

the
more

Their position is

their position

is
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superior

because it is privileged.

Such circular logic, especially wheu it is used

to justify an adversarial relationship with students, frightens me.

It

can lead to a dogmatism before which any denial of the legitimacy of
the teacher's interpretive
legitimacy.

frame is itself evidence of that frame's

There is no space in which the incommensurability of the

student and the fallibility of the teacher can be recognized and even
celebrated.

Such circular logic blinds its users not only to their own

situatedness

but to that

of their students—preventing the

teacher

from seriously listening to student objections.
In general, Berlin's

seemingly common sense argument that

"the success of the kind of classroom he wants depends
teachers

knowing

their

students"

(R h e t o r i c s

104)

on the

could

be

interpreted as license to define students in terms of lack, to attempt
to remake them, to, in a very Foucaudian sense, force students to
confess (in both a religious and legal sense) the truth of the teacher's
political discourse.

In the case of theorists like Berlin, the confession

is not of a gross political agenda, clearly Berlin, Bizzell. Shor, and
others

oppose

unproblematized

that;

it

political

is

the

confession

premises

located

of
in

more
the

subtle

moment

student resistance is seen as denial instead of difference.

and
when
When

Mary Louise Pratt writes that
All the students in the class had the experience. . .of having their
cultures discussed and objectified in ways that horrified them: all the
stu d e n ts
e x p erien ced
face -to -face
th e
ig n o ra n c e
and
incomprehension, and occasionally the hostility o f others . . . . Along
with the rage, incom prehension, and pain, there were exhilarating
moments o f wonder and revelation, mutual understanding, and new
wisdom—the joys of the contact zone.
("Arts" 39)
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I cannot help but hear the words of Foucault from the first volume of
History o f Sexuality—words that express the horrors of of the contact
zone.

He writes:

The confession is a ritual o f discourse in which the speaking subject
is also the subject of the statement: it is also a ritual that unfolds
within a pow er relationship, for one does not confess without the
presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the
in t e r lo c u t o r but
the
a u th o rity
who
re q u ire s
the
c o n fe s s io n ,
prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in o rd er to ju d g e,
punish, forgive, console, and reconcile; a ritual in which the truth is
corroborated by the obstacles and resistances it has had to surmount
in o rd e r to be form ulated; and finally, a ritual in which the
e x p re s s io n
a lo n e, in d e p en d en tly
o f its e x te rn a l c o n s e q u e n c e s,
produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it:
it
exon erates, redeems, and purifies him; it unburdens him o f his
wrongs, liberates him. and promises him salvation.
(61-62)

Placing this frame over the language that many critical theorists use
produces,

for me at least, a very frightening echo.

Foucaudian

terministic

screen,

teachers

become

Through a

the

authoritative

interlocuters demanding a confession as to the racism, sexism, and
inadequacy of the students' subject positions.
subjects who
perhaps

most

areexonerated, redeemed, purified,
l i b e r a t e d through

chillingly,

forgiveness with the teacher's truth.
ritual in which

Students become the
unburdened, and,

confrontation

and

Foucault’s words concerning "a

truth is corroborated by

the obstacles and resistance

it has had to surmount in order to be

formulated" seems to speak

directly to the critical theorists' justification of confrontation in the
name of the rhetorical invention it creates.
Students are

being

and student

being

is

being

"'put

into

discourse,'" "a technology of power," a "will to know" over which they
do not have the same control as the teacher.
paraphrase

Foucault's

ideas

on

sexuality,

Critical pedagogy, to
"compels

everyone

transform their" identity "into a perpetual discourse, to the

to

manifold
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mechanisms which, in the areas of economy, pedagogy, medicine, and
justice,

incite,

extract,

distribute,

discourse of subjectivity.9

and

institutionalize"

(33)

the

Of course, Foucaudians would argue that

the subject is always an effect of discourse anyway.
should be taken as a warning not a celebration.

But this insight
The more one's

being is subjected to discourse, especially discourses in which one
has

less

becomes.

power,

the

more

trapped

in the games

of power one

To paraphrase Foucault's ideas on sexuality once again,

student subjectivity is "driven out of hiding and constrained to lead a
discursive existence" (32).

Students are made knowable subjects:

they are subjected to discourses of truth grounded in the teacher's
superior power position.
the

privatization

of

And while some would rightly argue that
student

identities

may

su p p o rt—at

least

implicitly—the exploitation of others, who is the teacher to decide
which student subjectivity is exploitative and which is not? Do we
really want to grant such power to a teacher? To claim that teachers
unavoidably have such power anyway is to concede that there are no
ethical differences in the ways in which power is used—a proposition
the critical theorists decry.
I suppose one could read Foucault's work as supporting the
effectiveness of confrontation in the classroom—a place where the
teacher is unalterably the "authority who requires the confession"—
but such a reading takes Foucault's work as a license to abuse power
instead of as a critique of those who hide their power behind notions
of truth, objectivity, and scientism.

It reads Foucault not as someone

who problematizes the ethical use of power but as someone who
gives joyful accent to repressive strategies.

Further, such a reading
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would run counter to the expressed desire of critical

democracy

pedagogy—to liberate students through critique.
Instead,

a Foucaudian

inspired teacher would

focus on the

p r o c e s s of political change, change as a semester long project rather
than the product o f an overwhelming confession.

Change is not

something we impose; it is something we strive to create and such
creation

requires

openness

to each unique classroom

rather than

adherence to a politics that can be applied to any classroom.

Change

is something that we test and try to learn from, something that
involves
teacher

the transformation
as

well.

not only of the students

Otherwise,

the

pedagogy

but of the

of critical

theorists

becomes, if not in letter than in spirit, like the curriculum Mike Rose
describes

in Lives

on

the

Boundary

—"a curriculum

that

isn't

designed to liberate . . . but to occupy" (28).10
Third, the power relationship of the teacher to the student is
not theorized enough in some critical pedagogy.
tone

that

many

proselytization.

critical

theorists

take

The "evangelical"

sounds

too

close

to

As Graff argues "There are those who justify turning

their courses into conscious raising sessions on the grounds that all
teaching is inevitably political anyway.

This authoritarian behavior

is indeed disturbing, and it has been making enemies out of potential
friends of the reform movement" (B e y o n d 25).

Yet, France's and

Fritts' objective is to "awaken" their students to class consciousness.
Mary Louise Pratt writes of the "exhilarating moments of w o n d e r
and r e v e l a t i o n " ("Arts" 39 my emphasis) in her class.

Dale Bauer

argues that "The feminist agenda offers a goal toward our student's
c o n v e r s i o n s to emancipatory critical action" ("The Other" 389 my
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emphasis).

Would we allow such practices in the classroom if they

actually were used in the service of religious conversion?
We must always remember that as teachers we have two votes
in a classroom, that we are representatives of powerful institutions
(sometimes governmental institutions).

The classroom is not a free

space, a Habermasian public square where equals come to debate
claims.

Students are often frightened, intimidated, or feel attacked

by our authority.

Indeed,

Hairston warns us "That novice writers

can virtually freeze in the writing classroom when they see it as an
extremely

high-risk situation"

("Diversity"

189).

Listen to

this

famous passage from Bartholomae and Petrosky's Facts, Artifacts and
C o u n te rfa c ts.
that would

But as you read, consider the weight of intimidation

be added

to this project if the

teacher assumed an

adversarial relationship with the student:
In the course, and in this book, we are presenting reading and
writing as a struggle within and against the languages o f academic
life.
A classroom performance represents a mom ent in which, by
speaking or writing, a student must enter a closed community, with
its secrets, codes and rituals. And this is, we argue, an historical as
well as a conceptual drama. The student has to appropriate or be
appropriated by a specialized discourse, and he has to do this as
though he were easily and com fortably one with his audience, as
though he were a member of the academy.
And, o f course, he is not.
He has to invent himself as a reader and he has to invent an act of
reading by assembling a language to make a reader and a reading
possible, finding some compromise between idiosyncrasy, a personal
history, and the requirem ents o f co n v e n tio n , the history o f an
institution.
(8)

The

struggle Bartholomae and

Petrosky urge students to undertake

(and

which I support) is already intimidating. Adding an adversarial

relationship to the performance would, as Hairston claims, freeze the
students' ability to write.

I am not arguing that the teacher can or

should relinquish his or her authority, or that the teacher should be
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afraid of his or her authority.

I am arguing that the teacher should

use that authority to become the student's advocate instead of his or
her

adversary.
Of course, advocacy itself can be dangerous, especially when

those who one is advocating for are from different racial, ethnic,
gender,

and class backgrounds.

If not constantly open to revision

and listening, advocacy can become appropriation.

We can come to

believe that we are the students, that we can know them, that we
can unproblematically represent them through a common humanity
or a supposedly shared culture.

As John Ernest argues concerning

the attempt of teachers to "recognize the authority of the various
cultures represented by our students." such attempts "too often . . .
conceptualize,
b a c k g ro u n d

essentialize,
of

unintentionally,

th e ir
the

and

stu d e n ts

mystical

13).

appropriate

w hile

authority

understanding" ("100 Friends"
beginning with ourselves.

thereby

the

cultural

su sta in in g ,
of

academic

how ever
modes

of

Instead, we must advocate by

We must examine who we are as teachers,

what we want, and how these often conflicting identities and desires
threaten, harm, or help our students negotiate their own conflicting
desires

and multiple

identities

within

the

academy.

In

short,

advocacy is a process that begins with self critique rather than
student evaluation.

The evaluation must inevitably come but only

after the self examination and only if that evaluation is opened
ended rather than closed.
I
student

know
and the

introduction

first

hand the pain advocacy can cause for both the

teacher.

I

to critical analysis

once

taught

a

course in which

sophomore

level

I had a bright.
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intelligent, and talented writer.

Indeed, Erin came into my class with

tremendous ability, and it was because of this that I decided to push
her.

Firmly grounded in a Bartholomae mode at the time, I decided

that what she needed as a writer was to challenge herself, to push
her abilities beyond where she thought they could go.

Consequently.

I held back on her grades, asked for multiple rewrites, pushed her to
push herself.

And it worked.

tremendous jump

in

her

By the final paper, Erin made a

writing

ability—but

there

was

a cost.

Among my evaluations for the semester was the following:
1.

What have you learned by taking this course?

"That my writing sucks.
I learned how to rack my brain to support
everything, every point that I made in an essay.
I learned a lot more
about literature obviously.
I think that this class has made me a
better writer, but it was an ego blow.
I've never had less than an ’A’
on an English paper until this class.
Welcome to college, right.”

2. Which features of this course, or of this particular section
of the course, do you think are effective? What changes
might be made to improve it?
"The reading assignments were good, c o n v ersatio n —discussion
beneficial & enjoyable.
Conferences helped a lot.”

was

3. What are the particular strengths and weaknesses of this
instructor's teaching? Please elaborate.
"Lance gave way too many pointers and when I got done w/a
conference, my brain hurt.
That's a good thing.
Lance was a good
Prof.. but he’d never ever ever ever give me an A.
I thought I
deserved A’s, and it frustrated me to no end when I was unsuccessful.
I thought he graded too hard & should have measured more on
im provem ent and effort."

I knew it was Erin’s evaluation from the hand writing, the attitude,
and the major.

I think the first line. "That my writing sucks," and the

line that I would "never ever ever ever give me an A" struck

135

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the

deepest cord.

Both were false.

Erin was a very good writer, and she

got an A on her final paper (although she did not know that when
she wrote the evaluation).

Her writing was filled with voice, insight,

and academic rigor, but she was cruising in the course.
her, and it worked.

Her writing improved.

So I pushed

She learned

how to

"support everything, every point that I made in an essay," and that
she could be "a

better writer" than she was.

Overall, I think it is

positive evaluation.
But somehow I missed her need to hear me
good writer.

My agenda on

the other needs
suffered.

say that she was a

the needs of mystudent blinded me to

of my student,

and

her confidence as a writer

In my advocacy of Erin I had appropriated who she was

and what she needed.

I hadn't examined myself closely enough.

Why was I so adamant on Bartholomae's approach? Was I convinced
that the personal writing of first year English wasn't good enough for
critical analysis?

I'm not sure, but I shudder to think what would

have happened if I had pushed
Erin?

an adversarial

relationship

with

Would I have shut her down completely, turned her off to

writing forever? Is it right for a male instructor to p u s h

a female

student? Her writing got better but at the price of her identity.
Luckily, my relationship with Erin was still
her

and

evaluation.

asked
She

to

meet.

We

talked

assured me everything

the class, that I was a good teacher.
concerned with how she saw me.

about

a good one.
her

work

Icalled
and

the

was fine, that she enjoyed

But, I wasn't actually all that
I was concerned with what my

view of her had done to her confidence as a writer.

Sure enough,

after a few minutes, she said something that I will never forget:
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"I

just wanted to feel like you were on my side once in awhile Lance."

I

thought it was obvious that I was, but in my appropriation of what
that support should be I missed part of what it should have been.
How

much

more

do

critical

theorists

miss

in

their

adversarial

pedagogies?

They see their students as racist, sexist, classist, and

homophobic.

While I’m sure this view is partially true, does it also

allow them to see their students as human beings, as intimidated by
writing, as needing encouragement

as well as critique?

Clifford argues, "students want to become writers . . . .

because they

are convinced they have something

to

somebody to say it to.

anaudience they can

They want

that encourages them" ("The Subject"
classroom

a

place

where

transformed, do critical

the

As John

say, and more importantly,

46).

trust, one

In their rush to make the

inequities

of

the

world

theorists participate in the

can

be

very brutality

they abhor?
Fourth,

I

am

sym pathetic

to

or

at

least

influenced

by

Baudrillard's argument that there is no space outside of the flow of
culture

from

which

to

critique

it.

As

Lester

Faigley

argues,

"Baudrillard rejects the idea that we can somehow get outside the
flow of codes, simulations, and images to discover any space for
social critique" (213).
little

simplistic,

While this interpretation of Baudrillard is a

after all

Baudrillard

is ultimately

rejecting

the

distinction between inside and outside, Baudrillard's theory does call
into question the central claim of critical democracy pedagogy, that
students can liberate

themselves

though a critique

culture is produced, circulated, and consumed.

of how

mass

If Baudrillard is right,

then Henry Giroux's "language of possibility" (P o s t m o d e r n i s m 52)

137

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

becomes

an

impossibility,

and

Fitts'

and

France's

attem pt

to

"facilitate political demystification and social change" (Left Margin
xi) becomes an exercise in a "will to truth."

And while Zavarzadeh

has argued that there is an "unsurpassable objectivity which is not
open

to

rhetorical

interpretation

and

constitutes

the

decided

foundation of critique" and that "is the outside" that Marx called the
"working day," I, as a rhetorician, question that any position is not
open to rhetorical interpretation ("The Stupidity" 98).
Zavarzadeh

ignores or chooses

to deny

Moreover.

the constitutive

role

of

language in creating our conscious awareness and understanding of
that working day.
As I wrote in the first chapter, Berlin, Morton, and other critical
theorists haven't rejected the hegemonic terror of reason but merely
shifted its locus of control, its foundational justification outward to
the "social situation, context, paradigms, communities, or local nomoi
as loci of deliberation or judgement"11 (Vitanza, "Three" 143).

The

"social-epistemic rhetoric" of Berlin and the "hidden curriculum" of
Giroux are still based too deeply on the "game of knowledge"~no
longer a game of individualist consumerism but now of socialist
rationalism.

Vitanza sees this shift in the location of reason as

potentially "both dangerously utopian and blindly ideological" (143).
and so do I.
Further, Baudrillard's work makes me suspicious of the claim
that "The teacher can best facilitate the production of knowledge by
adapting a confrontational stance
293).
teacher's

Strickland

believes,

confrontational

like

toward
most

stance

the

critical

forces

the

student"

(Strickland

theorists,
student

that
to

138

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the

invent

rhetorical strategies to deal with that confrontation.
right,

then

the

student's

supposed

If Baudrillard is

resistance

and

eventual

acceptance of the teacher’s political view may be more an example of
the student playing the capitalist game than of a true conversion.
Even if I grant that confrontation can create social critique. I’m
still not sure it creates the intelligence to act on that critique.

We

might listen more closely to Dewey when he warns that "unless the
activity lays hold on the emotions and desires, unless it offers an
outlet for energy that means something to the individual himself, his
mind will turn in aversion from it, even though externally he keeps
at it" {How

We

Think 218).

Dewey believes that the role of the

teacher in taping into this energy should be as a "guide and director:
he [the teacher] steers the boat, but the energy that propels it must
come from those who are learning" (36), and I agree.
Fifth,

I agree with Gregory Jay and Gerald Graff that much of

critical pedagogy is based on an unexamined contradiction.

In Jay

and Graffs reading of Paulo Freire’s influential Pedagogy

o f the

O ppressed

, they

worry

"that efforts

by teachers

to empower

students often end up reinforcing the inequalities of the classroom,"
and

that

doctrine

teachers

"who

. . . merely

knowledge

down

to

directly

invert

passive

promote

progressive

the traditional practice
students"

("A

Critique"

political

of handing
202).

For

example, while "Freire does attack the Leninist model of education in
which revolutionary leaders impose their teleological blueprint on
students, merely inverting rather than breaking with the ’banking’
model of education,"12 (202) Jay and Graff point out that "the goal of
teaching for Freire is still to move the student toward ’a critical
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perception of

the world' and that this perception implies a correct

method of approaching reality"

(203).

Such an implication throws

into doubt Freire’s claim that liberation education "starts with the
conviction that it cannot present its own program but must search
for this program dialogically with the people" (118).

While Freire

argues that he is merely giving the will of the people back to them in
amplified form, he "clearly presumes he knows in advance what the
'authentic will

of the people' is or should be" (203).

Hence, how

dialogic can Freire's program be?
More troubling, what does Freire do with those who go through
the Freirean dialogue and reject his view of reality?

As Jay and Graff

ask.
Suppose a student ends up deciding that he or she is n o t oppressed or
not oppressed in the way or for the reasons Freire supposes? What if,
after a Freirean dialogue, the student embraces capitalism or decides
that, fo r him or h er. au th e n tic lib eratio n
m eans jo in in g a
corporation and making a lot o f money? Freire can only account for
such decisions as the result o f the student having been brainwashed
by the dominant culture.
(203)

It is, in short,

"a pedagogical premise" that begins by "condescending

to students" (203).
with

the banking

Thus, critical democracy pedagogy does not break
model of education;

ideology to be "deposited."
must

play

and

the

it simply supplies a new

The roles which the student and teacher

proper

outcome

of

that

interaction

are

p re d e te rm in e d .
Finally, I’mconvinced that critical pedagogy
harm than good to the
attempting to support.

may do more

political and social causes that

they are

Besides risking alienating students or forcing

them to play a game, critical pedagogy institutionalizes a form of
practice that could turn on them.

Theorists like Freire, France. Berlin.
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and Miller seem to assume that only critical pedagogy people will
adopt their method of instruction, or that even to use the method
requires a similar ideology.

For example, when Knoblauch argues

that we "denounce the world . . . and above all oppression and
whatever arguments have been called upon to validate it" (181), I
guess he assumes that what institutions, practices, laws, and systems
are oppressive, in what ways, and how they are to be denounced are
obvious.

But what if a teacher decided to denounce affirmative

action, gay rights, or feminism?
Read again the passages I quoted from Paine, Bizzell, Morton
and

others

but

imagine

that

the

person

who

would

use

these

methods is a racists or a homophobe hoping to advance his or her
political

agenda.

Do

we

really

want

to

in stitutio nalize

a

confrontational pedagogy considering the many people on the far
right who might disagree with its radical message but agree with its
methods? Critical pedagogues would do well to remember that they
are

a

minority

com m unity—probably

certainly within the larger society.

within

the

academ y

and

They must be careful what

practices they institute for fear that those practices could be wrested
from their ideological control.

If the critical theorists are not careful,

they will create a precedent, a power structure, that will not be
dependent on their particular ideology to function.

Foucault has

pointed out that changing the world is more complicated than merely
changing the ideologies
Miller,

paraphrasing

which operate its machinery.

Foucault,

argues,

"To seize

and

As James
exercise

a

dictatorial kind of power might simply reproduce old patterns of
subjectification under a new name" (The Passion 234).

Revolutions
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that change only the

ideology of a power structure and not the

structure itself change only who gets killed (which can often be
important but loses the moral high ground).
Thus, it seems to me that much of critical pedagogy lacks the
indeterminacy, the celebration of paradox, and the ability to live
with

incommensurability that

theory.

Instead,

themselves

the

I value

critical

so

theorists

much

seem

in postmodern

to

have

aligned

with what de Man has criticized as the philosophical

attempt to suppress the creative aspect of language through the
"grammatization

of rhetoric"

grammar

limits

which

( A l l e g o r i e s , 15)—only now it isn’t a

creativity

but

a

methodology

of restraint

employed in the name of establishing an equal ground for freedom.
I'm not suggesting
classroom door.

that politics can

should

be left at the

I am suggesting that there is a difference between

recognizing the situatedness and
finding that

and

political dimension

of all pedagogy,

troublesome and challenging, and using that as an excuse

to privilege the teacher's ideology.
Whether postmodernism can ultimately provide both a love for
indeterminacy and a progressive pedagogy is questionable.

Indeed,

a progressive postmodern pedagogy is an oxymoron—but, then again,
postmodernism does not shy away from oxymorons.

Further, if we

argue for the post postmodernism of Friedman, then the possibility
of joining

postm odernism

to

increases.

Yet there are serious questions as to whether such a

postmodern project is possible.
difference?

Can

we

live

projects

for

social

transformation

Do we need a self for a politics of

with

the

paradox

of

universalizing

difference? Does postmodern politics deny us the possibility of self
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and community—elements
theory? I don't know.

that are crucial to any viable political

But I agree with Phelps and Friedman that

these questions must be answered within the sociocultural matrix
that composition finds itself embedded, and that there is a discursive
authenticity in the attempt.

The question for our field in the post

postmodern age is not whether our classrooms are political but in
what way.

It is, in the end, a question of ethics—an ethics of the

political.
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CHAPTER THREE NOTES
1. See Kennedy's The A rt o f Persuasion page 67 and Kinneavy’s "Translating
Theory into Practice in Teaching C om position:
A Historical View and a
Contemporary View" pages 71-72 in Connors, Ede, and Lunsford’s E ssays on
C lassical R hetoric and M odern D isco u rse for a more detailed discussion of
K airo s.
2. See Emig, Newkirk, Jones for a further exploration of Dewey's tacit tradition
as an alternative to radical pedagogy.
3. See Dewey's How We Think:
A Restatem ent o f the Relation o f Reflective
Thinking to the Educative Process pages 270-271.
4.
For other theorists who also try, to varying degrees, to
postmodern politics for the classroom see: Faigley, LaDuc, Jay and
H ark in .
5. See Susan Miller’s Textual Carnivals:
overview o f this political past.
6. See Left Right and Center:
Robert Atwan and Jon Roberts.

construct a
Graff, a n d -

The Politics o f Composition for the best

Voices fro m A cross the Political Spectrum . Eds.
New York: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press.

7. See Left Right and Center:
Voices fro m Across the Political Spectrum p a g e s
425-34.
In the essay Churchill tries to point out the injustice, cruelty, and
disrespect of using Native American tribal names
to name U. S. sports
teams—
especially since the U. S. commited a holocaust against Native Americans.
8.
Berlin
teacher as
Indeed, he
discussions
class, race,

specifically opposes the banking model of education, "the model of
giver of knowledge and student as passive receiver " { R h e to r ic s 102).
blames that model for making students unwilling to participate in
on the differences am ong students organized around issues of
age, and gender.

9.
I am changing the subject of Foucault's writing from sexuality to identity in
this passage.
However, I believe Foucault's writings on sexuality could also
apply to subjectivity or identity. The actual passage reads as follows:
Sex was
driven out of hiding and constrained to lead a discursive existence.
From the
s in g u la r im p erialism
that
c o m p e ls
ev eryon e
to tra n s fo rm
th e ir
sexuality into a perpetual discourse, to the manifold mechanisms which, in the
areas of economy, pedagogy, medicine, and justice, incite, extract, distribute,
and institutionalize the sexual discourse, an immense verbosity is what our
civilization has required and organized" {The H istory 3 3).
10. O f course. Rose was writing o f a curriculum that did not challenge—but the
effect is the same.
11.
Vitanza does see this shift—while inadequate—as
an improvement over the
Cartesian justification of reason.
However, he still labels Berlin's reason as a
will to power.
Social-epestemic rhetoric, Vitanza believes, is too tied to the
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games o f rationality and knowledge
rep resen tatio n" ("Three" 143).

and

the

"dominant

(political)

modes

of

12.
Though Freire is usually the theorist most quoted for this type of idea,
Dewey has expressed similar ideas.
See ’’The Child and the Curriculum" page
209. D em o cra cy a n d E ducation pages 4-30, and "The Need for a Philosophy of
Education" page 10.
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CH A PTER IV

A POSTM O DERN ETHICS FOR TH E POLITICAL CLASSROOM

I would more or less agree with the idea that in fact what interests
me is much more morals than politics or, in any case, politics as an
ethics.
—Michel Foucault "Politics and Ethics:
An Interview"

In "Teaching the Political Conflicts:

A Rhetorical Schema,"

Donald Lazere argues that "little basis has been established within
the

discipline

fram ew ork

or

controversies
offers

of

com position

ethical

delineating

g uidelines

in writing courses"

a rhetorical

frame

as

a

for

(194).
"model

either

dealing

a

theoretical

with

political

Consequently, his essay
for incorporating

thinking about politics in writing courses" (194).

critical

As I do, Lazere

favors courses that "broaden the ideological scope of students' critical
thinking, reading, and writing capacities," yet he fears "that such
courses can all too easily be turned into an indoctrination to the
instructor's particular ideology" (195).
frame,

therefore,

is to

"empower"

The goal of Lazere’s rhetorical
students

"to make

their own

autonomous judgements on opposing ideological positions in general
and on specific issues" (195).
While
frame

endorsing

leaves

guidelines
classroom"

the

Lazere’s

more

p ro jec t,1 I find that his rhetorical

im portant

for dealing with political
undone.2

job

of

constructing

"ethical

controversies in the writing

Lazere’s frame provides a technical basis for

how to include politics in a writing classroom but not the basis on
which to decide what politics and behaviors should be allowed in the
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writing classroom.

For example, when Lazere writes that, "Part of

my theoretical intention here is to indicate ways in which partisan
political positions . . . can be introduced within a rhetorical schema
that is acceptable to teachers and students of any reasoned political
persuasion,"

(195)

he

leaves

out

or

leaves

constitutes a reasoned political persuasion.

implicit just

what

What criteria distinguish

a reasonable political persuasion from an unreasonable one? What
behaviors in the name of those persuasions do we allow in the
classroom? Does the partisan politics of Klan ideology get equal space
with Queer Theory? Where and on what basis do we draw the line?
The answer to such questions requires something more than a
rhetorical schema.
can

It requires an ethical one.

be rhetorically

propaganda

ministry

consider it moral.

After all, something

effective yet morally objectionable.
was

very effective,

but

few

of

Hitler's
us

would

To use politics in the classroom requires an ethics

of the political, a system of moral principles or values that governs
the conduct of the members of our profession in the arena of politics.
I do not claim that this ethics somehow escapes ideology.
present it as the utopian opposition to ideology.3

Nor do I

Instead, I accept

"Althusser's notion of ideology as an interpretation that constitutes
reality" (Bizzell,

"Marxist" 55), but I maintain that to constitute

reality is not to determine it.
in the word "constitutes"

There is an indeterminacy, a looseness,

that should be filled by an ethics of

experimentation, practice, an awareness of effect, and dialectic to
prevent the calcification of ideologies.

There is often a gap between

how our ideologies say the world works and our experiences of how
it does.

As Patricia Bizzell argues, "if we were utterly convinced of
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the inevitability of ideology, we would not feel uneasy about seeing
the world through ideological interpretations . . . any more than we
feel embarrassed about needing to eat or drink" ("Marxist" 55).

And

while Bizzell overstates her argument (we often do feel embarrassed
about the need to eat), many of us still desire a truth, beauty, or
morality that is above ideology.

We do feel the need to test our

ideologies in practice, and "reality" is constantly surprising us.
is

an experience

of the

world that exceeds

the ability

There
of our

ideologies to contain it.
Thus, ethics is the reminder of our experience of our ideologies'
limitation.

It is the reminder of what is left over from what was

prior to ideology—the echo of our first need to respond to the world
rather than to understand it.

Jeffery T. Nealon, using the theory of

Emmanuel Levinas, explains ethics as "the primacy of an experience
of

sociality

or

otherness

that

comes

before

any

philosophical

understanding or reification of our respective subject positions" ("The
Ethics" 131-32).

I would argue that this experience of overflow, this

urge to test ideologies, this need to respond to other is itself the
possibility

of

the

ethical.

It

allows

our

calcification, to remain open and changeable.

ideologies

to

resist

Ethics, therefore, is not

above ideology so much as envelopes it, precedes it, informs it, or
puts it to the test.

In short, I am arguing for an ethics of the

pragmatic, the experimental, the answerable.

I do privilege this

ethics of practice over an ideology of interpretation but through
argument and not because it has superior access to reality.

Without

this ethics we have no way of controlling what politics and behaviors
are allowed in the classroom save raw applications of power.
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The following is my attempt to construct a postmodern ethics
for the introduction, operation, exclusion, and critique of politics in
the writing classroom.4
its scope.
issues.

It is different from the political in terms of

The political is the encrusted beliefs one has on specific

The ethical is the larger methodology of value constraints in

which many specific and even contradictory politics can exist.

The

political

that

represents

support us.

the

cultural

structures

we

support

and

It provides the foundation for self interested action,

action that is often different from what we say, on cultural issues.

It

is through the political that we protect the self, but it is through the
ethical that we make the self vulnerable.

In constructing this ethics

I will first examine and synthesize potentially useful ideas from four
influential theorists of postmodernity:

Michel Foucault, Gerald Graff,

Patricia Harkin, and Mikhail Bakhtin.

I will then put this ethics to

the test against examples of "offensive" student writing, writing that
challenges deeply held beliefs.
I place the
perform

multiple

word offensive in

quotation marks because it must

functions in this chapter~not simply because

I

desire it to but because in the postmodern era all such evaluative
terms are political and situated.

From a postmodern perspective

what is offensive is every bit as ideological as what is true, beautiful,
and good.

Offensive is used in different ways by different people for

different reasons.

To the right offensive becomes synonymous with

over sensitivity, with political correctness gone wild.
offensive denotes an attack with words, an
weaker positions

of power.

To the left

assault upon those in

To the center offensive can

anything from bad judgement to bad taste to low morals.

mean

Offensive
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is a word wrapped in situatedness and intent—both of which are
often only partly conscious.

How are the words and intentions

framed and by whom? What is the intent of the person using the
offensive words—harm, mockery, destruction, resistance? How is that
intention

perceived

by

those

the words

target—a

bad joke,

an

assault, a reflection o f lower consciousness? A lesbian will perceive
an attack on gay rights differently than a straight male and a straight
male will aim an offensive
target.

remark differently

Thus, offensive is always relational.

depending on his

As Laura Kipnis argues

concerning the counter-hegemonic and class

based degradation of

women's bodies in H u stle r,
The sense of both pleasure and danger that violation o f pollution
taboos can invoke is clearly dependent on the existence o f symbolic
codes, codes that are for the most part on ly sem i-con sciou s.
Defilement can't be an isolated event, it can only engage our interest
or provoke our anxiety to the extent that our ideas about such things
are systematically ordered, and that this ordering matters deeply—in
our culture, in our subjectivity.
As Freud (1963) notes, 'Only jokes
that have a purpose run the risk o f meeting with people who do not
want to listen to them.' ("(Male)" 379)

In essence, offensive words have an addressivity built into them.
They represent a Bakhtinian dialogism in which the offensive words
mean, are understood,
constant

interaction

"as a part of a greater whole—there is a

between

meanings,

all

of

which

have

potential of conditioning others" (Holquist, "Glossary" 426).

the

Being

offensive and being perceived as offensive are determinations based
on one's situatedness within structures of class, gender, and race.
Offensive writing is enacted as, within, and against structures of
morals and tastes that constitute the meaning and intention of that
writing, where one stands on that meaning and intention, and that
reveal one's own place within the structures of society.
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My schema, therefore, is not the only possible ethics or an
ethics for all time.
offensive terms.

It too reflects my own situatedness in relation to

Rather, it is designed to begin a discussion among

those of us who are uncomfortable with oppositional pedagogy but
still see a place for the political in the writing classroom, a place
which requires ethical conduct.

Of course, as Lazere argues, "any

effort to construct such a schema is itself bound to be captive, in
some measure, to the partisan biases it sets out to analyze" (196).
My ethical guidelines will be no different.

However, like Lazere I

believe that "the only possible way to transcend these biases is
refinement

through

dialectical exchanges

with

those

of differing

ideologies" (196).
F o u r A lte r n a tiv e s to O p p o sitio n a l P ed a g o g y :
F o u ca u lt and the F reed om o f the E thical

The

idea

of

positively

associating

Michel

F ir s t,

M ichel

Foucault

questions of ethics might, at first, seem rather strange.

with

After all,

Foucault is more often associated with the central figures credited
with

creating a body of work—postmodernism—before

principled position can stand"5 (Faigley xii).

which

"no

The strangeness of the

idea, however, results from focusing too heavily on Foucault's early
work, where he is described by Paul Rabinow as "a philosopher or
historian of power" (Foucault, "Politics" 375).
F oucault

uses

em pirical

evidence

to

In these works, where
reveal

the

oppressive

consequences of humanism's attempt to reform hospitals, asylums,
and the penal system, the argument that Foucault is in favor of ethics
does seem rather naive.

It is in Foucault's later works, when he

becomes what Rabinow calls a philosopher or historian "of the self or
15 1
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subject," that the argument for ethics becomes not only credible but
central

(375).

Indeed, in "The Subject and Power" Foucault states

that "the goal of" his "work during the last twenty years has not been
to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations
of such analysis."
history

Instead, jis "objective . . . has been to create a

of the different modes

by which, in our culture,

beings are made subjects" (208).
history

of themodes

human

It is in this attempt to create a

of subjectification

that

concerned with questions of the ethical.6

Foucault

becomes

Consequently, there are

three crucial idea on ethics that we can take from Foucault's later
works:

that "Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics" ("The

Ethics"

284), that "ethics is a practice" ("Politics" 377), and that

individuals who live under systems of constraint must "at least have
the possibility of altering them" ("Sexual Choice" 148).
In "The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of
Freedom," Foucault argues that "Freedom is the ontological condition
of ethics.

But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when

it is informed by reflection" (284).

In other words, ethics comes into

being as freedom, or freedom is "a reality that is already ethical in
itself" (284).

However, to maintain freedom requires understanding

what is necessary for its continued existence, and that is ethical or
responsible behavior.
whatever
constraints.

we

want

Freedom does not mean that we can choose
nor

does

freedom

exist

in

the

absence

of

On the contrary, ethical freedom exists, precisely, as a

system of constraints that enables choice.7 The ethical results from
how a system of constraints is structured and operates.
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How, therefore, should a system of constraints be structured?
Defining ethics as a tangible domain of choices amongst constraints
necessitates that we structure "ethics as a practice" rather than as a
theory.
believes,

To be ethical we must act.
"do

not

constitute

"The 'best' theories," Foucault

a very

effective

protection

against

disastrous political choices; certain great themes such as 'humanism'
can be used to any end whatever" ("Political" 374).
must structure ethics instead as a conscious
experimentation.

Consequently, we

form of practice or

”[W]hat is ethics," Foucault asks, "if not the . . .

conscious . . . practice of freedom?" ("The Ethics" 284).

For Foucault

ethics is the freedom to test ideas, to see how they play out, to
modify them as the situation changes, to open one's self and one's
theory to critique.

Hence, the theory that everything is political does

not justify one's behavior.

Instead, it is the exact opposite:

theory is

made ethical by practice, by "a demanding, prudent, 'experimental'
attitude. . .[in which] at every moment, step by step, one must
confront what one is thinking and saying with what one is doing,
with what one is" ("Politics" 374).
example

the

m aterial-fem inist

The a p p l i c a t i o n of ideas, for

ideology

of

many

oppositional

pedagogies, implies a finishedness, a correctness, a rightness to the
idea.

Foucault, on the other hand, insists "on all this 'practice,' . . . not

. . . in order to 'apply' ideas, but in order to put them to the test and
modify them" (374).

Ethics is not, in other words, a encrusted

attitude one holds, an abstraction that removes one from the world,
or even a political outlook one applies.

Ethics is the ability to open

oneself to possibility.
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The questions Foucault is "trying to ask are not determined by
a

preestablished

political

outlook

and

do

not tend

realization of some definite political project" (375).

toward

the

Instead, Foucault

is trying "to open up problems that are as c o n c r e t e and g e n e r a l as
possible, problems that approach politics from behind (376).

The

political is too limited as a frame for understanding systems of
domination and for constructing practices of freedom.

The political

cannot explain the existence of its subject without reference to it. and
so it cannot adequately provide the genealogical history necessary to
trace the constitution of knowledges.

Without this genealogy it is

impossible to locate the gaps in knowledges in which different ways
of being are possible.
Finally and logically, therefore, Foucault believes that a system
of restraints is ethical when those who are ruled
means of modifying it.

by it have some

He writes:

the important question . . .
is not w hether a culture w ithout
restraints is possible or even desirable but whether the system of
constraints in which a so ciety fun ction s leaves in divid uals the
liberty to transform the system.
Obviously, constraints o f any kind
are going to be intolerable to certain segments o f society.
The
necrophiliac finds it in tolerable that graves are not accessible to
him.
But a system of constraint becomes truly intolerable when the
individuals who are affected by it don't have the means o f modifying
it.
This can happen w hen such a system becomes intangible as a
result of its being considered a moral or religious imperative, or a
necessary consequence of medical science . . . . restrictions have to
be within the reach of those affected by them so that they at least
have the possibility o f altering them.
("Sexual Choice, Sexual Act"

147-48)
Thus, those who argue that it is unethical for the teacher to keep his
or her politics secret in the classroom because that makes it harder
for students to confront
Foucaudian point of view.

those politics

would be correct from a

For a system of constraints to be ethical.
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the student must at least have the possibility of modifying the self
that that system produces and the system itself.

And to modify

these the student must first be able to see the system's structures.
But they are wrong in making those politics oppositional.
move they are a p p l y i n g

a theory, assuming its correctness, rather

than testing it to study its effects.
classrooms leading
becoming

places

Consequently, instead of their

to possibilities of greater freedom,
of

In that

further

political

domination.

they risk

Oppositional

pedagogy does not offer a means for the student to change the
classroom's systems of constraint-only the skill to survive them.
Of course, one objection that composition theorists could raise
to Foucault's ethics is whether it is ever truly possible for students to
modify a classroom's systems of constraint.

The classroom, they

might argue, can never be a democracy and, therefore, attempts to
portray

it

inequities

as

such

(See

merely

Jarratt's

mystify

"Feminism

both
and

authority

and

Composition"

power
106-13).

However, there is a difference between a classroom having to be a
democracy and a classroom where choice is possible—just as there is
a

difference

between

being

suspicious

consensuality and supporting nonconsensuality.

of

the

possibility

of

For while Foucault is

suspicious of systems of constraint based on consensus, seeing the
consensus as a mask for political domination and repression, he
nevertheless maintains that the idea of consensus is pragmatically
useful as "a critical idea to maintain at all times" ("Politics" 379).

As

Foucault argues, "perhaps one must not be for consensuality, but one
must be against nonconsensuality" ("Politics" 379).
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So, what can we take from Foucault for the construction of our
ethics? We can take the crucial ideas of ethics as a state of freedom,
as an opened ended practice designed to test theories rather than
apply

predetermined

responsive

to

the

political
situation,

outlooks,
as

as

dependent

fluid,
on

tangible,

and

empiricism

and

experimentation, as non-coercion, and, most importantly, as a system
of constraints in which those who are ruled by it have a means of
altering it.

In short, Foucault's ethics forces us to situate our theory

in practice, in who we are, and in what we are doing.
try

to

pressure

their

students

into

accepting

a

Teachers who
predetermined

political outlook do not provide the means to alter structures of
domination but merely enact new ones, constructing the classroom
not as a place to experiment but to regurgitate.

Foucault teaches us

that to ethically use politics in the classroom depends not on being
honestly confrontational but honestly vulnerable, making ourselves,
our theories, and our authority open to critique.

G erald

G r a ff’s E thics o f T each in g th e C on flicts

In many ways Gerald G raffs desire
themselves . . .

"to teach the conflicts

as a new kind of organizing principle to give the

curriculum the clarity and focus that almost all sides now agree it
lacks" (B e y o n d 12) seems the perfect model for furthering an ethics
of the political.

Graff clearly criticizes "those who justify turning

their courses into consciousness raising sessions on the grounds that
all teaching is inevitably political anyway," yet he maintains that
there is a "crucial distinction between e x p re s sin g a political view in
class and imposing it forcibly on students and colleagues" (25, 149).8
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Further, Graffs solution to make the "disagreements themselves . . .
the

point

of

connection"

(119)

seems

especially

friendly

to

composition teachers in that it stresses the importance o f students
having

access

to

the

process

professors' intellectual debates.

as

well

as

the

product

of their

Graff writes:

students typically experience a great clash o f values, philosophies,
and pedagogical methods am ong their various professors, but they
are denied a view o f the interactions and interrelations that give
each subject m eaning.
They are exposed to the results o f their
professors’ conflicts but not to the process o f discussion and debate
they need to see in order to become something more than passive
spectators to their education.
(12)

Graffs stressing of process and active learning not only echoes much
of composition pedagogy, it shifts the brunt of the conflict off the
students

and

themselves.

onto

the

professors—people

better

able

to

defend

This shift, while not removing a productive tension, may

do a great deal to lessen the fears of theorists like Maxine Hairston
who believe that students can freeze when the stakes of performance
are too high (189).
Graffs are indeed important to the furthering of an ethics of
the political for the writing classroom, but there is another aspect of
Graffs theory that is equally important for ethics though not as often
stressed.

It is the crucial role that respect plays in making it possible

to teach the conflicts, for there to be "a positive role for cultural
conflict," for difference rather than consensus to be the "basis for
coherence" (10, 58).
W ars

that "The

Graff argues early on in Beyond the

first step

in dealing productively

conflicts is to recognize their legitimacy" (5).
conflicts being debated are real.

with

Culture
today's

In other words, the

There are legitimate, intelligent, and

moral people on different sides of the issues.

When a teacher does
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not respect the conflict as authentic, he or she presents only one side
of the debate or, at best, a caricature of it.

But Graffs organizing

principle necessitates that no one teacher’s (or student's) politics be
presented as the only "correct," "enlightened,” or "true" position on a
subject.

Each

position

legitimate

positions,

legitimate

position

the
is

represents
ethical

willing

only

one

principle
to

"create

of many

involved
a

possibly

being

common

that

ground

a
of

discussion" and not that it must form or submit to an overarching
consensus (194).

We must "respect" others' "objections as arguments

needing to be addressed rather than as mere mystifications" (169).
The necessity for this respect only increases when one's goal is not
simply to include politics in the classroom but to endorse a politics.
As Jay and Graff argue, "persuasion has no chance unless it is willing
to respect the resistance of those not yet converted" ("A Critique"
208).
If an argument (or arguer) is not willing to grant this respect, if
it is authoritarian, dismissive, hostile, or monologic, then, within
Graffs frame, it loses the "right" to participate in the debate.

Using

the political in the classroom requires the humbleness, the courage,
and the perspective to "risk entering a debate that . . . [one] would
not necessarily be guaranteed to win" (Graff 169).

Thus, rather than

dismissing

ill informed, or

our colleagues or students as naive,

bigoted, we should try to respect the legitimacy of their political
situ a te d n e ss--e v e n
Conversely,

we

ones

should

with
expect

w hich
like

we

treatment

strongly
in

d isa g re e.

return.

This

reciprocal respect does not mean that all positions are equal, or that
we must give up our passionately held beliefs; it merely means that
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our colleagues' and students' subject positions should not be reduced
to examples of false consciousness.

Instead, they should be treated

as examples of a different consciousness, a different situatedness,
that we sometimes agree with, sometimes object to, but always try,
to the best of our ability, to respect—at least in terms of their
ultimate

incommensurability.

If

we

give

this

respect to

our

colleagues and students, then, according to Graff, we have the right to
demand it in return.
Teaching the conflicts, constraints

based on common ground

and not consensus, access to the process of debate and not merely
the product, acknowledging the legitimacy of difference, building a
coherence out of reciprocal respect for that difference, respect as the
beginning of persuasion, and an awareness of
own situatedness are all

the limitations of our

crucial ideas that we can take

work to further an ethics of the political.
limitation to Graff's solution.

from Graffs

However, there is also a

Besides its utopian

nature, Graff's

solution misses the visceral way in which many of us hold our
political beliefs.

Lynn Worsham argues in "Emotion and Pedagogic

Violence," that "the discourse of emotion is our primary education"
(122), yet the idea of "teaching the conflicts" assumes a level of
em otional

distance

or

privileges a

disinterestedness that many effective

measure o f intellectual

teachers

do not

have, would

not endorse, and, most importantly, do not feel.
A refusal to participate in Graffs conflict centered classroom is
not necessarily an example of dogmatism or entrenchment.

Instead,

it could be a form of self defense, a refusal to be seriously involved
in

a classroom

where

painfully,

perhaps

threateningly,

different
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ideological

arguments

are given equal

space (in terms

of time,

resources, assessments, and lesson plans) with ones that a person
holds dear.

And while Graff is not asking us to deny our feelings, our

passions, or our beliefs to participate in the debate, he is asking us to
admit that the other side is at least worthy of debate.

Thus, Graffs

solution reveals a situatedness that allows him to intellectualize or
make

hy pothetical

the

h o rro r

of

patriarchy,

the

pain

of

discrimination, the limitations of class.9
This gap in Graffs solution is somewhat ironic given that he
critiques John Searle’s argument to, when possible, "leave our politics
at

the

classroom

door"

as

ignoring

"the

fact

that

'political

commitments' are often expressed in the very choice of what to
include or not include in a course" (147).

As Graff reminds a

conservative sociologist with whom he had been corresponding, "the
mere

act of teaching

Marxism

at all"

conveys

the

"'view'

that

Marxism is a respectable body of thought or at least merits study"
(146).

In a similar vein, G raffs solution to the culture war asks

passionately committed feminists, Marxists, and multiculturalists to
convey the view that extreme conservative ideology on race, class,
and gender is a "respectable body of thought or at at least merits
study", and vice versa.

Graff proudly states "that what gives the

integration

he

experiments"

has

outlined

"a hope of

succeeding

where their predecessors failed is that they do not set themselves
against

the

American

dynamics

democracy

of
but

modern
take

opportunities to be seized" (195).

academic

these

professionalism

dynamics

for

granted

and
as

This "failure" to set himself against
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those structures of power is exactly the problem

some

theorists

would have with Graffs solution.
However, let me make it clear that I am not one of these
people.

I find Graffs solution brilliantly pragmatic and ultimately

ethical in its willingness to test ideologies in debate.

But I am trying

to show how the visceral way in which political beliefs are often held
makes this ethics difficult to achieve.

The playing field in which this

debate will occur is not a level one.

Different people will bring

different histories, often painful histories, to that debate.

True, we

can and should make the inequality of the playing field and the pain
of history part of the debate itself, but in order for Graffs solution to
work it requires more than the opportunity and ability to argue.

It

requires an ethics of care for those, especially from marginalized
positions, with whom we argue.

It is not the same thing to ask a

conservative, white male to share the ideological space of a classroom
with a feminist, African-American female as it is to ask the feminist,
A frican-Am erican

female

to

share

the

ideological

classroom with a conservative, white male.

classroom s,

therefore,

must

of

a

The feminist has much

more to lose both professionally and psychologically.
our

space

acknowledge

The ethics of

this

preexisting

condition.

Perhaps it could, at times, allow special considerations in

terms

time,

of

resources,

marginalized groups.

and

right

of

refusal

to

those

from

This is, of course, an open question, and I do

not intend this chapter to answer that question.
intend the chapter to at least raise it.

However,

I do

In any case, teaching the

conflict is a reasonable solution, but we must work an ethics of care
into that reasonableness.

16 1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

P a tr ic ia

H ark in

and

the

E th ica l P o ten tia l o f L ore

The work of Patricia Harkin can help us untangle one of the
most pressing problems for constructing an ethics of the political:
how

do

we

prevent

these

principles

from

themselves

becoming

authoritarian, arbitrary, and unresponsive to the changing dynamics
of our classrooms? Foucault and Graff have already supplied part of
the answer.

The ethics must be experimental, pragmatic, modifiable,

and tangible.

It must enable choice, be formed by a coherence of

difference rather than consensus, and be based on a respect not only
for that difference but for the emotional depth with which many
beliefs are held.
dangerously
em brace

But is such an ethics possible or is it hopelessly and

utopian?

an

ethics

Can
that

a discipline,
is

pragmatic,

specifically

composition,

experimental,

conflicted,

diverse, fluid, and playful? Yes according to Patricia Harkin, because
composition is not a discipline but a post discipline, and as a post
d is c ip lin e

it

th riv es

on

c o n tra d ic tio n ,

p rag m atism ,

and

e x p e rim e n ta tio n .
A discipline, according to Harkin's reading of Stephen Toulmin,
is,
a traditional procedure for raising and answ ering questions in a
regulated way.
It is precisely the regularity o f its procedures of
inquiry that produces the facts.
A discipline, therefore, is a function
o f its lexicon (the way it defines its term s), its representation
techniques (or traditional ways o f sharing that knowledge through
lab reports, articles, books, conferences, presentations, maps, charts,
d ia g ra m s, etc.), and its a p p licatio n p ro cedures.
(H arkin, "The
P ostdisciplin ary " 130)

Composition, on the other hand, does not function, at least for its
practioners,

in

a disciplinary

way.

Its

lexicon,

representation
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techniques, and application procedures are based on what Stephen
North calls lore.
traditions,

North defines lore as "the accumulated body of

practices,

and

beliefs

in

terms

o f which

Practioners

understand how writing is done, learned and taught" {The
22).
are

Making

Far from being regulated, lore's traditions, practices, and beliefs
unapologetically

disparate
126).

and

contradictory;

unarticulated

Further,

"its

assumptions

procedures
about

derive

writing"

Lore's making knowledge is "driven

pragmatic logic:

from

(Harkin

. . .

by a

It is concerned with what has worked, is working, or

might work in teaching, doing, or

learning

structure is primarily experiential" (North 23).

writing.

Hence,

its

Finally, lore is "anti-

essentialist" in that it eclectically forages among theories to test their
effectiveness in the classroom.
single

causes

cannot

be

It deals "with situations in which

stipulated,

in

discriminated from effects" (Harkin 134).

which

causes

cannot

be

Thus, these "irregular, ad

hoc procedures of lore" could be seen "as post disciplinary in their
willingness

to

use,

but

refusal

to

be

constrained

by.

existing

institutional rules of knowledge production" (Harkin 130-31).
If Harkin is right, and I believe she is, then composition's post
disciplinary

ethos

authoritarian way.

would prevent it

from

using an ethics

in an

Indeed, just as composition embraces a way of

making knowledge that is experimental, pragmatic, anti-essentialist.
and contradictory, it could easily embrace an ethics that contains
many of the same qualities.
disciplinarity

allows

it

"to

Harkin believes that composition's post
avoid

the

unfortunate

aspects

of

disciplinarity, particularly its tendency to simplify to the point of
occulting its ideological implications and making us think that its
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narrowness

is

normal"

(134).

In

a

sim ilar way,

this

post

disciplinarity would allow composition to avoid using ethics as a
narrow, abstract,

and unchanging set of laws to be imposed from "on

high," especially

if this post disciplinarity was itself part of the ethics.

Harkin’s objective for lore could be our objective for ethics:

the

objective of trying "not to achieve a totalizing" ethics "but rather to
see where" ideologies "intersect, where they contradict, where they
form constellations, and, perhaps what is most important, where they
form

la c u n a e " 10 (136).

To

paraphrase

Harkin's

ideas on

lore,

composition's post disciplinarity can allow it to embrace an ethics
that will help us to "see ways of construing relations of relatedness to
which our ideology has made us blind" (135).
M ik h a il B a k h tin 's C arn ival:
O ffen sive
A ct in N eed o f an E thical R esponse

Finally,

W r itin g

the work of Mikhail Bakhtin is

construction of a postmodern ethics.

a

P o litica l

important for the

So far my ethics has centered

mostly around the behavior of composition teachers.
the behavior of

as

But what about

composition students? How should we

deal with

students whose behavior is authoritarian, disrespectful, monologic,
dismissive, or threatening? How should we see and deal with their
writing? I think the of work Bakhtin can supply some answers.
We might see offensive student writing as a hybrid form of
Bakhtin’s
"temporary

carnival.

For

liberation

from

Bakhtin
the

the

carnival

prevailing

truth

was
and

a

time
from

of
the

established order; it marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank,
privileges,

norms,

and

prohibitions"

(R a b e l a i s

10).

During the

carnival all that was placed above or beyond the physical body, all
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that was officially sanctioned as "high, spiritual, ideal, abstract" was
"degraded" or parodied into the lowest common denominator, the
obscene, the material (19-20).

"The lower stratum of the body, the

life of the belly and the reproductive organs" (21) were particularly
important

to

this

degradation

because

so

much

commonality lies within its biological functioning.

of

humanity’s

Degradation, by

constitution, relates "to acts of defecation and copulation, conception,
pregnancy, and birth" (21).

Its power

is p redicated on its oppo sitio n from a n d to high d is c o u rs e s ,
them selves prophylactic against the debasem ents o f the low (the
lower classes, vernacular discourses, low culture, shit...) . . . .
The
very highness of high culture is structured through the obsessive
banishm ent o f the low, and through the labor o f suppressing the
grotesque body (which is. in fact, simply the material body, gross as
that can be) in favor o f what Bakhtin refers to as ’the classical body’
. . . —a refined, orifice-less. laminated su rface’’ (Kipnis, "(Male)''
376).

The weapons of the carnival were a "gay, triumphant and at
the same time mocking, deriding laughter" (Bakhtin, Rabelais

12), an

abusive, insulting "marketplace language" (16), and a "carnivalesque
speech" liberated "from norms of etiquette and decency imposed at
other times" (10).

Laughter is the most important weapon of the

carnival because it draws the object
into a zone of crude contact where one can finger it familiarly on all
sides, turn it upside down, inside out. peer at it from above and below,
break open its external shell, look at its center, doubt it, take it apart,
dism em b er it, lay it bare and expose it, exam ine it freely and
experiment with it. (Bakhtin, D ia lo g ic 23)

In short, carnival is the resistance of the oppressed through crude
jokes, degrading portrayals, and mocking caricatures.

It is often

violent and obscene, but it is also transformative and generative.
The carnival is like a great compost heap in which everything that is
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seen as above is degraded into its "organic" communality and from
that mass the possibility of new patterns of existence grow.
I would argue that for many students we—English teachers—
represent the high, the holy, and the official, especially those of us
who hope to inspire a political consciousness about issues of race,
class, and gender.

I would further argue that, rightly or wrongly,

many of our students feel oppressed or threatened by this attempt to
broaden consciousness.
in

a

column

newspaper.

for

For example, a student wrote the following

the

University

of

New

Hampshire's

student

It represents his take on the campus’ Diversity Support

Coalition:
When I was a little boy, my mother would try to force me to eat my
peas at dinner time. She always failed because I was a stubborn little
turd who n ev er saw the value o f eating her stupid peas simply
because s h e said it was good for me . . . . Now I’m in college and
multicultural special interest groups are trying to spoon feed me
cultural d iv e rsity like a gross baby fo rm ula that they claim is
essential to my growth as a
well-rounded human being.
Well, I'm
gonna have to spit-up in their
laps because I still don’t see the value
of swallowing what th e y consider to be good for me.

The student feels pressured and infantilized by the coalition.

As he

writes, the coalition is trying to "spoon feed" him "cultural diversity."
He resents this treatment.

He sees it as authoritarian, imposed on

him from above, coercive, so he degrades it.
Thus, offensive writing, while sometimes a sign of immaturity,
bad

taste, or poor judgment,

attempt

to

resist

our

could also

authority,

to

mock

relationship's power structure, to bring us
can be poked at.

us,

to

realign

down to a level

the

were we

It can be a political weapon aimed at that which is

seen as oppressive.
Kipnis argues.

been seen as apolitical

This is, of course, a rather unsettling thought.

"There

is discomfort at the

As

intended violation—at
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being

assailed

'with the part o f the

question' (380).

body or the

procedure

in

For Kipnis there is a "further discomfort at being

addresses as a subject of repression—as a subject with a history—and
the rejection of porn can be seen as a defense erected against
representations
(380).

which

mean

to

unsettle

her

in her subjectivity"

But I would add that there is a discomfort in being associated

with repressive structures of power as well.

English teachers usually

do not wish to see themselves in the role of the authoritarian figure
(neither do they want their authority so challenged), but I believe
students often do see us so.
Coalition was

Whether or not the Diversity Support

acting in an authoritarian way, this young man feels

that it was, and he resists that pressure with carnivalesque writing.
O f course, I am stretching Bakhtin’s theory somewhat to call
this student’s
example,

writing carnivalesque.

O'Neill’s other writing

Though not apparent in this

is particularly misogynist,

racist,

homophobic, and xenophobic (I will examine his writing more closely
in a later section).
carnival,

while

Bakhtin, on the other hand, stipulates that the

mocking,

degrading,

and

even

abusive,

is

a

celebration that embraces all people, that degradation is "not only a
destructive, negative aspect, but also a regenerating one" (R a b e l a i s
21). that the bodily element "is deeply positive . . . . not . . . a private,
egotistic form,

severed

from the other

spheres of life" (19).

reasonably be

argued,

therefore, that

much offensive writing lacks

the utopian sensibility of carnival.

Itcould

And yet, the writing of Rabelais

often depicts extremely violent and degrading acts against women as
humorous,

and

Bakhtin

carnivalesque writers.

sees

him

as

one

of

the

greatest

of

Indeed, Bakhtin is ominously silent on the
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plight of women.

He does not recognize that his carnival—as he

conceptualizes it—cannot be fully used by women, and, in fact, that it
uses women's bodies to achieve its ends.

Given this and other blind

spots in Bakhtin's theory of the carnival, it is difficult to determine
when mocking, degrading, and abusive writing has gone too far.
When has offensive writing stopped being an attempt to mock that
which is seen as oppressive, an attempt to transform hierarchical
power relations, and started being an attempt to use the power of
the carnival as a weapon of oppression,

an attempt to maintain

inequities of power?
Further, Bakhtin does not see the potential strategic use of
carnival like power and techniques by specific groups against specific
structures of authority (instead of the mass of humanity using it
against easily identifiable and monolithic power structures).
at a time and place

Writing

and about times and places where official

structures of power and authority were concentrated in theocracies,
aristocracies, or state dictatorships and influenced by the sparse class
categories of Marxism, Bakhtin could not imagine an official power
structure dispersed by democracy, capitalism, and technology nor a
populace stratified not only by economic class but by gender, race,
ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, and ideology.
Consequently, neither the structures o f American power, the
dynamics of our classrooms, nor the constitutions of the oppressed
are categorically unified enough for Bakhtin's original concept of the
carnival

to

be

applied

in

a

"pure"

or

unproblematized

form.

Categories still exist in very material ways, but they also overlap,
intersect, explode—resulting in people who occupy multiple positions
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of privilege and oppression at the same time.

For example, one may

be born into a privileged class but an oppressed race, an oppressed
class but a privileged gender, an oppressed gender but a privileged
race.

It is a condition that Patricia Bizzell, inspired by Fredric

Jameson, calls a "change in the history of totalities."

She writes:

T h i s vision o f change
may help us und erstand why we
have
difficulty defining the social order in modern A m erica and securely
d e lin e a tin g the bo undaries o f the w orking, m iddle, and upp er
classes.
A c o lle g e -e d u c a te d high school te a c h e r may make
considerably less money than a plum ber who is a high school
dropout; and both may be considerably
less com fortable with leftoriented political ideas than the psychologist with a graduate degree
and an incoming totaling more than theirs combined.
("M arxist” 60)

In single, identifiable, monolithic structures of oppression it is easy
to tell who is the oppressor and who is the oppressed.
fordian,

multi-identity,

heterogeneous,

and

But in post

technological

America,

who uses the power of the carnival and against whom is determined
not by easily definable categories of oppressed and oppressor but by
much more complicated, layered, and specifically situated political
in terests.
It

is easy to see the mocking, deriding, degrading

laughter of

the carnival as universal, joyful, and uniting when it is directed at
the church, the state, the
we

patriarchy, or the aristocracy (especially if

are not members of those groups). It is not so easy when we a r e

members of the group being mocked, especially when that group, in
certain areas of society, might not have all that much power.
who is

deemed "worthy” to be in the carnival and who

its attacks is, at least partially, an ideological question.
"clean"

Yet,

must suffer
Ironically, the

use of the carnival was possible only when meta-narratives

and their supporting power structures made it so.

In

the age of
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finite narratives, fractured power structures, and shifting identities,
the carnival is more complex, less utopian, and used by more people
than

we—teachers

of

a

progressive

bent—would

like.

English

teachers may have to recognize that, under certain political lenses,
they are

the

"oppressive"

class

which

an

"oppressed"

group

is

resisting, resisting in ways they don’t like, and against things they
hold dear.

Today,

disturbingly,

almost any

group can

use

the

leveling power of the carnival but leave its universal good will and
easily identifiable categories of oppressed and oppressor behind.
If this fractured and political take on offensive writing is how
we should view it, then how should teachers deal with it? How do
teachers connect with students who see their writing as resisting our
"PC

fascism,"

when

we

see

it as

supporting,

albeit at

times

unconsciously, larger oppressive structures? If what makes offensive
writing offensive is ideological, then can we create an ethics broad
enough to encompass those different ideologies yet tangible enough
to put them to the test? I

believe so.

I think the answer

to these

questions is once again ethical, an ethics of answerability.
In Art and Answerability,
an excess of seeing or knowing.

Bakhtin has a concept that he calls
This is the idea that others can see

parts of our spatial and temporal being that we cannot.

Bakhtin

argues that
When I contem plate a whole human being who is situated outside
and over against me, our concrete, actually experienced horizons do
not coincide.
For at each given moment, regardless o f the position
and the proxim ity to me
o f this o th e r human being
whom I am
contemplating, I shall always see and know som ething that he, from
his place outside and over against me, cannot see himself:
parts o f
his body that are inaccessible to his own gaze (his head, his face and
its expression), the world behind his back, and a whole series of
objects and relations, which in any o f our m utual relations are
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accessible to me but not to him.
Aswe gaze at
each other, two
different worlds are reflected in the pupils of our eyes.
(22-23)

The other can sees parts of myself I cannot and can, therefore,
extend my understanding o f myself and vice versa.

Each person's

unique spatial and temporal position in the world gives him or
an irreplaceable perspective.

her

The self has a structural need for the

excess of seeing this unique perspective can provide (Nealon 140).
The other's excess of seeing gives the self the potential for growth.
change,

and

new ways

o f being.

New ways of

understanding

ourselves are literally reflected in the eyes of another.
The mutual dependency of self

and other for an excess

of

seeing ensures what Bakhtin calls the obligation of answerability, the
responsibility of response.

I and the other must

empathize or project m yself into this other human being,
see his
world axiology from within as h e
sees this world: I must put myself
in his place and then, after returning to my own place, 'fill in his
horizon through that excess of seeing which opens out from this, my
own, place outside him.
I must enframe him, create a consummating
environment for
him out o f this excess o f my own seeing, knowing,
desiring, and feeling.
( Ar t 25)

The spatial, temporal, biological, psychological, and social parts of the
self cannot be interconnected without the extended view provided
by the other.

This interconnectedness depends upon our realization

of an ethics to respond.

"[W]hat," Bakhtin asks, "guarantees the inner

connection of the constituent elements of a person? Only the unity of
answerability" (I).
turning

away

from

We cannot turn away from the other without
the

potential

of

ourselves.

We

must

be

answerable to each other because it is in the ethics of response that
the

self comes into being and has the potential for change.
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This ethics of response does not mean that I can become the
other.

Both physically and subjectively I cannot see the world

e x a c t l y as the other sees it and any attempt to do so would be
im p e ria lis tic .11 But as Nealon argues, the Bakhtinian "self is never
merely an appropriation machine, but always open--responding or
answering—to the other" (133).

Answerability represents a dialogic,

intersubjective understanding of ethics.
writes in Postmodern

It is, as Zygmunt Bauman

Ethics, "an ethics that recastes the Other as the

crucial character in the process through which the moral self comes
into its own" (84).

This moral self is the obligation to response.

"What the self is answerable to," Anne Dyson explains, "is the social
environment; what the

self is answerable for is the authorship of its

responses"

short, the self, in Bakhtinian terms, exists

(229). In

in

relation to others; "the self is an act of grace, a gift of the other"
(Dyson 230).
If a student is

willing to present his or her discourse in

a

dialogic of answerability, even if ideologically offensive, then we
must respond

in kind.

For even,

perhaps

especially,

offensive

writing can give us a view of ourselves as teachers that we cannot
get anywhere else, a view that can be used to critique, modify, and
extend who we are, what we do, and why we do it.

And we can offer

the same gift of self, growth, and change to our students.

In the

spirit of this ethics, then, I would now like to put it to the test.

In

the following pages then, I will present the writing of two students
that I find extremely offensive.

The difference between them is one

writer's willingness to be answerable.
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T e stin g

th e

E th ics

Sitting in my office late one afternoon grading papers and
listening to the student produced sewage

run

through

the pipes

crisscrossing my ceiling, a quiet yet determined knock sounded at
my door.
program.

It was Kerry Reilly, a fellow instructor in the writing
She was upset.

It seems a student had given her a very

misogynistic paper, and she was torn about what to do with it.

She

had already been to see the director of first year composition.

The

director had first determined what the context

of the writing was.

Was this the first example of such writing or was it part of a larger
pattern? Had Kerry attempted to engage the student over a period of
time?

Did

Kerry

feel

threatened? In

short,

thedirector

had

emphasized the importance of the process o f engagement for dealing
with offensive writing.
support whatever
that was.

Then the director told Kerry that she would

she needed to do—but Kerry wasn't certain what

This wasn't, in fact, the first time that "Doug" had given

Kerry problems.

He wasn't hostile but he was subtly inappropriate

and threatening, challenging Kerry's right to authority in small ways.
For instance, he commented on her new

haircut in

a one-on-one

conference (he liked her hair better long), asked about

her dating

habits,

wondered

out loud

how old

she

challenged the worth of Kerry's assignments.

was.

He

also

subtly

In a reflection essay on

how he felt his work was going, he wrote the following:
Surely, you would rather I tell you about the wedding plans and how
the horses will fit in.
Or maybe I should
relate how my brother
wants to meet me in North Carolina at the end o f the week.
Maybe
how I intend to retrieve the vessel into which I poured every spare
ounce o f love and energy for three years.
All o f this seems much
more exciting and alive right now than reflecting on some "choice”
past essays.
Never the less, the direction I must go has been chosen
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for me and you will have to wait weeks or even months to find out
about weddings and horses, brothers
I haven’t spoken to in years,
and who or what was that vessel exactly.

The challenge is small but there nonetheless.

Doug doesn't want to

waste his time on Kerry's meaningless assignments.
spend his

time writing about things that

He would rather

should interest them both.

Nevertheless, Kerry had "chosen" (forced would be a more honest
word for how Doug feels) the direction in which Doug must go, and
Doug didn't like to be forced.
Doug was a large, muscular man, a few years older than most
first-year students.
college.

With

opinionated

He had been in the military before coming to
his

manner,

military
he was

expressed opinions were that
should be
frustrated.
produce.

hair cut.

imposing

intimidating

presence,

to Kerry.

and

Among

his

homosexuals are abnormal, that a man

proud of his homophobia, and that feminists are sexually
Kerry

feared

what

an

outright

confrontation

might

And yet, there was an honesty about Doug, a willingness to

enter into debate, to see debate as necessary that caused Kerry not to
want to, in her words, "banish him from the class."

For example, in

another self evaluation of his work, he wrote:
I think that my contribution to discussion in class and in workshops
is a necessary evil.
Although, a couple o f times I thought that if the
mob had a leader I might be lynched.
Particularly when the class
was discussing Adrienne Rich, five more minutes and I think they
would have gotten a rope.
Stirring up the class and taking the road
less traveled was not and is not my goal. I just seem to end up on that
road anyway often carving my own road alone, although I do believe
my roads are justifiable.
In conferences I would have to say that I
am usually not holding up my half o f the conversation.
I think that
maybe this gives you the wrong impression o f how I am taking what
you are saying.
It's not that I do not agree, or am not willing to
change, but I fear this is often how I come across . . . . If you will
bare [sicJ with me I think we are headed in the right direction now.
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The incorrect
appropriate.

use of the word "bare" in the last time is ironically
It is symptomatic of the situation.

Doug is not only

asking Kerry to bear with him but to bare herself to him as he will to
her.

He is asking Kerry as a female instructor to enter into a

relationship that may be threatening to her.
make this relationship answerable.
opinions, but
other

words,

therefore, that

Yet, he is willing to

He realizes that others dislike

he maintains that his opinions are "justifiable."
he

understands

that

opinions

they must be argued for.

more than simple rebellion.

are ju st

that.

his
In
and.

His actions are driven by

He doesn't stir up the class to cause

trouble, but to remain authentic to his individualist ideology.

He is

aware, to some degree, of his own subjective biases.
Further, his self mockery about being lynched displays at least
some measure of perspective on the subjective, socially constructed
nature of perception.

He understands that what he finds legitimate

others find offensive.

Indeed, in the same evaluation he writes that

"in responding to an essay we have preconceived notions, usually
rooted in our

own path, that

this quote is

important.

fill in someof

the blanks."

It shows at least some connection

Thewe in
to the

class and a perspective on interpretation being "rooted" in individual
or cultural experience.
the evaluation.

This "we" also echoes with the final "we" of

He tells Kerry that he knows that he is not "holding

up" his "half of the conversation" in conference, but that "if you will
bare with me I think we are headed in the right direction now."
"we" shows that Doug does see himself
obligation

or answerability with

This

in a relationship of mutual

Kerry, one

that he feels
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he is

currently not respecting, and that is an important insight for dealing
with him.
Kerry also felt that Doug was an important, if disruptive, part
of the class's community.

One young woman wrote in her class

evaluation to Kerry that,
My favorite part of the class is when we have the open discussions. I
get to learn about other people’s outlook on the story. It helps me to
think about other ways that I can look at something.
["Doug"] drives
me nuts because he contradicts everything everyone says, but I also
liked to put myself in his shoes and look at things in the way he does
(to some extent).

Thus. Doug does seem to provide an important Bakhtinian excess of
seeing for the class.

He opens up new ways for the class members to

see the subject and themselves.

He also seems to be an integral part

of initiating the debates that allow Kerry to "teach the conflicts."

Yet.

the writing Kerry hands me to read makes me wonder exactly what
the effect and worth of that opening up is.

The paper, or

at least

parts of it, reads as follows:
Jim the Binge and I
Jim and I started out the evening without planning to binge.
We
went down to the worst part o f town, where I knew the owner o f this
run down hole in the wall bar/strip joint.
Her name was Kimberly,
she was pregnant, she was bisexual, and she was more than just a
little less than impressed with the shape and weight o f her body at
the time.
I hesitate to describe her feelings towards me as a crush as
she is all of thirty two years old, but that would seem to be the most
accurate way to describe them . . . . I’d taken her out a couple of
times, I wasn’t trying to get anywhere with her but I was getting
there none the less.
So Jim and I headed out for the night and the
first landing was at Kim’s bar.
Jim and I shot a few games o f stick
and drank a few beers when another younger lady who I was good
friends with and who new Kim very well pulled me aside to have a
few words.
I can’t recall the exact wording but it went something to
the effect of ’’If you don’t have protection with you, you should slip
out and go get some.
I think Kim’s going to ask you to spend the
night with her."
Knowing how close the two of them were that was
more than a suggestion.
Meanwhile I still haven’t figured out what
if anything I feel for this girl.
I consult Jim, who is the greater
womanizer, and his advice of course is to take what I can get and if I
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don’t feel anything for her run like hell when I’m done.
He also
suggests that I give him a lift up to the Fantasy Club so that in the
event I stay with Kim he can catch a ride home and
in the event I
don't I can join him . . . . Thirty minutes or so o f contemplation later
I am back at Kim's no further along than I was to start out with.
A
couple of hours and three or four beers later I am still undecided but
leaning towards the realistic side of the house, that is to say, I don't
have any real feelings for Kim at all, and I know her just a little too
well to steal the candy and run.
Being the honorable individual in
an honorable mood, when asked to adjourn to her place, I told the
truth and I felt like shit.
Both because I had hurt her feelings and
once again I was going home alone. Next stop the Fantasy Club.
I dropped in on Jim intending to polish off another beer and
offer him a ride to the "Big House” if he wanted it. Leave it to Jim to
give good advice, "Let's
kill some Pain, Jessica, com e here
you
sweethart.
My friend and I need a couple o f shots and a fresh
pitcher." So much for going home. Jim is a connesier o f strip joints,
his second ex-wife was a stripper, and there is no place he would
rather spend his time or his money and we ju st got paid.
My
tolerance is high right now so it’s going to cost us
a bit to get
trashed.
However drinking is not the only attraction and both Jim
and I are tipping the girls rather heavily when com pared with our
normal tipping styles.
Usually we make them work alot harder for a
dollar and we never tip more than a dollar at a time, to easy to run
out of money that way and ruin the evening.
We both know we will
be going home alone this evening however Jim is still trying to turn
his luck around. One o f the girls is selling "shooters" usually a mixed
drink o f only hard alcohol served in a test tube in the size o f a
double.
Depending on how good you are, that is to say how good
looking, how smooth yo ur style, how much money she thinks she
can milk you for and so on will define the finer points o f how you
will receive your drink.
On this particular night Jim is ranking well
up the scale when he calls her over.
She get's down on her knees
and kneeling between Jim ’s legs, with some extra show and flourish
deep throats Jims test tube.
While Jim is looking down at her she
pulls his mouth to hers and kisses him while standing up.
Jim being
seated in a chair the effect is to empty the tube when she is once
again standing above him.
And to Jim's credit he did better than I
and did not spill a drop.
O f course some o f the other patrons have
observed this display and are now calling the young lady to their
ta b le s .
It was shortly after this display that Jim looked at me and in a
completely somber voice said, "Isn't it amazing, that is that money
has such power.”
That was when he pulled old George out o f his
pocket to be forever associated with this moment.
He spoke as a
gentleman making a completely scientific observation.
"You see this
doller, it has real power, with this doller, one doller now, I have the
power to make that girl over there, the one thats crawling all over
that guy like a hot rock, come over here and crawl all over me. And
this single doller gives me the power to do that with any girl in the
room.” This is no news flash for me, but at that moment for some
reason the thought just clicked.
It really is amazing the power that
money holds over people and truth be told there are few who for the
right price would not do nearly anything that you asked of them.
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Now make no mistake these p articular youngladys were not selling
themselves short, on a good night these girls will walk away at over
a hundred dollers an hour. Thats alot o f power.

The essay is strikes me as very misogynistic.

He writes happily of

"girls." women reduced to vessels, of taking "the candy" and running,
and of a multiple of other horrid things.
particular classroom is important.
essay to me or another male

Further, the context of this

Would Doug have written this

instructor? I don't think so.

His

challenge to Kerry’s authority is deeply rooted in Kerry being a
female in a position of power over him.

The sexual content of the

essay is a way to let Kerry know that Doug has the power to make
her feel uncomfortable, to assert the male privilege that he has in
other areas of life.

If ever there was an essay that could cause a

visceral reaction, it is this one.

Can we find a way to respect or at

least understand Doug's subjectivity? Can Kerry? Can we make a
connection? Do we want to?

Still, there are ways into this essay,

ways that can be found in what has been written, ways to begin a
critiqu e

that

are

in tern ally

p ersu asiv e

rather

than

sim ply

confrontational (a strategy that would not work with Doug anyway).
For example, there is a certain morality or code of ethics in this
and other essays.

In this essay, Doug writes that he does not sleep

with Kim because he doesn't "have any real feelings for Kim," and he
"knows her just a little to well to steal the candy and run."
is

wrapped

in a crude

misogyny,

there

is ethics

Though it

at play

here.

Sexuality is not merely a physical act, and he does not want to use
someone he knows.

He feels some sense of obligation to people with

whom he has a relationship.
treat Kim as disposable.

He decides, against Jim's advice, not to

It would be a dishonorable action, and he. in
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his own words, is an "honorable individual."

While hardly the high

water mark of moral behavior, it does give us a place to start that is
internally persuasive to Doug, that recognizes his subjectivity and is
based on a morality he wrote rather than one we imposed.

It allows

us to begin a discussion in which we can historicize why Doug has the
attitudes about women that he does.

We could ask him why he is

able to humanize Kim but could participate in the dehumanization of
the "girls" at the strip bar? How can he justify "stealing the candy"
with them so to speak but not with Kim? Is it only because he knows
her? How logical or reasonable a basis is that for an honor code? And
logic or reasonableness is of great importance to Doug.
and

c o n v e rsatio n s

are

peppered

unreasonableness or ill-logic of others.

with

rem arks

His essays
as

to

the

By turning his own ill-logic

against him, we, once again, have an opening for critique that could
be

internally

persuasive,

respectful

of difference,

and

based

on

evidence derived from the student's own writing.
In other papers, Doug also betrays a sense of morality we could
use to make a connection and form a critique.
essay called

"Of Morality,

Honesty,

For example, In an

and Things

that Cannot be

Forgiven," Doug writes that
My buddy Jim believes that if a married
woman is out on the town
looking, her husband is not taking care of business at home and she
is therefore fair game . . . .
I have found m yself hard pressed to
consider the wives fair game morally . . . . I do not believe in divorce
. . . . It used to be alot easier for me to say [that], way back when,
before my
first relationship with a married woman . . . . Truth be
told, o f all the shameful things I have done in my life I put the . . .
[affair] right at the top.
Biblically speaking there is only one thing
that is grounds for divorce and that is adultery.
The woman whom I
am seeing
now is in the pursuit o f divorce, and she is justified
biblically.
Yet she is still technically married and that has been the
thorn in my side and the inspiration beh in d some ex ten siv e
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research into
the
searching as of late.

The

religious

imagery

obviously forms
behavior.

sub ject.

Combined

of this

with

passage

some serious

soul

is important.

Religion

the grounds for a rather extensive code of moral

Doug finds adultery biblically wrong.

committed it is a "thorn in"

his "side."

Therefore, to have

This pain forces him into

serious contemplation, "serious soul searching," of his actions.

Could

we not use this sense of religious morality, this willingness for self
examination, to critique Doug's behavior at the strip bar in a way
that be internally persuasive to him? Is it moral for him to treat the
woman in the bar the way he does? It would not be difficult to find
examples

of

religious

based

essays condem ning

the

sexual

exploitation of women, to give these essays to Doug, and ask him to
respond.

Is it possible that such an assignment might provide an

excess of seeing
believe so.

that would rupture Doug's ethical blind

Later in same essay Doug writes that he

spots? I

accepts "full

responsibility for the weaknesses of my own flesh and mind.

Sadly,

they have so often been my downfall. . . .Having searched my soul
and passed judgement on what I found, I set about to correct that
which was not."

I would argue that Doug has a strong sense of what

is right and what is wrong, that he can be made to feel guilt, and that
this guilt or response causes him to attempt to change his behavior.
Doug ends his essay on morality with an important question:
"where do you draw the line and what are you willing to forgive?"
This

question

reflects

the

openness

required for entrance into ethical debate.
I think, with moral behavior.

and

responsibility

that

are

Doug is concerned, deeply

Indeed, in a conversation with me, he

stressed how he always stops to help women in need of car repairs
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while other so

called

"sensitive" people drive right

p ast.12

H is

behavior at the strip bar, therefore, represents a contradiction in his
ethics that a teacher could rightfully ask him to explain.

Perhaps

trying to explain that contradiction could help change where Doug
currently draws the line on what he is willing to accept.
There

is another

potential path

for

critique

paragraph of the "Jim the Binge and I" essay.

in

the

last

Indeed, part of me

wants to argue that the first part of the story is designed to highlight
the immorality of the last paragraph; that the narrator of the story
comes

to an insight or cannot be trusted and, therefore, cannot be

assigned to Doug.
think

we

will

But I'm afraid I'm not that optimistic.

have

to

settle

for

the

connections

Instead. I
to

Marxist.

Foucaudian,

and feminist criticism that we can make in the

paragraph.

We can point out the interconnection of money, power,

and the exploitation of women in the paragraph.
nexus is ripe for dialogue.

Jim's speech on this

Of course, Jim's argument and its impact

on Doug are hardly Marxist, Foucaudian, or feminist in character.
though

Doug sees the connection among money,

servitude, he

final

feels no necessity to critique it.

For

power, and sexual
He writes that the

connection between money and power "is no news flash for me, but
at that moment for some reason the thought just clicked."

This click

shows at least the beginnings of an insight that might make further
Marxist, Foucauldian, or feminist critiques of that connection also
click.

Then again, it might not, but it is a place to begin, to put

pressure, to make a connection.
has

a

much greater chance

In any event, it is a strategy that

of working

with

this

student

oppositional pedagogy does.
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than

Doug was quite aware and proud of his military background,
and he was convinced that the "left wing liberals" of the English
department would not and could not understand it or him.

In an

essay called "A Momentary Expansion of Time," Doug writes that "My
platoon was just about as tight as they come, and this may not really
mean anything to you, or more precisely you don't know what 1
mean."

And in a personal note to Kerry, Doug argued, concerning his

service in the Gulf War, that "I don't think anyone who has never
had such

an experience can truly understand."

Doug's

military

background is every bit as much a culture to him, a unique and
separate

way

of

understanding

the

world,

as

racial,

ethnic,

or

religious cultures are to someone else, and he was upset that people
in the English department did not, could not, and would not "respect
it."

According to Doug, strip joints, affairs, competition, confrontation,

violence, and strong opinions were the way of military life.
constituted

They

what was important to him, his personal experiences,

what he wanted to write about, the way he rendered meaning from
experience.

He didn't expect the English department to validate his

experience, but he was angry, nonetheless, that it didn't.

However,

he was also grateful that Kerry, while setting firm boundaries for his
behavior, had not tried to shut him down, to make him write what he
called

"pet the puppy papers."

I believe oppositional pedagogy

would have gotten just that from him—no critique, no self reflection,
no growth, only "the playing of the game."

True, Doug would not

have been intimidated by an oppositional pedagogy.

He would have

pushed back, but eventually he would have, as he told me, "gone
along to get along."
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Kerry, on the other hand, was able to make at least some kind
of connection with Doug, cause some kind of self reflection in him.
and, so achieve a measure of answerability.

While in an early

personal note to Kerry Doug claimed to be "a person mostly devoid of
feelings," in another essay he confided what it was like to be in the
military:

"When you get back to base and the demons come to visit

you at night in your rack you cry your tears and deal with the
ghosts, but in the field you shut your emotions off."

I think it is an

insight into and for this man that came only from Kerry's ethical
engagement of his offensive writing.
But what do we do with a student with whom we cannot make
a connection, when the visceral reaction

to the student's writing

overwhelms our desire and ability to form a relationship, when the
empirical evidence before us shows that the student does not want a
relationship of answerability? The writing of Bryan O'Neill raises just
those questions.
ethical

system

I include his writing, therefore, to show that any
must

have

behaviors or ideologies.

limits,

ways

of saying

no

to certain

As open, fluid, experimental, answerable,

and respectful as my ethics tries to be, those very principles also
necessitate a standard of both inclusion and exclusion.

Still, I believe

some kind of controlled engagement with writing that we would
condemn as unethical can give us a better perspective on who we
are, what we believe, and how the effect of what we do is perceived
by certain others.

For example, while the writings of Adolf Hitler

would occupy no ethical space in my classroom, they could occupy a
kind of negative space, a means for starting debates or historicizing
arguments.

Perhaps we can use writing that we cannot engage
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ethically to, at least, inform our ethics, to make them concrete and
lived.

I will first present O'Neill's writing and then comment on how

we might understand it and its impact.

The 666th

The

L evel o f E vil

1993-1994 and

1994-1995 school years

were a highly

conflicted, painful, divisive, yet unifying time at the University of
New Hampshire, a time when four important events occurred.

The

first of these was the suspension of Professor Don Silva on charges of
sexual harassment of students in his basic writing course (eventually
the matter was settled in court but not before the University was
forced into the media spotlight).
Zeta Chi (ZX) fraternity.

The second was a "stinger rush" at

The members of ZX held a party in which it

was alleged that alcohol had been served to minors, and that the
brothers

had

hired

strippers

members threw money.

to

perform

oral

sex

while

party

The third incident was a SHARPP [Sexual

Harassment and Rape Prevention Program] sponsored "Mock Rape
Trail."
sides

The trail was a dramatization of a date rape in which both
of the

incident

presented their views

on

what

happened.

Football players who had been required to attend the presentation
made

lewd

and

derogatory

subsequently sentenced

comments

throughout.

to attended presentations

on

They

were

rape culture

sensitivity.
Finally, and thankfully positively, Jared Sexton was elected the
first African American student body president in the University's
history.

Mr. Sexton was not only a vocal supporter of diversity on

campus, he was instrumental in encouraging the creation of many
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University
BSU

supported student organizations.

(Black

Student

Union),

AASO

Among these were the:

(African

American

Student

Organization), Alliance (Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgendered, and
Their Allies),
American

ARC (Against Rape

Student

Organization),

O rganization),

Culture),
Hillel

ADELA
(The

(The

Jewish

Latin
Student

DSC (Diversity Support Coalition), WRC (Women’s

Resource Center) CED (Coalition to End Discrimination), ASO (The
Asian Student Organization), Queer Campus, and People for People—
not to mention a series of events and programs such as Sexual
Awareness Week, Blues Jeans IF You're Gay Day, Take Back the Night,
and

Safe

Zones.

University's

These

resources

and

groups
culture.

made
The

demands
school

on

both

the

newspaper

was

flooded with demands for more diversity, sensitivity, and resistance,
letters against these very demands, and letters either for or against
Silva and Zeta Chi.

In short, it was a traumatic and dynamic time for

the UNH community.
Into this emotionally and politically charged situation walked
Bryan O'Neill and his student newspaper column: "Hi Mom! I'm in
Jail:

A Rating Scale of All Things Evil from 1 to 666."

In it O'Neill

listed and ranked a series of people, places, and things on a scale of
evil from I to 666.

O'Neill's column led to a storm of controversy

that culminated in calls for his removal from the paper and article
length

letters

from students and professors either condemning or

supporting him (or at least his right to free speech).

The following is

a sketch of his writing and the controversy it caused from September
1994 to May of 1995.
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O'Neill's first contributions to The New Hampshire (T N H ) were
in the form of cartoons:
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Though the cartoons dealt specifically with the Silva and

Zeta Chi

controversies, they caused surprisingly little stir.

After the cartoons,

however, the first of O'Neill's columns appeared.

The following is a

sample of his first entries:
D iv e rsity :
Some people seem to think that the best way to diversify
our fair campus isto enhance the enrollm ent o f minorities.
True.
But I think the whole process would go much faster if we just killed
off a whole bunch o f white guys.
Sure, it may sound extreme, but
then again. I'm pretty hard-pressed to think o f any gender or race
related issues on this campus that haven't already been beaten like a
stinky mashed potato.
(345)
S m ith Hall:
Oh goody! Let's make one really nice dorm where we
shove all the diverse foreign students and make them feel at home!
Oh yeah! Let's even leave a few spaces open for a few white students
so that they can experience many different cultures in the confines
of their own room.
Pbbbttt! Why don't we ju st shove Satan in there
so that we can make the place completely evil. (665)
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The ZX trail: Give me a break. If the university decided that they
were going to nail every whore that walked through the doors of a
fraternity p art...ah h h ...n ev er mind.
(98)
Special interests groups: Well. now. We must be a very diverse
campus because w e’ve finally got at least one student committee per
nationality, race, and sexual orientation on our fair campus.
I'm so
happy I could <§>#$%&* die. Ha. I'm just kidding, o f course. I really
think it all sucks.
I’m a white heterosexual male, and I’m feeling sort
o f left
out. There’s no group out there for me.
I was thinking of
starting
up a little group for lonesome little white
guys like myself,
and calling it "Pale Sausages.” but it just never quite got off the
ground.
Then
again. I don't
really believe that this campus needs a
school recognized organization for honkies.
N othing in that group
could ever represent what I truly think an yw ay—that is, assuming
that all oth er white guys don't spend th e ir time thinking about
quicker ways to get high off of paint fumes. (666)
Sexual H arassm en t:
There's already been way too much written
about this stupid subject in the forum pages o f this stupid paper, so
I’m not g oin g to bo th er writing anything even sem i-in telligent
about it.
Instead I'll write this: Seeing as how it's almost impossible
to prove anything in a court of law regarding sexual harassment,
why not save everyone a little time and heartache by...oh...lighting
yourself
on fire! Hell, why not? It's a quick and easy
way to get
everyone’s attention, and
you won't be around long enough for the
public to get
apathetic towards your case!
M aybe, if you're real
lucky, you’ll even die before they get your body to Health Services—
the place where the real pain always begins.
(666)

These first

entries are typical of the content and style

of

O'Neill’s w riting.13 They are crude, juvenile, misogynist, racist, and
violent, but they are not without an effective use of mocking humor.
The humor expresses a feeling a being "left out" and then a denial of
that

feeling— "Nothing in that group could ever represent what I

truly think anyway."

It ties references to the body to references of

"the social" (Kipnis 376)—groups designed to give support to the
marginalized in society are equated to a group of "lonesome little
white guys" called

"Pale Sausages."

O’Neill's reduction of these

support groups to his crotch effectively communicates his opinion of
them—they aren't worth piss.

Nevertheless, these entries are tame
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compared

to what

they

will

become.

Even

at

this

however, O'Neill is obviously trying to be provocative.
response, a reaction, but he doesn't get it.

early

stage.

He wants a

Because of this lack of

response, he decides to end the column:
UNH:
The whole friggin’ campus.
Each and everyone of you suck.
You might think I’m kidding, but I’m not. I’ve been trying to get my
ass kicked for the entire semester, but no one has even stepped
forward~not even a cheesy letter to the forum pages . . . .
you
politically correct liberal Nazis are still sitting, listening to your
Counting Crows crap, and bitching about everything under the sun.
Well, you know what? Screw you all. I’m ending this dung-heap of a
column for two reasons:
1) it doesn’t serve any purpose if I can't get
killed or laid. 2) I’m trying to take over the Arts pages.
That's right.
The whole damn thing. 'Nuff said. (666est)

O'Neill’s departure will not last long however.
column, he finally gets the response his is craving.

After he ends the
A female student

sends the following letter to TNH editor:
This is my reaction to Bryan O’NeiH's decision to end his "dung-heap
of a column."
Do with it what you will, but at least make sure he sees
it . . . . Evil is supposed to persist forever. Does Satan exist because he
wants to get beat up or laid? Is he going to give up his eternal
position as "Dark Lord” and all o f its benefits to write for the Arts
pages? I don't think so.
Perhaps he knows the true key to evilbrainwashing.
A few measly weeks of suggestive com ments and a
numerical rating
scale aren’t going to suffice.
If
most o f the
students at our fair UNH are human (which I can be wrong in
assuming), then each one of us has a dark vein of evil inside.
Most
of us have been taught to suppress this vein for the "good o f
humanity."
It is colum ns like yours that we read in private,
ingesting the
inequity like nutrient deficient beggars;
feeding the
deep vein o f evil.
The vein expands, the blood pumps with
increasing intensity, and we crave more evil to satisfy this new
hunger . . . but what’s this? He’s quitting!? Oh well, that ought to help
everyone go
back to their ignorant, m onochrom atic,
boring p.c.
lives.
We can't do anything about the evil that persists around us
unless we can see it.
The real "good for humanity” exists in finding,
pointing out. and dealing with the evil around us.
You tried to point
it out, giving us our first taste o f blood, and then you left us starving
for more. The quest for evil needs a competent guide to succeed, and
I almost thought you were it. Thanks for nothing, quitter.
You suck.

For O'Neill this was manna from heaven.

He now has the

purpose, the "mandate,” and the target he wants—become the leader
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for those who are fed up with calls for diversity, gender equality,
and racial justice.
that leader. Before

A few issues later O’Neill does come back to be
his writing had been merely

As Kipnis says of Hustler, O'Neill's

will be offensive with a mission.
mission is

offensive, now it

"to disturb and unsettled"

sexually and socio-sexually" (375).

his "readers,

both psyhco-

Almost all of his entries now deal

with issues of race, class, gender, or sexual orientation.

He writes:

Author's note: Yeah, alright. So I’m too lame to dump the column
like I said I was going to. So what? This isn't the first time I've gone
back on
som ething I've sa id —not w ithout sex being
involved.
Besides,
who really
cares if I continue writing this piece o f trash?
We're all going to die of boredom in about a week or two anyway.
"Race, Culture, and Power" minor: That's a good start, but why
stop there? I’m sure we could probably toss in a "Women and Sexual
Paranoia" major somewhere.
Hell, with a little extra encouragement
from the student body,
we might even be able to squeeze in an "All
Men Suck” minor into
the program.
Yes.
That would all be very
nice.
We
could also get some key speakers from the Gestapo to help
out any students who wished to further their educational interests
outside of the classroom. (134)
Roger Brown: I don't understand why feminists would want to file
a sexual
harassm ent charge against a German
language professor
[Roger Brown was another professor accused o f sexual harassm ent|.
How are they going to
be able to read their Nazi literature without
his help? Jeez.
Talk about shooting yourself in the foot.
Oh, but,
then again most o f the self-proclaim ed feminists on this campus
probably
don’t need to be educated to make irrational, paranoid
decisions about ending a teacher’s career anyway.
(2)
National Coming Out Day:
This is always
the most upsetting
holiday of the year for me. It never fails. I constantly go out of my
way to buy nothing but the best presents for my friends, and I
always get
stuck with crap.
I mean...really. How many bad leather
suits and hand-cuffs can a guy deal with before he starts to feel like
a complete slut? If this keeps up I’m just going have to resort back to
the old edible boxer shorts until someone finally gets the point.
(3 4 5 )

I think O'Neill's last entry on "National Coming Out Day" is especially
revealing.

It has the carnival’s degradation of the body, but also the

vein of fear that motivates O'Neill's writing.

National coming out day
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is an attempt to bring gays into the larger culture, to remove the
stigma of perversion that keeps gays

"in the closet."

O ’Neill's

portrayal of homosexuality reasserts the perversion of gays, keeps
gays in an image controllable by the larger community, lets the gay
community know that it cannot come out into "normal" society.
O 'N e ill’s

increased

ex a g g eratio n ,

misogyny,

xenophobia,

homophobia, and liberal use of the term Nazi do not go unnoticed or
unchallenged.

Indeed,

at

the

end

of

another

column,

O'Neill

addresses the growing pressure on T N H editorial staff to pull his
column from the paper:
Hi M om, I'm in J a il:
A p p a re n tly , so m e people have actu ally
complained about this stupid column.
That’s very nice.
I’m glad that
those people are brave eno ug h to com e forth and voice th e ir
opinions in such a bold manner. [Most o f the complaints to this point
had been in the form of personal messages to the editors.]
Hell, I
admire them so much that I'd like to present my little friends with a
simple five-step process that will guarantee that I am never printed
in this rag again: 1.) Write a lame letter to the TNH editor. Make sure
to include lots of harsh derogatory generalizations about my heinous
criminal record and all the obscene party-tricks that I can do with
my dirty underwear.
2.) Giggle like a schoolgirl when you see your
letter in the newspaper, show it to
all your
friends, and then
send a
copy to my apartment—but only after you've
rubbed it on the men’s
bathroom floor at Nick's. 3.) Organize a boycott in front of the MUB
to shut off all access to the TNH offices. If you don't get many people,
steal one o f the bulldozers out front and plow the building down . . . .
4.) Spread rumors that I bombed the SHARPP [Sexual Harassment And
Rape Prevention Program! office and beat up Jared Sexton during
the get-away.
5.) Call the police after I’ve slaughtered all of your
friends.
There.
Simple enough.
And celebrate when the column is
finally pulled, have some nice C anadian Pork Pie with your lame
friends at Philbrook.
(0)

O'Neill's

open acknowledgment o f the controversy he is causing

signals the beginning of a deluge of student letters, for and against
him, to the editor of TNH.
God for Evil,"

One student, in a letter entitled "Thank

thanks "God Bryan O’Neill is alive! His column . . . is the

only thing worth reading in The New Hampshire."

Another student.
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in a letter entitled "Hi Mom, I'm a Nazi," believes that "O'Neill . . .
should stop calling people whom he knows nothing

of Nazis. In fact,

he should take a history lesson and learn what Nazis and Nazism is.
If Bryan O'Neill thinks that women who feel obligated to protect
themselves

from

Neanderthal

men who seek to

continue holding

down and degrading females are Nazis, he is mistaken."

A similar

letter, entitled "UNH loser," argues that "O'Neill's attitude stinks and
his philosophy of life is damaging . . . .

if he had his way with the

world would have people sell tickets to abortions."

Finally, one

letter, entitled "O'Neill exercises free speech," champions O'Neill as
"one of the few people on this campus that has the
for

himself . . . .

ability to think

he is one of the few students that has the balls to

stand up against the pathetic political correctness movement."
These letters represent only a sample of the
column began to generate.

responses O’Neill’s

Typically the letters either praised O'Neill

for standing up to the "PC Nazis," condemned him as writer of filth
and hate, or claimed that they didn’t like him but defended his write
to free speech.
the

Eventually, the controversy grew to such a level that

University's student body president, Jared Sexton, dedicated his

weekly column to it.

Sexton writes:

My first impulse was to simply dismiss his [O’NeiH's] writing as crude,
absurd, and virtually inconsequential . . . .
However, upon second
and
th ird
read in g s
I felt that his
m e ss a g e s , d e s p ite
th e ir
incoherences, illustrate something im portant about our student body
and the whole University.
For some reason, or great number of
reasons, Bryan O’Neill felt it necessary to ridicule every part o f this
cam pus that he can possibly think (momentarily) about . . . .
One
th e m e
is
b la t a n t l y
m is o g y n is ts
and
cen ters
around
his
m isunderstanding and subsequent hatred o f women in general and
the feminist movement in particular . . . . Another motif . . . is the
continual denial of racial injustice in our society.
He attempts to
belittle the efforts o f individuals and o rganizations that seek to
express their cultural-racial heritage and break down barriers and
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discrimination . . . .
I am
most outraged by his brazen racism and
advocacy for sexist thinking
and practice . . . . I find it hard to
believe that our campus newspaper alotted a space of such malicious
com m entary.
I am not su g g estin g that T N H
be biased or
discrim inatory o f o pinio ns.
I am simply urging them to use
discretion in selecting the manner o f writing they print each week.
Finally, I would invite the readers o f T N H
to respond to Bryan
O ’Neill's column.

Sexton's mistake was to misread the intention of O'Neill's column.
O'Neill isn't interested in debate-only reaction.

And the readers of

TNH do respond, though perhaps not all as Sexton intended.

Though

Sexton makes clear that he is calling for editorial responsibility and
not censorship, he, those who support him, and the editors of T N H
are accused of fascism over the course of the next several months.
One especially impassioned student writes in about "freedom of the
press":
the editors of T N H should stick to their guns, wherever they might
be pointed.
The C onstitution gives them, and them alone, sole
editorial control of what is printed and what isn't.
No one can force
them to either print or not print material.
Not the town of Durham.
Not the University of New Hampshire.
Not the Dean.
Not campus
political hopefuls.
No one.
Popular or not, offensive o r not.
thoughtless or not, it can be printed . . . . Regardless of what O'Neill’s
intentions are, regardless o f how offensive he is, regardless o f how
sensitive and delicate the groups he attacks are, he must be printed.
UNH wants him.

Another student argues, in a letter entitled "Fascism in T N H ," that
"Jared is not the only fascist on campus, as the editors of T N H hold
true to form.

These wonderful individuals, who 'fight' for student

rights, are, at the same time, destroying our constitutional right for
free speech."
Alone,"

A few weeks later, in a letter entitled "Leave O'Neill

another student

censorship? . . . .
censoring.

asks

if the

paper had

"ever

heard

of

Well maybe where you're from they believe in

I guess I'm from a more liberal state where they believe

in the Constitution.

You

know

that little piece of paper that
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guarantees us the freedom of speech?"
entitled

"Dear thought Police,"

cleaning up the world for him:

And finally, in a letter

a student

thanks the editors

for

"To think that you are able to censor

out all that is bad, so by the time any information reaches my virgin
ears, it is clean—much like the world itself."
change

in the

thoughtful,

responses

more

intricate,

to O'Neill.
about

They

larger

whether an individual finds O'Neill offensive.

These letters signal a
are becoming

social

issues

than

more
just

In short, the argument

really isn’t over O'Neill anymore but over what the UNH community
values and should value.
O'Neill himself does not take Sexton’s criticism lightly.

His next

column both attacks Sexton and causes more controversy than any
other he will write.
A u th o r 's
n o te : Well.
Jared Sexton didn't seem to like my other
column, but maybe he'll get a rise in his pants for this one.
I sure
hope so. Feel the love, Jared. Feel the love.
"H ig h er
L e a rn in g "
(m o v ie):
I went and saw this with Jared
Sexton. I thought it was a good movie but that it tried to accomplish a
little too much.
Jared told me that he couldn’t concentrate on the
movie because he was still pissed at me, for ordering white bread at
Subway.
Silly Jared.
Always getting mad at the wrong white guys.
He even tried to blame me when the condom broke.
(puke green)
[O’Neill decided to rate these "evils" on a color scale. He will often
make such alterations].
M u rk la n d C o u rty a rd :
So many people, so few bullets, (sigh)
I
can never decide if I want to start my killing spree with the two
jerks in the coffee tent, or the bazillion stinkin' alterna-hippies who
sit around analyzing Fugazi lyrics.
D onald Silva tells me that I
should shoot all the femi-nazis first, but I have to say that I'm not
really com fortab le with that idea.
It m ight give people
the
impression that I hate women.
That would be terrible.
I love those
m ilitant UNH gestapo chicks som etim es, even when they're
still
breathing.
(banana red)
Alliance:
Someone creates a special interest group for people with
alternative sexual orientations, yet, they never invite me and my
necrophiliac friends into any o f their parties.
That's sort of like
opening up a deli and not serving sausage because the manager is
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afraid that
something.

his vegetarian g irlfrien d
(Black Francis)

will

beat

him

up.

Uh...er.

Letters to the Editor: For all you losers who agree with Mr. Jared
Sexton about how much I suck, but are too lazy to write a letter to the
newspaper, here’s a form letter that you can just sign your name to
and stuff in a mailbox: "Hey, Mr. Editor Guy: I’m, like, a stupid hippie
who's been going to this school for a long time, and I got me
som ething to say about this O ’N eill ch a ra c te r that y ou’ve been
publishing.

These entries by O'Neill clearly reflect important dimensions of the
carnival.

They are tied to the

defecation, copulation, blood,

functions of the material body:

snot, etc.

They use violence and

degradation to pull down those parts of the student(s') body(ies) and
the University structure that place themselves, O'Neill feels, above
him or beyond him, to pull down "sanctified" bodies to a place where
he can finger them, poke at them, split them open.

As with the

depictions of the body in Hustler, O’Neill's body is an "unromanticized
body."

It is "not a surface or a suntan: [it is] insistently material,

defiantly

vulgar,

corporeal"

(Kipnis

375).

O'Neill

writes

of

necrophilia, condoms, killing sprees, alternative sexual orientations.
His body, like H u stle r's, is a "gaseous, fluid-emitting, e m b a r r a s s in g
body, one continually defying the
and mores

strictures

of bourgeois manners

and instead governed by its lower intestinal tract—a body

threatening to erupt at any moment" (Kipnis 375).

And while I am

hard pressed to read O'Neill as a champion of the working class, his
erupting body is one that appeals to the UNH masses—or at least
large parts of the masses.
Despite the disturbing quality of this column, especially its
portrayal

of violence against women,

support O'Neill, many of them women.

many

students wrote in to

One young woman writes that

"Bryan O'Neill is an angry, insulting, degrading, sexist, sarcastic.
I 94
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politically

incorrect,

intolerant,

blasphemous,

lewd, atheistic,

nothing, disgusting, neurotic, nauseating, hopeless bastard.
love him."

God, I

Another young woman encourages O’Neill to remain

unrepentant
week's

pro

"after he poked

TNH.

I'm

sure

fun at just about everyone

there

were

plenty of people

in last
who

felt

uncomfortable and threatened, but isn't that O'Neill's whole point? . .
. . The killing spree in Murkland Courtyard is a riot—not scary or
threatening
responses

as
give

some

are

credence

bound
to

to

imagine

it."

Kipnis’ argument

that

These

student

expecting

all

women to react the same to pornography ignores differences among
women based on class, race, and experience.
that not all women do

Just as it is a "social fact

experience male pornography in the same

way" (Kipnis 380) not all women experienced O'Neill's writing in the
same way.

Indeed, another young woman writes a long, thoughtful,

critical response on O'Neill.

She argues that those who cry free

speech and free thought in the defense of O’Neill have reduced these
rights "to mere

technical

entities.

associated

them."

She

with

. .divorced from the responsibility

defends

Jared

Sexton

as

merely

suggesting "that there be a bridge between language and thought."
She objects to the loose use of the word fascism in regard to either
Sexton’s or O'Neill's columns:
significant term
disagreement or

"I don’t believe that such a historically

should ever be applied so
everyday

issue." She also defends "PC" as simply

"being sensitiveto the people around you and
in a multicultural society."

freely to any public

accepting that we live

Finally, she argues that

Bryan O'Neill does have the freedom o f both the press and o f speech,
but we have to stop pretending that the issue at hand has anything
to do with dialogue alone.
Because O’NeiU's column appears in such a
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public forum as a university newspaper, he cannot utilize his rights,
w ithout taking on the responsibility not to abuse them.
A
responsibility, which he clearly does not adhere to, and one which,
through the publication of his recent column. The New H am pshire
refuses to hold him to.

The responses are becoming even more thoughtful, eloquent,
and rhetorical in their attempt to persuade.

The last young woman

even gives a rough definition of Bakhtin's notion of answerability.
Some of these letters must have taken the writers hours to compose.
It is a mark of how serious this supposed "dung-heap of a column”
has become, but, of course, it's not about the column anymore.

It's

about issues of free speech, racism, censorship, women's rights, and
civic responsibility.

O'NeiH’s writing has become the catalyst or focal

point for a Graffian debate on some of our campuses most pressing
problems.
For example, student organizations

begin to protest O ’Neill,

women's groups condemn his column in their speeches. Take Back
the Night rally's cite his work as a prime example of misogynist
literature.

It is a pressure that O’Neill begins to feel.

A u th o r 's
n o te :
Theres a strong possibility that the Nazi
that be are going to successfully have my column banned
plague—their supreme logic being that you boys and girls
fragile to handle controversial material.
That's too bad.
talking dirty to little children.

M u lticu ltu ralism
debate:
puked.
(pubic hair)

W ould've

been

co oler

if

powers
like the
are too
I love

somebody

Take Back the Night: Hell, it almost seemed to be a privilege to
have my name brought up in Jane S tapleton’s [head of SHARPP1
speech regarding "misogynists literature.”
Thanks Jane.
It's good to
know that people are willing to make me the poster child of the
hyper-paranoid delusion of male evil.
I’ll be interested to see them
take the garbage agenda a step further and explain why you have to
d istin g u ish y o u rs e lf as being a "fem inist" rath e r than ju s t a
"woman"—do you find something so inherently wrong with being a
woman that you have to label yourself? Tell you what, if you can
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think o f a really clever answer. I’ll start leaving the toilet seat down
for ya.
(tampon commercials)

Dimond Library:
It’s pretty easy to target me as being a womanhater because I have a dangling lump of skin and cartilage lodged
in-between my legs.
It’s also pretty easy to target me as being a
racist because I'm a dum b whitey who wears flannels and drinks
Meister-Brau voluntarily.
But it's definitely easiest for me to target
all the stinkin' hippies from the top o f the library when I’m blowing
their filthy heads all over the pavement, (toe cheese)
A uthor's post-n ote:
In case anybody’s noticed, there's been quite
a change in tone for this article over the past few weeks.
And it
hasn’t been a good one. The new T N H editing staff is much
more
c o n c e rn e d
w ith a v e rtin g
c o n tro v e rsy
than c o n fro n tin g
it, so
they’ve told me to "tone d ow n ” to get printed. This, of course, makes
me sell out to the same system that I've been trying to butcher for
the past year.
But that’s OK.
I figure in a couple of weeks I’ll be
sitting down at the L ic k e r Store with all the stinkin' hipp ies,
gathering the support o f all my feminist friends over having my
penis surgically removed.
T hat’s when we'll all sit back and laugh at
the fact that I ever thought something was wrong with UNH.

The tone of O'Neill's columns have indeed changed but in more ways
than he admits.

While the material body is still present in lines like

"lump of skin and cartilage
surgically removed," "toe
hair,"

the

"penis

cheese," "tampon commercials," and "pubic

column spends

attacking others.

lodged in-between my legs,"

more

time defending

O'Neill is on the defensive.

targeted have begun to fight back.
when a professor in the
page editorial against O'Neill.

O'Neill

than

in

Those who he has

The entire drama draws to a head

Communication department writes a
The article is eloquent and powerful.

quote from it at length:
As I sit down to write, the official death count in Oklahoma City
stands momentarily at 78, with 150 other victims still buried in the
rubble that was once the A lfred Murrah Federal Building . . . .
terrorism , like recent anti-abortion murders, is not 'random' at all
but is politically motivated and fueled by enormous, irrational rage .
. . . if the editors are concerned about the heinous consequences of
hatred, and I take them at their word, I ask them to reconsider the
wisdom of their decision to provide a regular forum on the campus
for a columnist to vent his own contempt for selected groups and
individuals and tomuse abo ut em barking
on murderous shooting
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full
I

sprees against them.
Those of us who have expressed concern about
the publication of fantasies of slaughter have been told by various
individuals that we do not apprehend their inherent humor, that we
have failed to understand them as attem pt at satire, and that we
object because we do not agree with this individual’s point o f view. [
plead guilty on all counts . . . .
Beyond the obvious fact that
newspapers are not bound to publish any and every opinion, speech
that promotes harm or results in harm has always faced restriction
(threats to kill people, bomb threats, o r Ju stice O liver Wendell
Holmes's famous reference to ’yelling’ "fire" in a crow ded theater’
are salient examples) . . . . Given that The N ew Hampshire column in
which these musings o f m urder appeared also contained ridicule
leveled ag ain st w om en e n g in e e rin g stu d e n ts, I had co nsidered
writing in about the p olitically-m otivated m assacre o f 14 women
engineering students at the University of Montreal in 1989.
To me,
this ’coincidence’ rendered the colum nist's fantasies o f a shooting
spree even more disturbing . . . . I confess that I did not relish the
prospect o f becoming a potential target for the contempt which had
been rained
on others who had spoken out . . . . I readily concede
that words and deeds are often not equivalent . . . .
Nonetheless, as
the m anufactured carnage in O klahom a C ity, recent anti-abortion
murders, and the horrors o f the Holocaust all reveal, acts o f bloody
terrorism rarely, if ever, occur in some wordless vacuum.
Rather,
such
acts are fre q u e n tly
the logical c o n s e q u e n c e s o f potent
rhetorical framing and argum ent.
Some partial truth exists, after
all, in claims by defense attorneys for the murderer o f Dr. Gunn in
Wichita and for New H am pshire’s own John Salvi similarly charged
with two anti-abortion m urders that extrem e anti-abortion rhetoric
contributed to their acts . . . . Yet when voices at UNH express outrage
over the reduction o f groups or individuals on campus to ’’turds,"
"vomit," "scum," and worse, or when we object to the editor's choice
to publish ponderings over beating women or musings over whom to
start killing first on cam pus given that there are "so many people,
and so few bullets,” we are told by the editors o f The New Hampshire
and the colum nist they have defended that we are overreacting,
have m iso rd e re d our p rio ritie s , and are s u ffe rin g from
"PC
paranoia."
Try telling that to the families o f the dead in Montreal,
Brookline, Pensacola, Wichita, and now, Oklahoma City.

The fact that this letter resulted from O'Neill's columns gives great
credence
conflicts.

to Graffs belief in the pedagogical benefit

of teaching the

The professor's connection of rhetoric to violence, her

weaving of the personal and the political, her use of logos, ethos, and
pathos are all an education in themselves.
just to the professor's ideas but her beliefs.

Students' are exposed not
I would like to report

that the professor's letter changed O'Neill's attitude.

However, the
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essay had little effect on him.

His last column for the paper is a

thinly veiled response to the professor's editorial.
M o ck R ap e T r a i l : Let's get real, people. We've already had our fun
with starting a nationwide panic over one bomb, why do we need to
set o ff another
one? Is the UNH femi-nazi agenda so downtrodden by
the fact that
they have no potentially ex p lo itab le rape victim
traumas in the news this year that they have to take the time to
create a false
rape scenario altogether? Gee.
That sounds smart.
Let's create s e x u a l p aran o ia out o f absolutely nothing at all.
Pbbbbbtttt. That really ju st sounds to me like somebody in some lame
Women Studies class who can't get laid.
The worst part o f this
particular sex-bom b, how ever, is that if it blows up their aren ’t
gonna [be] pieces o f dead children anymore because the femi-nazis
are secretly distributing heroin to all the Oyster River kids.
C'mon.
baby. Don’t do me like that. (Iuv 4 taco)
W o m e n 's R u g b y T e a m :
Nice puke! Oh. Whoops. That’s a rugby
chick. Help me scrape her off the tar so we can eat her. (69)

O'Neill, like Kipnis’ reading of Larry Flynt, "is a man apparently both
determined and destined to play out the content of his obsessions as
psychodrama on our public stage" (384).
into the muck with him.

His goal is to pull everyone

Why? Probably because discourses that

challenge his view of how the world works had gained power at the
U niversity

of

flourishing,

a black

football

players

represent.

New

Hampshire.

Student

organizations

student was elected student body

were

held

accountable

to

the

were

president,

institution

they

The culture O'Neill represents, a culture that wants to

deny inequalities of race, class, and gender, is suddenly under attack
on

multiple

fronts.

pressure built up in

O'Neill

becomes the release

those who see this change

value

for the

in cultural power as

th re a te n in g .
Importantly,

this

eruption

occurs

outside

Inside the classroom there is no intermediate
Inside the classroom

of the classroom.

barrier of a column.

O'Neill would face direct rebuttal for what
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he

has written.

For example, whereas Doug was in a relationship of

answerability with Kerry that developed overtime, O'Neill is immune
to the one on one conference.

While Doug had the restraint of a

particular reader, O’Neill has the target of multiple, faceless groups.
The classroom demands a level of (response)ibility that the student
column does not.

The classroom, in other words, does not allow for

the sovereignty of position his column does.
So what should we make of all of this writing, this heteroglossia
of competing voices? First,

[ believe that any teacher would be

justified in not allowing O'Neill to write this way in his or her
classroom.

O'Neill does not meet the ethical standard for being

treated in a open, respectful, dialogic, experimental manner.

He is

interested in neither being answerable to the people who disagree
with him nor in making his arguments in ways that show any respect
for the opposing side.

He dismisses any critique of him as PC

paranoia, femi-Nazi hatred, or hippie freak stupidity.
writing represents a very
homosexuals.

Second, his

real danger to minorities, women,

and

As the professor of communication wrote, "acts of

bloody terrorism rarely, if ever, occur in some wordless vacuum."

To

grant O'Neill’s writing equal treatment in a classroom, to sanction it
with the power of the University, is dangerous and unethical.
Still, I think there is an ethical and educative role that O'Neill’s
writing can serve in the classroom.
of hybrid carnivalesque power to it.

O'Neill's writing does have a kind
It is able, through mockery, to

show how those of use who care about issues of race, class, and
gender and the issues themselves are seen by large segments of the
student population.

In fact, what struck me most about the letters to
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the editor was how many students felt that O'Neill was a champion of
the oppressed, of those whom PC fascism was silencing.

Students

wrote of O ’NeiU's courage, perseverance, and, most revealing, balls.
O'Neill was so popular, in fact, that there was a movement to draft
him for student body president.

To which O ’Neill responded:

Let’s face it, folks, there was no way for me to realistically compete
in this year’s election.
No matter how amazing my ideas would have
been or how well I could have presented them, the PC paranoia that’s
been built up on this campus has hit a level that has completely
tran sfered o ur attention away from intelligent academ ic discourse
into condescending rhetorical nothingness.
Now. when I say this, I
am openly condemning the bland, empty and self-serving spiels that
accuse us day in and day out of being close-m inded and culturally
ignorant.
Why, you may ask? Because I’m a dumb whitey who lives
by Natural Light and P e n th o u s e F o r u m letters.

Though O'Neill wraps the response in his typical crude humor, 1 think
itspeaks to

a real feeling of anger among many students.

this feeling

is the result of conservative rhetoric on the dangers of

political correctness, actual authoritarian

Whether

teachers, the demands of

marginalized groups for more power, or a combination of all three,
the ideas masked by the label of politically correct are failing to be
internally persuasive to many students.
for diversity, justice,
’one’s

own

w ord’"

Instead of experiencing calls

and sensitivity as
(Bakhtin

The

"tightly interwoven with

D ialogic

345),

these

students

experience it as a form of authoritative discourse, as discourse that
"demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it our own."

These

students perceive the argument for diversity, gender equality, and
racial justice as condescendingly

having "its authority already fused

to it" (342).
Further,

the amount of discussion

from O'Neill’s writing was tremendous.

and debate that resulted
By the time he was done.

20 1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

professors and students had debated issues of crucial

importance:

the relationship of rhetoric to action, thought to language, rights to
responsibilities, and the role of a free press.

In short, the students

were given access to the process and not merely the product of
participatory democracy.

When the editors of The New

Hampshire

discredited the amount of letters and complaints they received about
O'Neill as a "truly amazing" waste of time and effort that could have
been directed at "the real issues of today," they missed the point
entirely.

The controversy over O’Neill had done just that.

But should we allow this kind of writing in the classroom? I
would argue that we should not~at least not in its first form, not as
an equal member of a classroom community.

But perhaps, as I have

argued, we could use O'Neill's writing as a kind of negative ethics, as
a kind of pedagogical tool.
classrooms to open up the

We could bring his column into our
debates on racism, sexism, homophobia,

and classism that are so often kept silent, sterile, or authoritarian.
The writing does have great pedagogical potential for the politically
oriented

writing classroom.

However,

to tap into that potential

would require an ethics of the political.

There is a real danger in

O'Neill's writing as there is a real danger in the rhetoric of any group
that encourages or

humorizes violence against others—namely,

others might put words to action.
caution.

We must, therefore, proceed with

Moreover, to use ethics in the way I suggest requires

revival of historical consciousness.
reasons

why

O'Neill

was

both

the

Without this consciousness the
effective

and offensive

explanation and provide no way to come at the issue
intellectual distance.

that

have

no

from any

And yet, the most devastating aspect of radical
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postmodernism

is

its

destruction

of

history.

The

necessity

of

reclaiming a notion of history, therefore, is to what I would now like
to turn.
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CHAPTER FOUR NOTES
1. Even though I agree with most o f Lazere’s argument, [ find it necessary to
distance myself from his b elief that "the major emphasis in theory, courses,
and textbooks has been on basic writing and the generation and exposition of
one's own ideas, to the neglect of more advanced levels o f writing that involve
critical thinking in e v a lu a tin g o th e r's ideas (p a rtic u la rly in the public
discourse of politics and mass m edia)~i.e., semantics, logic and argumentative
rh etoric, and th e ir a p p lic a tio n to w riting c ritic a l, a rg u m e n ta tiv e , and
research papers and other writing from sources" (194).
I do not believe that
emphasizing basic writing or the exposition o f one's own ideas resulted in the
neglect o f other ways o f writing.
Far from "imposing crippling restrictions
on our field” (194) this em phasis represents the most prolific, diverse, and
radical pedagogy we have so far produce.
The scholars o f this emphasis have
thrown away more
inn ov ation s for the classroom than the proponents of
"advance writing” have thought o f implementing.
I also have a problem with
argu m en tatio n bein g the "m ore adv an ced level o f w r itin g .”
Why is
autobiography and narrative so respected everywhere but first year English?
2.
Of course, constructing ethical guidelines is beyond the scope of Lazere's
p r o je c t.
3. See Bizzell’s "Marxist Ideas in Composition Studies" page 67 footnote I for a
discussion of Fredric Jameson's attempt to escape the ethical binary opposition
discussed by Nietzsche.
4. It is postmodern both in terms of the figures I draw upon to create it and the
content of what is created.
My ethics is not grounded in
a universal human
nature, an unchanging set o f physical or ideal laws, or a distanced and unified
subjectivity.
Like the postmodernists, I do not "reduce the other to categories
of the self" (Nealon 129).
Instead, my ethics attempts to embrace a dialogic
intersubjectivity that recognizes the incom m ensurability o f the other.
For
like the postmodernists, I believe that "Any ethical system that understands
the other as simply 'like the selF will be unable to respond adequately to the
other’s uniqueness and singularity; indeed, such a
reduction amounts to a kind
of subjective colonialism , where all the other's desires are
reduced to the
desires of the 'home country,’ the self" (Nealon 129).
5.
Like the term
postm odernism itself, Foucault is often hard to
place.
However, ju st as co m p o sitio n ist often use postmodernism synonym ously for
poststructuralism and postcolonialism , Foucault is often defined by all
three
areas when he really doesn’t fit neatly into any of them.
I prefer to think of
Foucault as a philosopher o f postmodernity.
His work, in other words, is part
of the larger rupture o f modernism ’s central tenets o f self, language, and their
relationship, but the term postm odernism is too limiting to encom pass the
scope of that work.
Yet because o f current parlance and the legitimacy
of
seeing postmodernism, in its broadest sense, as the critique o f modernism, I
will label Foucault with the term.
See Hubert L. Dreyfus’and Paul Rabinow’s
Michel Foucault:
B eyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics for a discussion of
the uniqueness of Foucault’s work.
6.
Beside the works I cite, see "On the Genealogy
Work in Progress" and "Technologies of the Self.”

of Ethics:

An Overview of
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7.
However, this freedom
to choose does not result from a pre-existing self,
from lib e ra tin g an innate s e lf from s y ste m s o f o p p ression, but from
constructing the conditions in which c h o ic e is possible and sustainable.
Foucault has "always been somewhat suspicious o f the notion o f liberation,
because if it is not treated with precautions and within certain limits, one runs
the risk o f falling back on the idea that there exists a human nature or base
that, as
a consequence o f certain historical, economic, and social processes,
has been con ce aled , alienated, or im p riso n ed in and by m echanisms of
repression.
According to this hypothesis, all that is required is to break these
repressive deadlocks and man will be reconciled with himself, rediscover his
nature or regain contact with his origin, and reestablish a full and positive
relationship with himself.
I think this idea should not be accepted without
scrutiny. I am not trying to say that liberation as such . . . does not exist . . . .
But we know very well . . . that this practice o f liberation is not in itself
sufficient
to define practices of freedom that will still be needed if this people,
this society, and these individuals are to be able to define admissible and
acceptable forms o f existence or political society" ("The Ethics" 283).
8.
Indeed. G raff points out that "there is something truly astonishing about
the degree o f exaggeration, patent falsehood, and plain hysteria attained by
the more prominent" accounts of supposed PC fascism (3).
See pages 16-25, 3436, and note 5 on page 197 in Beyond the Culture Wars for a discussion and list
of sources that exaggerate the "PC crises."
For example, see Michael Kingsley's
"P.C. B.S.” in the May 20, 1991 New R ep u b lic for a rebuttal to the PC hysteria
whipped up by conservative pundits.
In the article Kingsley notes, in his wry
style, that "many anti-PC diatribes are ju s t lists o f things the writer finds
objectionable and would like—in the spirit o f toleration and free inquiry—to
expunge from the college curricula" (8).
9. This statement is meant in no way to imply that Graff is insensitive to these
issues.
Indeed, his work shows a strong com mitment to rectifying inequalities
in race, class, and gender.
It is merely meant to show that whatever the depth
of G raffs feelings, he is, at least on an intellectual and pedagogical level, able
to distance him self from them
10. Harkin’s original texts reads as follows:
"The objective is not to achieve a
totalizing m etatheory but rather to see where theories intersect, where they
contradiction, where they form c o n stellatio n s, and, perhaps what is most
important,
where they form lacunae" (136).
11.
See N ealon pages 135-42 for the argum ent that there is still an
imperialistic elem ent in Bakhtin's work, an elem ent that Nealon counters with
L e v in a s
12.
I interviewed Doug in preparation for writing this chapter and
his permission to use his writing and information from the interview
chapter.
Indeed, Doug was very willing to talk with me.
He felt
experiences and his culture were not given adequate space or respect
English d ep artm en t.
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received
for this
that his
in our

13.
I am. of course, selecting the most offensive of O’Neill's writing. Not all of
his work focused on issues o f race, class, and gender; however, it was to these
entries that praise or scorn was directed.
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CHAPTER V

FO U C A U LT A N D THE PH AED RU S :
THE ANXIETY O F IN FL U E N C E AND THE IN E SC A PA BILITY OF
H ISTO R Y
In a moment, in the twinkling o f an eye . . . . this corruptible must
put on incorruption, and this mortal m u s t
put on immortality."
The First Epistle o f Paul to the Corinthians
We are far from h aving exh au sted the significance o f the few
symbols we use.
We can com e to use them yet with a terrible
simplicity. —Ralph Waldo Emerson "The Poet"
While history may be marked by no inherent plan or progression, it
is the product o f com plex interactions of disparate groups, social
institutions, id e o lo g ies, te c h n o lo g ic a l c o n d itio n s, and m odes o f
production. To abandon the attempt to make sense o f these forces in
the unfolding o f history is to risk being victimized by them. —James
B erlin Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures

In "Slacking Off:

Border Youth and Postmodern Education,"

Henry Giroux welcomes us "to the backlash against postmodernism"
(349).

He explains the backlash as a kind of "deep-seated anti-

intellectualism" (348).

He

postmodernism the worst

argues that "while conservatives . . . see in
expression of the radical legacy of the

1960s, an increasing number of radical critics view postmodernism
as the cause of a wide range of theoretical excesses and political
injustices" (349).
has

arisen

It seems that from both the left and the right there

"a kind of reductionism

irresponsible in its refusal

that is

both disturbing

and

to engage postmodernism in any kind of

dialogical, theoretical debate" (350).1
While I agree with Giroux's explanation for the backlash,
believe it needs to be expanded.

The current

backlash
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1

against

postmodernism

stems

not

only

from

an

anti-intellectualism

that

refuses to engage it but from the often hostile and fearful ways it is
engaged.

For

many

theorists

postmodernism

is

a

radical

dangerous break with the progressive forces of history.
in his article

"Consequences"

Stanley Fish

postmodernism by Israel Scheffler.

quotes

and

For example,
a critique of

Scheffler argues that to accept

the postmodern world view—as encapsulated by Thomas Kuhn—is to
accept that
Independent and public controls are no more,
co m m unication has
failed, the common universe o f things is a delusion, reality is itself
made . . . rather than discovered . . . . In place of a community of
rational men following objective procedures in the pursuit o f truth,
we have a set of isolated monads, within each of which belief forms
without systematic constraints,
(qtd. in Fish 113 )

While those of us more sympathetic to postmodernism might cringe
at Scheffler's unproblematized
rational

use

of terms

like

"community of

men," "objective procedures," and the "pursuit of truth" and

even laugh at

his caricature of what might

replace that community of

rational men, the passion of Scheffler's feelings, the nostalgia for a
world where objective,

disinterested investigation

is unchallenged

points to how frightening the postmodern world view can be if it is
based solely on the destruction of the previous one.
For Scheffler, postmodernism not only leads to an impasse but
shatters

the sacred

corresponding
rationality.
of Jane

notions

program
of

of

truth,

the E nlightenm ent
progress,

and

m ethodology,

its
and

As Lester Faigley has argued, generalizing from the work
Flax, for many people postmodernism means that "there is

nothing outside contingent discourses to which a discourse of values
can be grounded—no eternal truths, no universal human experience,
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no

universal

human

rights,

no overriding

narrative

of human

progress" (Fragments 8).
And, to be fair, the idea of postmodernism as a radical break
with history is one that many of its proponents relish.

For example,

Baudrillard has consistently maintained that history is no longer able
to provide us with meaning.

He writes:

Postmodemity is neither optimistic nor pessimistic.
It is a game with
the vestiges of what has been destroyed. This is why we are ’post’:—
history has stopped, one is in a kind of post-history which is without
meaning. One would not be able to find any meaning in it . . . . We
can no longer be said to progress . . . . But it is not at all unfortunate.
I have the impression with postmodernism
that there is an attempt to
rediscover a certain
pleasure in the irony o f things, in the game
of
things.
Right now one
can tumble into total
hopelessness—all the
definitions, everything, it's
all been done . . . .
postmodernity is the
attempt . . . to reach
a point where one can live with what is left. It is
more
a su rv iv al a m o n g
the
rem n ants
th an a n y th in g
e lse .
(Laughter.) (B a u d r il la r d 95)

Not only is there no historical meaning in Baudrillard's postmodern
world, there is no plan of positive action to resist this state.

Instead,

we must learn to play with the pieces of our hopelessness.

Given

such a nihilistic tone, it is not surprising that so many theorists, be
they from the left or the right, find this notion of postmodernism
frightening.2
For theorists

like

Stanley Fish, however,

both the extreme

nature of Baudrillard's theory and the hostile and fearful view

of

postmodernity which it inspires rests

on the same erroneous

It is the belief that in postmodernism

all constraints on human action

are no more, that one can play with

the pieces of the deconstructed

universe

in

any

way

one

wishes.

antifoundationalism or postmodernism

Fish

argues

belief.

instead

is not

an a rg u m e n t for u n b rid le d
su b jectiv ity ,
fo r the a b s e n c e o f
constraints on the individual . . . it is an argument for the situated
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that

subject, for the individual who is always constrained by the local or
com m unity standards and criteria o f w hich his ju d g e m en t is an
extension.
("Consequences” 113)

Itis the community, Fish

believes, that supplies

the "systematic

constraints," the controls needed for values and methodology.
However, while Fish's argument works

well in refuting those,

likeScheffler, who fear that postmodernism

removes all

constraints,

it does not remove either the fear written of by Faigley or the
radicalism expressed by Baudrillard.

In fact, it is exactly the idea

that the individual is "always [and only] constrained by the local or
community standards" that Faigley says so many people fear.

They

fear that "there is nothing outside contingent discourses to which a
discourse of values can be grounded."

The constraints of the local

community do not tell us whether this community's way of doing
something is more or less ethical than another community's way—
except, of course, from within the community.
argum ent
convictions"

does
(Fish

not

"dem onstrate

the

114) but maintains

contextual source for convictions.

Further, Baudrillard's

contextual

source

of

that there no longer is a

As Faigley points out,

Baudrillard's critique is far more extreme than
merely arguing that
students are situated within their culture and that any conclusions
they reach will be circumscribed by that culture.
Baudrillard rejects
the idea that we can som ehow get outside the flow o f codes,
sim ulations, and images to discover any space for social critique.
(2 1 3 )

For

Baudrillard,

constraints.
signs

context no

longer provides us with

meaningful

We are bombarded with so many images, codes, and

from the media that the object has

"everything comes fromthe object
(Baudrillard Fatal Strategies

111).

become

free-floating—

and everything returns

to

it"

The result of this bombardment
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is that the "model is truer than true" and no longer needs either to
refer to a model maker or the social material of which it was made
( 8 ).

To

answer

both

and

Baudrillard

those

who

fear values

grounded only in the narrowness of the local, therefore, we must
conceive of history in a way that both acknowledges the postmodern
critique yet provides a larger system of restraints for deciding values
and methods than just the local community.

Moreover, it must be a

conception that reclaims a form of agency, a plan of positive action, a
means of resistance within this history.

I believe this conception of

history can be formed from the concepts of intertextuality and the
anxiety of influence.
Joseph Harris has criticized the concept of intertextuality as
"little more than a metaphor, a shorthand label for a hermetic weave
of texts and citations" ("The Idea" 15) when it comes to explaining
the idea of a literate community.

For Harris, intertextuality replaces

"the sense of community as an active lived experience . . . [with] a
shadowy

network of citations"

(14).

When com bined

with

the

concept of the anxiety of influence and applied to the idea of history,
however,

intertextuality

provides

us

with

the

means

for

shared

meaning and agency within a postmodern frame, a means for setting
postmodernism in productive, dialogical, and critical tension with the
goals of the Enlightenment and traditional liberal humanism.
James Porter explains intertextuality as the belief that "Not
infrequently, and perhaps ever and always, texts refer to other texts
and

in

fact

rely

interdependent:

on
We

them

for

their

understand

a

meaning.
text

only

All

texts

are

as

we

insofar
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understand its precursors" ("Intertexuality" 34). This interdependent
and historical intelligibility creates a web of meaning which ties one
community to another through shared texts, and it eliminates both
the validity of absolute relativism and the tyranny of objectivism.
We cannot make a n y interpretation of a text nor can we make an
interpretation

free

interpretations
However,

from

our

the

web

that

given

the

fact

situatedness.
of

that

texts
an

We

can

prefiguratively

intertexual

only

make

constitutes.

situatedness

is

by

definition located in multiple communities, our situatedness and our
interpretations are not restricted to a single, determined monologic
community.

There are almost a limitless number of ways in which

communities manifest themselves within the multiple, overlapping,
fractured, and fluid identities of the individual.

Thus, interpretation

becomes a matter of drawing on a multi-communal intersubjectivity,
and agency comes from our ability to "encounter and learn new
codes, to intertwine codes in new ways, and to expand our semiotic
potential" (Porter 41).

Agency becomes what Bakhtin would call the

ability to reaccentuate texts.
"Texts do not exist . . .

For as Peter Mortensen reminds us,

in the absence of people to make them—and

neither does intertextuality" ("Analyzing" 118).

The anxiety of being

dominated by master tropes forces us to read or misread texts in
ways that make room for our own interpretations.
Viewing history as a series of inescapable yet malleable textual
influences

does

not

necessitate

progressive, or universal.

a

return

to

history

as

linear,

It is not a return to history as "the story of

disembodied ideas freely floating in an intellectual ether" (Berlin,
"Revisionary" 50).

Neither, however, is it the surrendering of history
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to a game in which we can play with the broken pieces of the
universe in any way we want.
plurality of micro-narratives,

Intertextuality sees history as "a

limited and

localized

accounts

that

attempt to explore features of experience that the grand narratives
typically exclude" (Berlin, "Postmodernism"

172), yet it maintains

that these localized and limited accounts are connected—not in a
"Great Chain of Being” ("Towards" 16) as Susan Jarratt might object—
but in a great web of overlapping texts.
This web, while neither an actual space outside the flow of
codes nor a "neutral space from which to record a historical thing-initself," (Berlin, "Revisionary" 56) provides at least the lines for a
continual dialogue on human
community.

values not grounded solely in one

It creates a shared, if conflicted, space out of multiple

knowledges, values, and histories that do not belong to any one
community.

Therefore, while the web is not outside contingent

discourses, its sum is greater than its parts.

History becomes not so

much a progression from the past as an ability to make a meaning in
the present using materials that are owned, interpreted, and fought
over by multiple communities.
Baudrillard is wrong:

history is neither as overdetermined nor

as easily escaped as he thinks.

History, the intertextual anxiety of

influence,

breathe the

lives

in and

makes

words

we

write,

arguments we make, the arguments we are able to make.

the

Despite

Baudrillard's argument that the intelligibility o f the object escapes
context, his own argument is understandable only through a lens of
historical

influence.

Baudrillard is made intelligible through his

connection to and our understanding of the works of Marx, Freud,
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Saussure, Heidegger, Nietzsche, and others.
those

writers

initiated

the

discursive

To paraphrase Foucault,
practices

that

made

Baudrillard's texts possible, and those initiators’ texts were, in turn,
made possible by previous initiators of texts like Plato.
To accept Baudrillard’s argument is to accept

the

dubious

notion that history no longer provides context or meaning within an
argument that depends on a continual reference to and critique of
history for its own intelligibility.

If there truly were a complete

break with history, a collapse of history's ability to provide meaning,
then we could never come to that historical realization.
that

history has

perspective.

disappeared

is

possible

only

from

To notice
a historical

To argue that history is no longer capable of providing

meaning is only possible by having the historical perspective that it
once did.
Postmodernism

is

not

a

radical

break

critique of what history is and how it is used.

with

but

a

radical

As Giroux argues, and

I have agreed,
Rather than proclaiming the end o f reason, postmodernism can be
critically analyzed for how successfully it interrogates the limits of
the project of modernist rationality and its universal claim s to
prog ress, happiness, and freed o m .
Instead o f as s u m in g that
postmodernism has vacated the terrain of values, it seems more
useful to address how it accounts for how values are constructed
historically and relation ally . . . .
instead o f c la im in g that
postmodernism's critique o f the essentialist subject denies a theory
o f subjectivity, it seems more productive to examine how its claims
ab o u t the c o n tin g en t c h a r a c te r o f id entity, c o n s tru c te d
in a
multiplicity o f social relations and discourse, redefines the notion of
agency.
("Slacking O ff' 350-51)

Within

the

intertextual

frame,

postmodernism

does

not

destroy

human rights, democracy, and science—it problematizes them.

As

Fish has argued, "The fact that we now have a new explanation of

2 14
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how we got our beliefs~the fact, in short, that we now have a new
belief—does not free us from our other beliefs or cause us to doubt
them"

("Consequence"

114).

Instead, it requires

us to

use our

intelligence to hold contradictory ideas and values in our head at the
same time, to play them off each other in an anxiety of influence.
The benefit of holding contradicting ideas in dialogical, dialectical,
and critical tension is that one value or view cannot hold supremacy
in our minds without the voice of another chewing away at it.
Postmodern history, like a postmodern ethics, encourages a lack of
dogma, continual interpretation, and openness.
I am aware, of course, that the most radical postmodernists and
anti-foundationalists will object to my notion of intertextual history
as unresponsive to the power inequities inherent in any system of
relations.

Texts, they might argue, do not influence each other

through the free-flow of egalitarian play but through strategically
biased

structures

of

power.

Intertextuality

privileges certain texts (usually
members)

but,

indifference,

through

marginalizes

already marginalized groups).

only

actively

those from privileged community

conscious
still

not

and

other

unconscious
texts

(usually

hostility
those

or

from

Moreover, they might point out that

many groups did not and do not have equal or any access to the
means of producing texts, that intertextuality privileges literacy over
orality, ignores class exploitation, and reinforces gender inequalities.
Indeed, it could be argued that the examination of Plato and Foucault
that I will soon turn to once again preserves the dead white male
canon.
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I have two responses.
anxiety

based

agency

to

First, this objection ignores the role of
refigure

the

intertextual

story.

As

Mortensen has pointed out, the intertexual community is not a call
for consensus, "But in so far as communities . . . contain conflict, the
outcome o f negotiation can be the subversion of convention, a move
that challenges authority" ("Analyzing"

120).

Scholars like Jarratt,

Quandahl, Miller, Crowley, Berlin, and Bizzell, each driven by the
desire to change social conditions, have shown that the meaning of
texts is as much created as it is received.

Accordingly, they have

woven disruptive texts into the intertext in an attempt to refigure its
content and reception
u n r e p r e s e n te d ,

They have sought out the voices of the

re fig u re d

a c c e p te d

in te rp re ta tio n s

of

the

marginalized, and challenged the dominance of the master tropes.
They have, in short, written ruptures, discontinuities, and revisions
into the inherited structure of the intertext in hopes of presenting
new

ways

of knowing.

For these

scholars,

writing

within

the

intertext is not a capitulation to the status quo but an act of micro
level resistance.
Second,

like

T erry

Rassm ussen,

"I'm

weary

of

anti-

foundationalists crying foul everytime someone approaches anything
that slightly resembles an attempt to establish a foundation or, for
that matter,

a promising

persuasion"

("Antifoundationalism"

157).

As Berlin so eloquently reinforced in Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures,
there is a price to pay if we simply give up on our attempt to make
meaning out of history and history meaningful.

For example, if we

do not reclaim history in the way I argue, then much of the nuance
and wonder of the influences that breathe life into texts, connect
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communities to shared values, and complicate those communities’
views on those values will be ignored.

In my comparison of Foucault

and Plato, I will try to show some of the often ignored echoes that
exist

between

these

two

thinkers

understanding and use of them.
but to

bring one of the

and

that

com plicate

our

I do this not to reinforce the cannon

twentieth

century’s most controversial,

creative, and frightening thinkers into productive tension with one of
antiquity's most dominant figures.

I want to subvert how Foucault

and Plato are viewed by reflecting Foucault in the mirror of Plato's
thought, thereby changing both the mirror and its reflection.

For I

maintain that Foucault is in many ways a product o f Plato, a seed
planted by Socrates, and a good example of the intertexual anxiety of
history for which I am arguing.

F ou cau lt and the P h a e d r u s

It seems a peculiar comparison at first:
who
forms

"established"
with

the

security

the contemporary

transcendental security away.

of the
theorist

the ancient philosopher

unchanging
who

"took"

transcendental
all

forms

of

As Bruce Herzberg has pointed out,

Foucault located and lamented the loss of discourse as an event "in
the defeat of the Sophists by the model of philosophy associated with
Plato" ("Michel" 70).3 And as Sheldon Wolin has written, Foucault
identified

Platonic

philosophy

as

one

"of the

most

horrendous

examples of totalizing" theory in human history ("On the Theory"
199).

It would seem that if ever two thinkers were at opposite ends

of the intellectual and political spectrum, it is Plato and Foucault.
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N evertheless,

while

granting

their

deep

and

im portant

differences, there is also a strange symmetry between the mind of
Plato and the mind of Michel Foucault,4 a similar penetrating gaze
which convicts all that falls beneath it, a shared passion to reveal
how blind, conditioned, and ultimately complicit we are in our own
In the R epublic , the G orgias, and the P haedrus Plato bans

suffering.
corruptive

poets,

condem ns

false

rhetoric,

and

belittles

the

In Madness and Civilization, The Birth o f the

importance of writing.
C lin ic , and Discipline

and

Punish Foucault argues that efforts to

reform the fields of psychology, medicine, and corrections actually
transformed

systems

of

oppression

into

new

and

more

subtle

technologies of control.
In effect, both men are cultural terrorists:

Plato

with his

realities surpassing and categorizing all human works and humans
themselves;
infecting
Indeed,

Foucault with his power emanating

everyone and every
I argue

that

Michel

"good"
Foucault

action

from everywhere,

they do and

is a Platonic

know.

philosopher

without the guiding and constitutive light of the forms, a moralist
without
Plato's

morals.
in

His

interest and

work purposefully and inescapably
personality

if not always

echoes

in theory

and

conclusion.5
The

purpose

of this

comparison

is to examine

the

often

disregarded echoes between these two thinkers, to examine the ways
and degrees to which they complement and complicate each other.

It

is an attempt, borrowing Susan Jarratt’s project for the rhetorical
historian, to "see the sophist in Plato, Augustine, and Bacon: the
hidden Platonist in Nietzsche" ("Toward" 16).

For despite Jarratt's

2 18
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call, little work has been done to make such a comparison between
Plato and Foucault.
Richard Marback has rethought "Plato’s legacy" by examining
"how

the

reconstruction

and

ex eg esis

of

Plato's

w ritings"

("Rethinking" 31) constitutes the way we see Plato, his works, and his
influence, but he limits the scope of this refiguring to figures like
Plotinus,
situated

Proclus,
within

the

and

St.

Platonic

A ugustine—thinkers
legacy.

Ellen

already

Quandhal

securely
has

used

Foucault’s concept of the "author-function" to question the "ways in
which Plato has been appropriated and summarized" ("What" 347),
but she does not use the concept to connect Foucault to Plato.
Instead, she uses Foucaudian thought to recast Plato as "a writer
whose text acknowledges, both theoretically and by example,

the

power of contextualized and contingent elements in rhetoric" (347).
In other words, Marback and Quandhal try to open a space in which
Plato's works can be seen as sympathetic to sophistry.
While supporting both Quandhal's and Marback’s projects, I am
concerned with expanding the question of who is seen as having
appropriated or been appropriated by Plato's legacy, with making
explicit the connection between Plato and Foucault that Quandhal’s
work makes implicitly.

I undertake this project because Foucault's

work, and postmodernism in general, is often feared as a dangerous
and radical break with history.

It should not be.

Foucault's work is

not an aberration that dropped fully formed out of a radical break
with history but an "apostate's" critique of that history.
understandable

It is fully

and useful only when seen as a continuation of,

albeit mostly through critique and confrontation. Western thought.
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In making explicit the connections between Foucault and such texts
as the P h a e d r u s

and the Gorgias,

I hope to make visible the

connections to history that make Foucault's work intelligible and
Plato's work relevant.

Instead of dismissing Foucault as too far

outside of the Western tradition to be taken seriously, or demonizing
him as too dangerous to the West’s projects of democracy and human
rights to be useful, we should recognize him as part of that historical
tradition and set him in dialectical, dialogical, and critical tension
with it.
Specifically, Foucault's relationship to Plato might be viewed,
using Harold Bloom's terminology, as one of an "anxiety of influence"
(5).

While Bloom's concept is or can be used ahistorically, it still

provides a useful frame for understanding the relationship between
Plato and Foucault.

Foucault reads and misreads Plato's theory "so as

to clear imaginative space" (5) for his own.
inexorably ties himself to Platonic philosophy.

Yet in doing so. he
Plato becomes the

initiator "of discursive practices" which "produced not only" his "own
work, but the possibility and the rules of formation" of Foucault's
("What"

189).6

He becomes Foucault's intertextual bogey man; the

figure Foucault must at once invert a n d support if he is to be "free"
of him:

invert because if Foucault's theory is to ascend, then the

interpretation of important shared interests must be wrested from
Platonic domination; support because while Foucault can criticize
Plato's conclusions on those shared interests, he cannot criticize the
validity of the interests without invalidating his own.

In short, I am

arguing that we should look at Foucault as the sort of man Diogenes
was looking for—"a Socrates gone mad."
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T he

In v ersio n

of

S im ila r ity

That Foucault saw himself and his work as part of the Western
tradition, especially its classical Greek roots, is evident in the kinship
he felt for Diogenes.7 In The Passion o f Michel Foucault, biographer
James

Miller

argues

that

Foucault

"masturbating in the market place"

saw
(363).

him self

as

Diogenes

According to Miller,

Foucault interpreted this gesture as an approach to philosophy "as a
field of limit-experience, pushing thought to its breaking point . . . .
Putting truth to the test" in a completely public and bodily way
(363).

That Foucault felt a kinship with Diogenes is important not

only because it ties Foucault to one of Plato's contemporaries, but
because it encapsulates Foucault's relationship to Plato succinctly.
The Oracle at Delphi instructed Diogenes to "change the value of the
currency."
Foucault

This change in
attempts

to do

the

valueof the currency is exactly what

to Plato.

He inverts

the

value, the

interpretation of Platonic subjects, while maintaining their use as
currency.
For example, in one of the most famous passages from Plato's
P h a ed ru s, Socrates8 tells Phaedrus that the soul is "entombed in this
which

we carry about us and call the body,

imprisoned like an oyster in its shell"
of the soul is trapped within the

in which we are

(126).For Plato the perfection

weakness of the flesh.

The body is a

prison of appetites which dims the soul's memory of heaven.
Discipline & Punish

Foucault argues the exact opposite:

A 'soul' inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a
factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body.
The soul is
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In

the effect and instrum ent
prison of the body. (30)

of a political

anatom y;

the

soul

is

the

In this passage Foucault inverts Plato's prison, changes the value
assigned both the body and the soul but maintains the binary as
rhetorically useful currency.

It is not the appetites of the flesh that

cause humans to suffer but "the interrogation of man's interiors"
(Coles S e l f 54).
concept of the

It is the socially constructed and politically useful
soul,

the "illusion of the theologians"

(Foucault,

D iscipline 30) which subjects the body to a variety of disciplines and
technologies of truth.
This
opposition
tradition

as

inversion

of Platonic

to

and

Plato
a

kind

thought

his resulting

of dialectic

reveals

place

both

within

adversary.9 Plato

Foucault’s

the

Platonic

"started"

the

discourse, set the terms of the debate and their relationship; Foucault
continues the discourse, accepts the importance and validity of using
its

terms,

but

then

changes

their

meaning

and

relationship.

Foucault's terms, therefore, can be fully understood only in relation
to Plato's, only in an intertextual play of an anxiety of influence.
Foucault commits a similar inversion of Platonic thought in his
treatment of madness.

In the P haedrus

Socrates

argues

that

madness, "when it is sent as a gift of the gods," is not an evil but "in
reality the greatest of blessings" (122).

Madness

gives humans a

special kind of knowledge, a special kind of insight, which the purely
rational, sensory bound mind cannot achieve.

For example, it is

while Socrates is under the influence of a "madness . . . . given by the
gods" (123) that he is able to communicate a figure of the soul’s form
to Phaedrus.

In Madness and Civilization Foucault also argues that

madness offers humanity a special kind of knowledge, a special kind

m
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of insight.

However,

Foucault’s madness is more of a

blasphemous

temptation than a divine gift:
The gryllos [statues with grotesques faces set in their bellies)
no
longer recalls man, by its satiric form , to his spiritual
vocation
forgotten in the folly o f desire. It is madness become Temptation; all
it embodies o f the
impossible, the fantastic, the inhuman, all that
suggests the unnatural, the w rithing o f an insane presence on the
earth's surface.
(20)

Here again Foucault inverts Platonic thought by changing the value
assigned

its subject—while simultaneously

basic assumption.

Plato is right.

agreeing with its most

Madness can represent an escape

from prevailing normalcy, a liberation from the limitations of sanity.
thought, and discourse. Only now madness no longer recalls humans
to

divine wisdom but shields them from its oppression.

becomes

a state of "unthought"

Heideggerian

terminology,

or

away

Madness

"limit-experience", to borrow

from

both

rationality

and

the

tyranny of the soul.
Also once again, Plato's theorizing initiates a discursive practice
within, through, and by which Foucault must produce his.
wrote M adness
madness

and

became

Civilization

a subject

became knowable subjects.

of

Foucault

in an attempt to understand how
rational

discourse,

how

madmen

During the Age of Reason, he argues, the

West stopped viewing madness as a

sign of divine touch or

as "la

Folie" and started viewing it as a subject which could be known,
measured,
empowered

and

treated.

a desire

This

change

for a kind

rational discourse on madness.

in

view,

o f madness

however,

which escaped

also
the

Ironically, it was Plato, according to

Simon During, who started both this discourse and the resulting
desire to escape it.
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During argues that in Plato's division o f madness

into the

secular and the divine, "Plato is already telling Foucault's story of
madness's secularization;
( F o u c a u lt 194).
subject

its split between insanity and la Folie"

In other words, it was Plato who made madness a

that could

be discussed.

It was

Plato

who

began the

historical process by which madness became divisible and knowable,
and, therefore, which led to the desire to escape it.

Foucault is drawn

to, indebted to, and, to some degree, controlled by Plato as the
initiator of the historical discourse that he is investigating.
describe

the

studying

it,

existence
or

invert

of

madness,

Plato's

validate

definition

of

the
it

He cannot

importance

without

of

drawing

historical connections to Plato.
Not all of the similarities between Plato and Foucault, however,
are inversions of shared interests.

Some similarities come

from

actual shared ideas on those interests, a nuance of similarity that is
lost if Foucault and Plato are not held in historical tension.
example,

both

men

have

similar understandings

of the

For

price of

power and the danger of writing.

S tr a n g e

B e d fe llo w s

In Plato's G o r g i a s

Socrates warns Callicles that he is "ill-

advised" if he believes that one can "have great power in this state
without conforming to its government either for better or worse"
(103), and that this conformity is not merely cosmetic.
"must be no mere imitator, but essentially like them" (103).
use of the word essentially is important.10

Callicles
Plato's

To be recognized as part

of a power structure's ethos, to gain access and wield its power, one
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must actually be or becom e

part of that ethos.

which, Plato believes, can taint the soul.
like his

It is a transformation

The person who tries "to be

unjust ruler, and have great influence with him"

finds

"himself possessed of the greatest evil, that of having his soul
depraved and maimed as a result of his imitation of his master and
the power he has got" (102).

Much like Hairston's view of the

corrupting influence of literary theory, Plato warns against following
those who do understanding the

nature of moral behavior. Thus,

both Hairston and Plato seeking

power risks one's virtue.

for

While Foucault denies the existence of an innate virtue that can
be maimed, he offers a similar theory of power in The Discourse on
Language:
D isciplines constitute a system o f control in the p roduction of
discourse, fixing its limits through the action o f an identity taking
the form of a permanent reactivation of rules . . . . none may enter
into discourse on a specific subject unless he has satisfied certain
conditions or if he is not, from the outset, qualified to do so. (224-25)

Like Plato, Foucault believes that to enter and employ a system of
power one has to be or become

enough like it to be recognized by it.

One must assume or be assumed by a sanctioned identity, embody a
form of rules in order to enter a discipline's discourse, in order to
speak and be heard within a structure of power.1 1
Also like Plato, Foucault believes there is a potential danger in
this transformation.

We must confess the truth of the disciplines we

enter:
We are subjugated to the production o f truth through power and we
cannot exercise power except through the production of truth . . . we
are forced to produce the truth o f power that our society demands
. . . . we m u s t
speak the truth; we are constrained or condemned to
confess or to discover the truth. ( P o w e r / K n o w le d g e 93)
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Power demands the confession of its truth as the price for exercising
it.

Disciplines need the subjugation of subjects in order to function-

like Callicles' unjust ruler needs true subjects or subjugated beings to
rule.

And while Foucault does not believe in a soul that can be

tainted, he does believe in a political identity that can be co-opted,
and that this co-optation is every bit as "profound" as Plato's tainted
soul.
For example, Foucault's use of the word confess

echoes Plato's

use of the word s o u l —not in metaphysics but in ethos.

Foucault

draws on religious vocabulary to create the "textual image" that this
confession is "forced out" from "within" a subject by an external
p o w e r .12

Moreover, his use of violent and restrictive language belies

the idea that this transformation is any more cosmetic than Plato’s.
While

Callicles'

Foucault's

soul

being

is

is

"possessed,"

"subjugated,"

"depraved,"

"forced,"

"condemned" by the demands of power.

and

"maimed,"

"constrained,"

and

In short, Foucault's language

purposefully takes on the tone of damnation in order to strike the
same profundity of horror in Western readers as Plato's maimed soul
does.
Power's

demand

for

transformation

danger of co-optation, either the

and

the

corrupting of the

corresponding
soul or the

production of a subjugated identity, is why, for both theorists, so few
"revolutions" actually change a discipline’s power structure.

People

believe, as Callicles does, that they can use power, attain power,
enter into a power structure without it using, attaining, and entering
into

them.

Like

the

o pp ositional

pedagogues,

too

many

revolutionaries believe that once the palace is seized, once the reigns
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of power are in ideologically correct hands, then the structure will
automatically change.

For both Plato and Foucault resistance to state,

economic, or cultural power structures is much more complex, and
our actions are much more complicit in maintaining that power.
Power

structures

presuppose

and

feed

off

resistance

to

maintain, rearrange, and even expand themselves. Resistance which
does not change the structure o f power only reproduces that which it
is fighting.

As Victor Vitanza has argued "the overthrow of a political

position . . . is only a capitulation to eventual recapitulation . . . .
Revolutions-against-fascism only end up being new (political, critical.
cultural, historiographical) fascisms" ('"Notes'" 107).
in maintaining what you are

resisting results from the fact that

power is exercised rather than possessed.
much as it owns us; we

This complicity

We do not own power so

are transformed by it rather than it being

transformed by us:
Power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on
those who 'do not have it’; it invest them, is transmitted by them and
through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves,
in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them.
This
means that these relations go right down into the depths of society.
(Foucault, Discipline and Punish 27)

Power structures create an identity and a purpose for resisters and,
in doing so, exert control over them.
neither would the resisters.

If the system did not exist, then

Moreover, if the resisters are able to get

inside a system of power and seize control of its operation, then they
too will pay the price of transformation and confession.

And, like

Callicles, they too will discover that this transformation is not merely
cosmetic but constitutive, that in changing to acquire power they
have changed in being.
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Consequently, Foucault believed, according to Janies Miller, that
the nature of power demanded that "resistance" begin at the level of
the "micro-politic," at the level of what Victor Vitanza has called
"individual cells . . .

of critical authority" ('"Notes'" 109).

Miller

w rites:
To change the world required changing our selves, our bodies, our
souls, and all o f our old ways o f ’know ing,’ in addition to changing
the economy and society. To ’seize’ and exercise a dictatorial kind of
pow er
m ig h t
thus
s im p ly
reproduce
the
o ld
p a tte rn s
of
subjectification under a new name.
{The Passion 234)

Changing the ideology of a power structure does not necessarily
change all of its functions.
treat

homosexuals,

minorities

For example, many socialists societies still

women, drug

harshly.

A

power

addicts,
structure's

illegal

immigrants,

main

purpose

is

and
to

promulgate itself, not to adhere to any specific ideological content.13
What has to change is the restrictive yet productive practices that
constitute thought and being.

What must be changed is not only

what is known and how it is known but what can be known and how
knowing can be.

Since these practices go down to the very depths of

society, they must be resisted at that micro-level.

This laser like

focus is why attempts to change student ideology must focus on
individual
political

classrooms
outlook.

rather

The

than

on

predetermined

understanding of operations of power.

applying
outlook

a predetermined
is too

gross

an

It risks turning itself into

another oppressive structure in the name of liberation.
The death of Socrates provides a good example of a Foucaudian
understanding of power and a corresponding enactment of resistance
at the micro or individual level.

The Socrates of Plato's The Apology

refuses to both escape as Crito pleads and to defend himself in the
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way of "clever" rhetoricians.

He does not assume, in other words,

that he can use rhetoric in a manner he opposes without it using him;
he does not assume that he can change himself in order to survive
without corrupting himself.
that sanction

He refuses, in effect, to resist in ways

the power structure’sways of knowing

and make him

complicit in maintaining and validating those ways.
Instead, Socrates presents his being, his way of knowing, as an
alternative and superior way of existing in the world.
seducing

He becomes a

object trying to persuade others to want to be like him.

Nietzsche, Foucault's great teacher, makes this point in The Birth o f
Tragedy:
From
this point onward Socrates conceives it his duty to correct
existence,
and with an air o f irreverence and superiority, as the
precursor o f an altogether different culture, art, and morality, he
enters single-handed into a world,
to touch whose very hem would
give us the greatest happiness.
(253)

Socrates’ seeming
actually an act
being by

act of submission in drinking

of micro-level resistance.

hemlock is

It creates a new way of

transforming death into a different way

the value of life.

the

of understanding

Indeed, Foucault believes that Socrates, in freely

embracing death, establishes '"the roots of what we could call the
"critical" tradition in the West"’ (qtd. in Miller 462 n.15).14
believes

that Plato's Socrates establishes the way

structures can

Foucault

in which power

be resisted.

Of course, for Plato knowledge of the realities
avoid the risk of co-optation.

allows one

to

With knowledge o f the realities in

place, one does not seek a corrupt state'spower.

One may

not be

able to avoid the state's wrath in refusing to be co-opted (as Socrates
could not), but

one's innate self does not have to be tainted if that
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self is understood.

The revolution of the selfs ways of knowing

would

end

begin

and

transcendent knowledge.

w ith

rem em bering

innate

being

and

Revolution for Foucault, however, would

begin with the recognition of how oppressive the idea of an innate
state

of

being

is,

by

creatin g

ways

of

being

not

already

overpopulated with the language and power relations of others.

And

while Foucault is not very optimistic about our ability to create these
"uncontaminated" ways of being, he draws inspiration from the being
of Plato's Socrates.

For while rejecting the specifics of Socrates’ way

of knowing, a way all too well known in our time, Foucault is drawn
to it as an example, in its time, of an achieved alternative state of
being, as a form of critical resistance.

In any event, both

Foucault

and Plato believe that a price must be paid in order to enter and
wield structures of power, that this price is often the transformation
of being into a more subjugated entity, and that revolution begins at
the micro-level.

The

T y ra n n y

o f W riting

Jasper Neel has argued that Plato saw writing as "an innocuous
pastime" at best and "a dangerous distraction" ("Dichotomy" 306) at
worst.

He has further argued that Foucault represents a modern

sophist's view of writing as an "unfinished and unfinishable

process"

that "permeates every aspect of whatever would like to present itself
as outside of and prior to writing" (308).

While not disagreeing with

Neel, I maintain that there is also a similarity between the two in
that each man fears writing.
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Plato
d ialectic.

fears that writing weakens both the
W riting,

he

believes,

subjugates

memory and the
the

mind

conventions and traditions of the transitory and external.

to

the

In the

P h a e d ru s Socrates warns that writing "will produce forgetfulness

in

the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practice
their memory” (140).

Worse, it causes humans to put "their trust" in

"external characters which are no part of themselves" instead of in
the memory inside of them (140).
outward placement of trust is the

Lost in this

lack of practice and

liberating knowledge of the eternal

forms lying dormant within memory.
Plato also fears that writing weakens the power of the dialectic.
The exchange of ideas between persons (interlocuters) with a telos of
truth has power because it allows us to perfect syllogism in order to
examine statements about

the world. W riting, Plato believes, does

not allow for this kind of continual examination:
W ritin g , P haedrus, has this strange q u a lity ,
and is very like
painting; for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but
if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence.
And so
it is with written words . . . if you question them, wishing to know
th e ir sayings, they always say
only one and
the same thing.
( P h a e d r u s 140-41)

Within the dialectic one can continually question, requestion, and rere-question the other person.
to their limits.

Answers can be nuanced and pushed

Whereas writing, Plato would argue, is a dead thing.

The written word is always bound to culture, to the past, to the fixed,
never changing text.

The person can question it, but it makes

reply but what is already stated.

no

Worse, writing, like painting, is

twice removed from the ideal forms, a copy o f a copy.

The traces of

the forms within it are even weaker than in the objects of nature.
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It

is harder, therefore, to see the truth of the forms within the object of
writing.

Writing is limited as a tool that can point beyond itself to

the forms.

One can only focus on its materiality and not through it.15

That Foucault fears writing is evident in his actions before his
death.

Before he died, Foucault "hurriedly destroyed hundreds of

pages of notebooks, letters, and manuscripts"
And

"In

anything

his

will,

he

how ever,

he

prohibited

might have missed"

not

because

it

the

posthum ous

(357).

threatens

(James Miller 357).
publication

Foucault fears

transcendent

writing,

knowledge

because it simultaneously threatens and fixes identity.

of

but

In his often

quoted essay "What is an Author?", Foucault defines an "'author' as a
function of discourse" (180).

Instead of there being an innate or

eternal role for the author, the author's relation to the text changes
historically.

The author-function is socially constructed.

In our era

"Writing is now linked to sacrifice and to the sacrifice of life itself: it
is the voluntary obliteration of the self . . . .

Where a work had the

duty of creating imm ortality, it now attains the right to kill, to
become the murderer of its author" (Foucault

180).

Whereas for

Plato the true rhetorician "destroys the very medium in which he
works" (Leff, "The Form" 22), for Foucault the very medium destroys
the author in which it works.

The author becomes "a victim of his

own writing" (Foucault, "What"

180).

Writing is now an act of

suicide.
Foucault, however, sees this self annihilation as double-edged.
On one hand, violence to the self is threatening.

While Foucault

claims that this writing is a "voluntary obliteration," his use of the
words "attains the right to kill" belies the idea that this violence is
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under the writer's control, an extension of his or her will.

One is not

granted a right in Western thought—as Foucault well knows—rights
are "naturally" the property of free human beings.

That writing has

attained the right to kill, therefore, suggests it is a separately existing
entity not morally under the control of the writer.

In fact, it is the

writing which has the moral authority, the agency to control the
writer.

The

word

right denotes

both

moral correctness

and

a

politically conservative ethos.
On the other hand, Foucault sees writing as a way to disappear,
to erase himself, and he seeks such a disappearance:

"I am no doubt

not the only one who writes in order to have no face.

Do not ask who

I am and do not ask me to remain the same:

leave it to our

bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order.

At

least spare us their morality when we write" {A rcheology 17). A n d ,
in his famous opening to The A rchaeology
D isco u rse

on

L a n g u a g e , Foucault

dreams

o f Knowledge
of a total

& The
lack

of

identification within any discursive form:
I would really like to
have slipped imperceptibly into this lecture, as
into all others I shall be delivering, perhaps over the years ahead.
I
would have preferred to be enveloped in words, borne way beyond
all possible beginnings.
At the moment o f speaking, I would like to
have perceived a nam eless voice, long preceding me, leaving me
merely to enmesh m yself in it, taking up its cadence, and to lodge
myself, when no one was looking, in its interstices as if it had paused
an instant, in suspense, to beckon to me. (215)

Foucault desires a kind

of anonymous oblivion out of which

he can

write or speak without

being subjected to the rules of a discursive

practice, but the words betray him and reveal that he does not
believe this possible.
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In the passage quoted from page seventeen of The

Archeology

o f Knowledge, Foucault is responding to an inquisitor who suddenly
appears in his text and subjects him to a series of questions:

"'Aren't

you sure of what you're saying? Are you going to change yet again,
shift your position according to the questions that are put to you, and
say that objections are not really directed at the place from which
you are speaking?"
dialectic here.

(17). In

a sense Foucault seems

to mimic the

He confronts his fear of the "bureaucrats" and "police"

by giving them presence in the form of interlocuters.

However, his

attempt to banish these "bureaucrats" and "police" who want to make
sure his "papers are in order." also succeeds in revealing his fear of
their presence.

In the very act of trying to disappear, Foucault can

already feel an audience whose interpretation of his writing might
fix an identity onto him with which he is not comfortable.
Plato

he feels

the

need to

defend him self against erroneous or

injurious interpretations, to attempt
read his work.

Much like

to control how the reader can

Rather than see interpretive communities as shared

and congenial as Bruffee does, Foucault and Plato both see them
more as the conflicted and dangerous places that Berlin, Bizzell, and
other critical theorists do.
those

interpretive

However,

com m unities

in

rather than trying to shape
hopes

of

encouraging

social

transformation, Foucault and Plato

try to create written documents

that

an

w ill

p ro te c t

them

from

in te rp re tiv e

com m unities

conceptualizing power.
In the second

passage

quoted, Foucault's use of the words

"would really like to have" and "would have preferred" denote a wish
that cannot be fulfilled.

If he had the choice not to begin, then he
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would not begin.

But he does not believe he has such a choice.

Indeed, since his wish for no beginnings comes at the beginning of
his text, it must be read ironically.
"slipped imperceptibly"
presence
presence

Moreover, his use o f the words

implies the existence of a panopticon-like

watching over

his beginnings

and use o f

language,

he "would really like to have" avoided but cannot.

begin, and no voice is nameless.
demands

one

to

confess

He must

Writing, speaking, all discourse

a public naming in W estern culture.

power force

a

the

systems'

Just as systems of

truth,

so

w riting

and

speaking force the writer and the speaker to confess their truths.
Writing is a perilous game for Foucault.
Foucault cannot

see

w riting

as

Unlike Hairston,

ever being low -risk.

Personal

narrative does not low er the stakes of writing—it raises them by
allowing the interpretive community to have even more authority in
constructing who the writer is through what he or she has written.
Writing is always a perilous exercise in self presentation.

It offers a

certain anonymity through self annihilation, but it also threatens to
subjugate through the interpretations and judgments of others.

It

simultaneously allows one to escape and threatens to bring one into
public existence.
has

written.

Foucault is produced as knowable through what he
W orse,

he

is

produced as knowable

interpretations of what he has written.

through

our

Worse still, he is produced as

responsible for our interpretations of what he has written, for the
positions to which we assign him with respect to certain political or
social causes.

Foucault, after all, was very aware of what the Nazis

did to Nietzsche's work and the Stalinists to Marx's.
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I believe each man’s fear of writing is traceable to this deeper
fear of being identified with suspect, dangerous, fixed, or revealing
interpretations.

It is as if both men, understanding the damage that

people and power structures can do by "corrupting" writing, tried to
remove the possibility of being held responsible for how others
interpret their writing.

In the P h a e d r u s we have the irony of Plato

disdaining writing in writing and then through the mouthpiece of
Socrates.

And while Jasper Neel has correctly pointed out

shrew dness

of

making

such

an

argum ent

in

w ritin g ,16

the

Plato's

displacem ent of authorship also reveals his genuine apprehension of
this new form of communication.

Plato writes:

And every word, when once it is written, is bandied about, alike
among those who understand it and those who have no interest in it.
and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak; when ill-treated
or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no
power to protect or help itself. (P h a e d r u s 14 1)

Plato discredits writing and plays games with authorship because he
fears the interpretive presence of the reader.
S im ilarly , Foucault’s writing, while often eloquent and poetic, is
also

at times

impossible.

so unintelligible

that certainty

of interpretation

He admits in The Archeology o f Knowledge

is

that he uses

writing to create "with a rather shaky hand~a labyrinth into which I
can

venture,

underground

in

which

passages,

I can
forcing

move
it

overhangs

that reduce and deform

purposely

makes his writing

to

my
go

its

difficult,

discourse,
far

from

itinerary"

opening

itself,
(17).

up

finding
Foucault

"deforms its itinerary",

to

reduce the possibility of readers assigning one meaning to it and to
him .
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In fact, James Miller speculates that Foucault enjoyed these
kind of games with writing.
purposely confided
because

he

knew

On his death bed, Foucault may have

life long secrets to his friend Herve Guibert
the

young

novelist

w ould

fictionalize

the

acco u n ts.17 This way Foucault could expect "that his confession would
be made public~and know as well that the artist would reveal the
truth only after it had been veiled in 'fiction'" (James Miller 372).
Thus, while there are vast differences between Plato's concept of
writing and F oucault's,18 there are also similarities in their fear of it.
Both men fear how others will interpret their writing.

Both men fear

what kinds of identities these interpretations will construct for them.
And both men play games with writing, try to hide within it, to
lessen the damage of interpretation.
These are the echoes I hear between Plato and Foucault, but
they are echoes that can be fully heard only if the two are held in
historical tension, in a kind of historical intertextuality.

History

provides a method for negotiating their texts that is more powerful
than simply drifting from one text and another, but only if we grant
that historical consciousness is still possible.

If Foucault's work is

viewed instead as simply part of a larger postmodern break with
history, then such a comparison as I have made makes little sense.

A L over o f W isdom , A Seek er o f Truth

I would like to end this chapter with a story James Miller tells
about Foucault and a young artist named Philip Horvitz.19 It seems
that while Foucault was teaching at Berkeley, Horvitz went to hear a
lecture Foucault was delivering.

After the lecture Horvitz decided to
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go to Foucault's open office hour and ask him a question.

Not well

versed in Foucaudian jargon, Horvitz asked Foucault the following
questions:
Does the artist have an identity, or is he a powerless ’type.’ who in
the last fifty years has become more powerless than ever, due to the
m anipulation o f te ch n ica l m edia like television? C an the artist
transcend ’The S tru c tu re ? ’ O r is he doomed to com m od itization ,
puppetizatio? (qtd. in James Miller 352)

Foucault could not answer the young man and told him to return the
next day.
question

The next day, however, Foucault still could not answer the
and so

asked

to meet Horvitz for coffee

that

Friday.

Foucault's answer on Friday, according to Horvitz, was the following:
Freedom can be found, he said—but always
into play a dynamic o f constant struggle.
But there is freedom in knowing the game
look to authorities: the truth is in your self.
your self.
Don't be afraid of living.
And
Have courage.
Do what you feel you must:
you can win the game. (qtd. in James Miller

in context.
Power puts
There is no escaping it.
is yours to play.
Don't
Don't be scared.
Trust
don't be afraid of dying.
desire, create, transcend—
353)

The great destroyer of subjectivity telling us to "trust in ourselves?
The man who took all forms of transcendental security away telling
us to "transcend"? The theorist obsessed with revealing the unseen
ways in which knowledge binds us telling us there is "freedom in
knowing the game is yours to play"? Yes—because Foucault's work
was not an attempt to destroy Western thought, human rights, and
democracy but to revitalize those domains through critique.

It is a

savage critique to be sure, but one, nonetheless, that ties Foucault
inexorably to the Western tradition, one that makes him useful to the
project of making our classrooms more socially just and our teaching
more self-conscious.
Perhaps the most telling moment in Foucault's life, when it
comes to understanding his relationship to that W estern tradition,
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came on his death bed.

As he lay dying, according to Miller. Foucault

confessed to Herve Guibert that he did not see himself as a historian,
an intellectual, or a revolutionary but as "a philosopher —a lover of
wisdom, a seeker of truth" (358).
hear from Michel Foucault.
mouth.

These are not words one expects to

They sound strange coming from his

Indeed, they sound more like words that would come from

the mouth of Plato,
are also Plato's.

but they are Foucault's words.
The seeds that Socrates

Of course, they

planted have grown in

strange places.
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CHAPTER FIVE NOTES
1. Giroux is quick to distinguish between this relatively new backlash and the
more serious critiques by theorists like Jurgen H aberm as, Perry Anderson,
David Harvey, and Terry Eagleton. He also points out that "one can find a great
deal o f theoretical material that refuses to dism iss postmodern discourse so
easily” (364 n.5).
2. For a different view o f postmodernism and its relationship to history and
meaning see L y otard ’s Just Gaming
in which he tries to uphold both the
heterogeneity o f
language games and a "justice o f multiplicity";
Habermas'
"Modernity versus P ostm odernity” and "M odernity—An Incomplete P ro je c t” in
which he views modernity as an incomplete project that postmodernism can
help to complete: and Stuart Hall's and Frederic Jam eson's "Clinging to the
Wreckage:
A C onversation” in which Jameson believes both in the existence
of a postmodern
capitalism and that a new class logic will emerge to confront
it.
3.

See Foucault's "The Order of Discourse."

4. By using the word mind I do not intend to imply that somehow I have access
to the authors' intentions.
Instead. I mean the personality, the shared interest,
the similar feeling that my reading o f each author’s text evokes.
5. For example, see Foucault's History o f Sexuality vol 2 pages 230-246 for his
reading o f the con cep t o f hom o-erotic love in the P h a e d r u s
and the
S y m p o siu m .
6.
Foucault, of course, wrote this
line in reference toMarx and Freud.
expanding the concept by applying it to Plato.

I am

7. See James Miller's The Passion o f M ichel Foucault pages 359-375 for a more
in-depth discussion o f Foucault's relationship to and last lectures on Socrates.
Diogenes, the Stoics, and especially the Cynics.
8.
All references to the Socrates
mouthpiece for Plato's ideas.

found

in this essay

assume

that

9.
See Roger Moss's "The Rhetoric that Dare Not Speak Its Name"
examination o f how Oscar Wilde inverts the P h a e d r u s in his work.

he

is a

for an

10. Here and in other places in this chapter I am forced to rely on translations
of Plato’s and Foucault's work.
There is, therefore, an inevitable slippage
involved when I do close readings o f individual words.
However, I would
maintain that my readings are of good translations and that they reflect the
"spirit" of each passage if not always the nuance o f the words in the original
texts.
11.
David Bartholom ae, influenced by F o ucault’s p o st-stru cturalist thought,
eloquently
encapsulates this view o f pow er for com position.
A ccording to
Bartholomae. "the student must, by writing, become like us . . . .
He must
become someone he is not.
He must know what we know, talk like we talk; he
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must locate him self convincingly in a language that is
struggle o f the student writer is not the struggle to
within; it is the struggle to carry out those ritual
entrance into a closed society ("Writing Assignments"

not his own . . . . The
bring out that which is
activities that grant one
300).

12.
Foucault, o f course, rejects such a Descartian split between outer and inner
being as itself oppressive.
Yet his p oint is that restriction is productive.
Power restricts the ways in which a thing can be known or a person can be;
however, since there is no innate state o f being to maim or stunt, this
restriction b u ild s an identity rather than d efo rm s one.
R epression is
productive.
The danger to the individual is that he or she might suffer under
and be com plicit in making a marginalized identity within a structure.
See
Foucault's H istory o f Sexuality volume I pages 10-12 for his evaluation o f the
"’repressive hypothesis'" and the role o f repression in producing identity.
13. See Foucault’s Discipline and Punish pages 257-292 for his belief that the
political issues o f the penal system are not ideological but m echanical.
Specifically, he argues that "if there is an overall political issue around the
prison, it is not . . . whether it is to be corrective or not; whether the judges,
the psychiatrists o r the sociologists are to exercise more power in it than the
adm inistrators or the supervisors; it is not even w hether we should have
prison or som ething other than prison.
At present, the problem lies rather in
the steep rise in the use of these mechanisms o f normalization and the wideranging pow ers w hich, through the pro liferatio n o f new disciplines, they
bring with them" (306).
14. Foucault felt that it was only in the moment o f death that true individuality
was possible:
"It is in death . . . that the individual becomes at one with
himself, escaping from monotonous lives and their leveling effect; in the slow,
half-subterranean, but already visibly approach o f death, the dull, common
life at last becomes an individuality; a black border isolates it, and gives it the
style of its truth" (—as quoted in Miller 20).
Consequently, he was interested in
suicide as a mom ent o f transcendence and agency.
See Ludwig Binswanger’s
"The Case o f Ellen" and Foucault’s introduction to Binswanger’s "Dream and
Existence" to exam ine the beginnings o f Foucault’s interest in suicide as an act
of agency. See also Miller’s chapter "The Heart Laid Bare” pages 66-93.
15.
In fact, Carol Poster argues that "Plato considers his philosophical doctrine
unwrittable."
See "Plato's Unwritten Doctrines:
A Hermeneutic Problem in
R h etorical H is to rio g ra p h y ."
16.

See Jasper Neel’s Plato, Derrida, and Writing.

17.
It seems that on his death bed Foucault revealed three incredibly private
secrets about his life. The outline of them is that: I) when Foucault was a boy
his father, a stern man and brilliant surgeon, forced Foucault to watch the
amputation o f a man's leg in order to toughen him up; 2) that
Foucault may
have
been haunted by the story o f a woman known as 'the Sequestered of
Poitiers’.
She went mad and was kept locked up in a room for some twentyfive years with little food.
When found she was covered with excrement, lice,
maggots, and rats; and 3) that during World War II Foucault was threatened by
the sudden ap pearance o f a small group o f Jewish students at his school.
Foucault supposedly cursed them for challenging his position as the smartest
boy in the class.
Later they were taken away to camps. These secrets, if true.

24 1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

subject Foucault to the kind of Freudian analysis which he, an intensely
private man. feared all
his life.
What M iller finds interesting is that Guibert
writes o f these secrets in a fictionalized account.
Therefore, we have no way
of knowing the "truth" o f Guibert’s accounts and no way of knowing the truth
of Foucault's secrets.
See pages 363-374 for a more detailed account of these
events and the controversy surrounding them.
18. For example, despite Plato's disdain for writing he does believe it can be
used correctly.
According to David White, Plato believed that "the writer must
know the truth about the subject m atter treated,” and more importantly, the
"writer’s knowledge o f truth entails know ledge o f the method for arriving at
truth” ( 8).
Foucault might agree with this statement, but truth would be
exactly the cultural practices produced by a situated discourse o f knowledge
that Plato wants to avoid.
Moreover, John Johnston argues that Foucault sees
"writing as a transitive intervention, a means by which the hardly visible
coercive pow ers o f discourse are confronted, wrestled with, even subverted,
thereby
re v e a lin g the
ultim ate in a d e q u a c y o f d is c u rs iv e
k now ledges,
categories, and their rules o f formation" (800-1).
Thus, while writing is to be
feared, Johnston believes Foucault also sees it as politically useful.
While I
believe he is correct. T tend to think he is not problematizing how complicit
the writer is in producing the inadequacy o f discursive knowledges.
19. See James Miller pages 351-53 for a fuller account o f this event.

24 2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

WORKS CITED

Appiah, Kwame Anthony. "Is the Post-in Postmodernism the Post-in
Postcolonial?" Critical Inquiry 17 (Winter 1991): 336-57.
Arnold, Matthew. "Dover Beach." The Bedford Introduction to
L itera tu re. 3rd ed. Ed. Michael Meyer. Boston: Bedford Books
of St. Martin's Press, 1993. 648-49.
Atwan, Robert, and Jon Roberts, eds. Left Right and Center: Voices
from Across the Political Spectrum. New York: Bedford Books
of St. Martin's Press. 425-34.
Bakhtin, M. Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays.
Michael Holquist and Vadiam Liapunov. Trans. Vadiam
Liapunov. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990.
. Rabelais and His World. Trans.
and London: MIT Press, 1968.

Helene Iswolsky.

Eds.

Cambridge

. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Ed. by Michael
Holquist. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist.
University of Texas Press, 1981.

Austin:

Bartholomae, David. "Inventing the University." When a Writer Can't
Write: Studies in Writer's Block and Other Composing
Process Problems. Ed. Mike Rose. New York and London:
Guilford. 1985.
.

"The Study of Error." College Commposition and
C om m unication 31 (Oct. 1980): 253-69.

.

"Writing Assignments: Where Writing Begins." Forum: Essays
on Theory and Practice in the Teaching o f Writing. Ed. Patricia
L. Stock. Upper Montclair: Boynton/Cook, 1983. 300-12.

Bartholomae, David, and Anthony Petrosky. Facts, Artifact, and
Counterfacts: Theory and Method fo r a Reading and Writing
Course. Portsmouth, NH: Boyton/Cook, 1986.

243

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Baudrillard, Jean.
1988.

A m erica.

Trans.

Chris Turner.

. Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews.
York and London: Routledge, 1993.

London:

Verso.

Ed. Mike Gane. New

. Fatal Strategies. Trans. Philip Beitchman and W.G.J.
Niesluchowski. Ed. Jim Fleming. New York: Semiotext(e), 1990.
. Sim ulations. Trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip
Beitchman. New York: Semiotext(e), 1983.
"The Melodrama of Difference."
Essays on Extreme Phenomena.
London: Verso, 1993. 124-38.

The Transparency o f Evil:
Trans. James Benedict.

. "The Object as Strange Attractor." The Transparency o f Evil:
Essays on Extreme Phenomena. Trans. James Benedict.
London: Verso, 1993. 172-74.
Bauer, Dale. "The Other 'F Word: Feminist in the Classroom." College
English 52 (April 1990): 385-96.
Bauman, Zygmunt. Postmodern Ethics.

Cambridge:

Blackwell, 1993.

Berlin, James A. "Poststructuralism, Cultural Studies, and the
Composition Classroom: Postmodern Theory in Practice."
Rhetoric Review 11 (1992) 16-33.
. "Postmodernism, Politics, and Histories of Rhetoric."
11 (1990): 170-87.
. "Response." College English 51 (1989):
. "Revisionary History:
(1987): 47-61.
.

770-77.

The Dialectical Method."

"Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class."
50 (1988): 477-94.

. Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures:
Studies. Urbana: NCTE, 1996.

P R E /T E X T

PRE/TEXT 8

College E nglish

Refiguring College English

244

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Bizzell, Patricia. "Beyond Anti-Foundationalism to Rhetorical
Authority: Problems in Defining 'Cultural Literacy.”' College
English 52 (Oct. 1990): 661-75.
"Cognition, Convention, and Certainty: What We Need to Know
about Writing." P R E /T E X T 3 (1982): 213-43.
.

"Marxist Ideas in Composition Studies." Contending with
Words: Composition and Rhetoric in a Postmodern Age. Eds.
Patricia Harkin and John Schilb. New York: Modern Language
Association of America, 1991. 52-68.

Bleich, David. "Literacy and Citizenship: Resisting Social Issues." The
Right to Literacy. Eds. Andrea A. Lunsford, Helen Moglen, and
James Slevin. New York: MLA and NCTE, 1990. 163-69.
Bloom, Harold. The Anxiety o f Influence:
York: Oxford UP, 1973.

A Theory o f Poetry. New

Borgmann, Albert. Crossing the Postmodern Divide. Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1992.
Bruffee, Kenneth. "Social Construction, Language, and the Authority
of Knowledge: A Bibliographical Essay." College English 48
(1986): 773-90.
Burke, Kenneth.
1969.

A Rhetoric o f Motives.

Berkeley: U of California P,

Burke, Sean. The Death and the Return o f the Author.
Edinburgh UP, 1992.

Edinburgh:

Chakrabarti, Sukanya. "Caste System: Guarding Ourselves Against
the
Truth." India Discussion Digest, <http://india.bgsu.edu/
index.html>. Sat. 30 Mar. 1996 16:46:08.
."Misconceptions About Caste System." India Discussion Digest.
<http://india.bgsu.edu/index.html>. Fri. 22 Mar. 1996 12:55:13.
Christian, Barbara. "The Race for Theory." Gender and Theory:
Dialogues on Feminist Criticism. Ed. Linda S. Kauffman. Oxford
and New York: B. Blackwell, 1989. 225-37.

2 45

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Churchill, Ward. "Crimes Against Humanity." Left Right and Center:
Voices from Across the Political Spectrum. Eds. Robert Atwan
and Jon Roberts. New York: Bedford Books of St. Martin's
Press. 425-34.
Clifford, John. The Subject in Discourse." Contending with Words:
Composition and Rhetoric in a Postmodern Age. Eds. Patricia
Harkin and John Schilb. New York: Modern Language
Association of America, 1991. 38-51.
Coles, Romand. Self/Power/Other: Political Theory and Dialogical
Ethics. Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1992.
Connors, Robert J. "Rhetoric in the Modern University: The Creation
of an Underclass." Politics o f Writing Instruction:
P ostsecondary. Eds. Richard Bullock and John Trimbur.
Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook,
1991. 55-84.
"Overwork/Underplay:
Teachers since 1880."

Labor and the Status of Composition
Rhetoric Review 9 (Fall 1990): 108-26.

de Lauretis, Teresa. "Gramsci Notwithstanding or, The Left Hand of
History." Technologies o f Gender: Essays on Theory, Film, and
Fiction. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1987.
84 -9 4 .
Delpit, Lisa D. "The Silenced Dialogue: Power and Pedagogy in
Educating Other People's Children." Harvard Educational
R eview 58.3 (August 1988): 280-98.
de Man, Paul. Allegories o f Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau,
Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust. New Haven: Yale UP, 1979.
Dewey, John. "The Child and the Curriculum." 1902.
Society; The Child and the Curriculum. Chicago:
1990:
181-209.
. Democracy and Education.

1916.

New York:

The School and
U of Chicago P,

Free Press, 1967.

. Experience and Education. 1938. New York: Macmillian,
1975. As quoted in Fishman, Stephen M. and Lucille
Parkinson McCarthy. "Teaching for Student Change: A

246

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Deweyan Alternative to Radical
Pedagogy." College
Composition and Communication 47 (Oct. 1996): 342-366.
. How We Think: A Restatement o f the Relation o f Reflective
Thinking to the Educative Process. Lexington, MA: Heath.
1 9 3 3 /1 9 6 0 .
.

"The Need for a Philosophy of Education." 1934. John Dewey
On Education, Selected Writings. Ed. Reginald D. Archambault.
Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1964. 1-14.

Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Rabinow, Paul. Michel Foucault: Beyond
Structuralism and Hermeneutics. 2nd ed. Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1982.
D'Souza, Dinesh. The End o f Racism: Principles fo r a Multi-Cultural
Society. New York: The Free Press, 1995.
duCille. Ann.
"Postcolonialism and Afrocentricity: Discourse and Dat
Course." The Black Columbiad: Defining Moments in African
American Literature and Culture. Eds. Werner Sollors and
Maria Diedrich.
Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard UP, 1994. 28-41.
During, Simon.
Writing.

Foucault and Literature: Towards a Genealogy o f
New York and London: Routledge,1992.

Dyson, Ann Haas. Social Worlds o f Children Learning to Write in an
Urban Primary School. New York: Teachers College Press,
1993.
Ebert, Teresa L. "The 'Difference' of Postmodern Feminism."
E nglish 53 (1991): 886-904.

C ollege

Emerson, Ralph Waldo. "The Poet." The Norton Anthology o f
American Literature: Third Edition Volume I. Ed. Nina Baym
et al. New York: Norton, 1989.
Emig, Janet. "The Tacit Tradition: The Inevitability of a MultiDisciplinary Approach to Writing Research." The Web o f
Meaning: Essays on Writing, Teaching, Learning and Thinking.
Upper Montclair: Boynton, 1983. 145-56.

247

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ernest, John. "100 Friends and Other Class Issues: Teaching Both In
and Out of the Game." Forthcoming in Coming to Class:
Pedagogy and the Social Class o f Teachers. Eds. John
McMillian, Alan Shepard, and Gary Tate. Heinemann, 1998.
Faigley, Lester. Fragments o f Rationality: Postmodemity and the
Subject o f Composition. Pittsburgh and London: U of
Pittsburgh P, 1992.
Fish, Stanley. "Consequences." Against Theory:
the New Pragmatism. Ed. W.J.T. Mitchel.
U of Chicago P, 1985. 106-31.

Literary Studies and
Chicago and London:

. Doing what Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the
Practice o f Theory in Literary and Legal Studies. Durham:
Duke UP, 1989.
Fishman. Stephen M., and Lucille Parkinson McCarthy. "Teaching for
Student Change: A Deweyan Alternative to Radical Pedagogy."
College Composition and Communication 47 (Oct. 1996): 342366.
Fitts, Karen, and Alan W. France. "Advocacy and Resistance in
Writing Class: Working toward Stasis." Pedagogy in the
Politics: Writing and Reading (in) the Academy . Eds.
A. Sullivan and Donna J. Qualley. Urbana: NCTE, 1994.

the
Age o f
Patricia
13-24.

. Left Margins: Cultural Studies and Composition Pedagogy.
Eds. Karen Fitts and Alan France. Albany: SUNY P, 1995.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline & Punish: The Birth o f the Prison. Trans.
Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage, 1979.
. Madness and Civilization: A History o f Insanity in the Age o f
Reason. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Vintage, 1988.
. "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in
Progress." Michel Foucault Ethics Subjectivity and Truth: The
Essential Works o f Michel Foucault 1954-1984 Volume One.
Ed. Paul Rabinow. Trans. Robert Hurley and Others. New
York: The New Press, 1997. 253-80.

248

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"Politics and Ethics: An Interview." The Foucault Reader. Ed.
Paul Rabinow. Trans. Catherine Porter. New York: Pantheon.
1984: 373-380.
-. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writing
1972-1977. Trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham.
Kate Soper. Ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon, 1980.
-.

"Sexual Choice, Sexual Act." Michel Foucault Ethics Subjectivity
and Truth: The Essential Works o f Michel Foucault 1954-1984
Volume One. Ed. Paul Rabinow. Trans. Robert Hurley and
Others. New York: The New Press, 1997. 141-56.
"Technologies
and Truth:
1984 Volume
and Others.

of the Self." Michel Foucault Ethics Subjectivity
The Essential Works o f Michel Foucault 1954One. Ed. Paul Rabinow. Trans. Robert Hurley
New York: The New Press, 1997.
223-51.

-. The Archaeology o f Knowledge & The Discourse on Language.
Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books,
1972.
-.

"The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom."
Michel Foucault Ethics Subjectivity and Truth: The Essential
Works o f Michel Foucault 1954-1984 Volume One. Ed. Paul
Rabinow. Trans. Robert Hurley and Others. New York: The
New Press, 1997.
281-301.
The History o f Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction. Trans.
Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage, 1990.

. The History o f Sexuality Volume 2: The Use o f Pleasure.
Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Random House, 1990.
.

"The Order of Discourse." Untying the Text: A Post
structuralist Reader. Trans. Ian Mcleod. Ed. Robert
Young. Boston: Rutledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. 48-78.

.

"The Subject and Power," in Michel Foucault: Beyond
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, by Hubert Dreyfus and Paul
Rabinow. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982.

2 4 9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

. "What is an Author?" Professing the New Rhetorics: A
Source Book. Eds. Theresa Enos and Stuart C. Brown.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994. 178-93.
Freire, Paulo. The Pedagogy o f the Oppressed. New York:
Continuum, 1970.
Friedman, Susan Stanford. "Post/Poststructuralist Feminist Criticism:
The Politics of Recuperation and Negotiation." New Literary
H istory 22.2 (Spring 1991): 465-90.
Gates, Jr., Henry Louis. Loose Cannons:
New York: Oxford UP, 1992.

Notes on the Culture Wars.

Ginsberg, Allen. "Song." Illuminated Poems. Paintings by Eric
Drookes. New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1996. 26-28.
Giroux, Henry A. Postmodernism, Feminism, and a Cultural Politics:
Redrawing Educational Boundaries. Albany: State U of New Y
ork, 1991.
.

"Slacking Off: Border Youth and Postmodern Education."
Journal o f Advanced Composition 14 (1994): 347-66.

Goleman, Judith. Working Theory: Critical Composition Studies fo r
Students and Teachers. Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 1995.
Gotur, Raghu. "Satire on Reservations." India Discussion Digest.
<http://india.bgsu.edu/index.html>.
Fri. 22 Mar. 11: 08: 51.
Graff, Gerald. Beyond the Culture Wars: How Teaching the Conflict
Can Revitalize American Education. New York: Norton, 1992.
Habermas, Jurgen. "Modernity—An Incomplete Project." The AntiAesthetic: Essays On Postmodern Culture. Ed. Hal Foster. Port
Townsend, WA: Bay P, 1983. 3-15.
"Modernity versus Postmodernity."
(1981): 3-18.

New German Critique 22

Hairston, Maxine C. "Breaking Our Bonds and Reaffirming Our
Connections." College Composition and Communication 36
(1985):
272-82.
250

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

. "Comment and Response."
6 9 5 -6 9 6 .

College English

52 (Oct. 1990):

. "Diversity, Ideology, and Teaching Writing." College
Composition and Communication 43 (May 1992): 179-93.
.

"Required Courses Should Not Focus on Politically Charged
Social Issues." The Chronicle o f Higher Education 37 (Jan. 23.
1991): B I.

Hall. Stuart. "Encoding/Decoding." Cultural, Media, Language:
Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-79. Ed. Stuart Hall et
al. London: Unwin Hyman, 1980. 128-38.
Hall, Stuart, and Fredric Jameson's, "Clinging to the Wreckage:
Conversation." Marxism Today (Sept. 1990): 28-31.

A

Harkin, Patricia. "The Postdisciplinary Politics of Lore." Contending
with Words: Composition and Rhetoric in a Postmodern Age.
Eds. Patricia Harkin and John Schilb. New York: MLA, 1991.
124-138.
Harris, Joseph. "The Idea of Community in the Study of Writing."
College Composition and Communication 40 (1989): 11-12.
Harvey, David. The Condition o f Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the
Origins o f Cultural Change. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
Hayes, Karen. "Creating Space for Difference in the Composition
Class." College Composition and Communication 43 (1992):
30 0 -0 4 .
Herzberg, Bruce. "Michel Foucault's Rhetoric." Contending with
Words: Composition and Rhetoric in a Postmodern Age. Eds.
Patricia Harkin and John Schilb. New York. MLA, 1991.
139-72.
Holquist, Michael. "Glossary." The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays.
Ed. Michael Holquist. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael
Holquist. Austin: U of Texas P, 1981. 423-34.

25 1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Holt, Mara. "Toward a Democratic Rhetoric: Self and Society in
Collaborative Theory and Practice." Journal o f Teaching Writing
8 (1989): 99-112.
hooks, bell. Killing Rage:
1995.

Ending Racism. New York: Henry Holt,

. Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice o f Freedom.
New York: Routledge, 1994.
Howard, Rebecca. "Reflexivity and Agency in Rhetoric and
Pedagogy." College English 56 (1994) 348-55.
Jameson, Fredric. "Afterward—Marxism and Postmodernism."
M arxism /Jam eson/C ritique. Ed. Douglas Kellner. Washington,
DC: Maisonoeuve, 1989. 369-87.
. Postmodernism; or, The Cultural Logic o f Late Capitalism.
Durham: Duke UP, 1991.
"Regarding Postmodernism—A Conversation with Frederic
Jameson."
Universal Abandon? The Politics o f Postmodernism.
Ed. Andrew Ross. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988. 3-30.
Jarratt, Susan. "Feminism and Composition: The Case for Conflict."
Contending with Words: Composition and Rhetoric in a
Postmodern Age. Eds. Patricia Harkin and John Schilb. New
York: MLA, 1991. 103-123.
. Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured.
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991.
.

"Toward a Sophistic Historiography." P R E /T E X T 8 (1987):
9 -2 6 .

Jay. Gregory,
Higher
in the
York:

and Gerald Graff. "A Critique of Critical Pedagogy."
Education Under Fire: Politics, Economics, and the Crisis
Humanities. Eds. Michael Berube and Cary Nelson. New
Routledge, 1995. 201-13.

Johnston, John. "Discourse as Event: Foucault, Writing, and
Literature." MLN 105.4 (Sept. 1990): 800-18.

252

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Jones. Donald. Beyond the Postmodern Impasse o f Contemporary
Composition: The Non-Foundational Alternative o f Deweyan
P ragm atism . Dissertation: University o f New Hampshire
Library, 1996.
Kellner, Douglas. Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism
and Beyond. Stanford. Stanford UP, 1989.
Kennedy, George A. The Art o f Persuasion in Greece. Princeton:
Princeton UP, 1963.
Kent. Thomas. Paralogic Rhetoric: A Theory o f Communicative
Interaction. Lewisburg. P. A. : Bucknell U of P, 1993.
.

The Hope of Communication. Journal o f Advanced
Communication 12 (Fall 1992): 427-30.

Kimball. Roger. "Tenured Radicals:
(Jan. 1991): 4-13.

A Postscript."

New Criterion 9.5

Kinneavy, James L. "Translating Theory into Practice in Teaching
Composition." Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modem
Discourse. Eds. Robert J. Connors, Lisa S. Ede, and Andrea
Lunsford. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1984. 69-81.
Kinsley, Michael.

"P.C. B.S." New Republic 204. 20 (May 20, 1991): 8.

Kipnis, Laura. "(Male) Desire and (Female) Disgust: Reading H u stler.”
Cultural Studies. Eds. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, Paula
A. Treichler. New York: Routledge, 1992. 373-91.
Knoblauch, C. H. "Rhetorical Constructions: Dialogue and
Commitment." College English. 50 (Feb. 1988): 125-40.
Laditka, James N. "Semiology, Ideology, Praxis: Responsible
Authority in the Composition Classroom." Journal o f Advanced
C om position 10 (Fall 1990): 357-73.
LaDuc, Linda M. "Feminism and Power: The Pedagogical Implications
of (Acknowledging) Plural Feminist Perspectives." Pedagogy in
the Age o f Politics: Writing and Reading (in) the Academy .
Eds. Patricia A. Sullivan and Donna J. Qualley. Urbana: NCTE.
1994.
153-65.
253

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Lazere. Donald. "Teaching the Political Conflicts: A Rhetorical
Schema."
College Composition and Communication 43 (May
1992):
194-213.
LeFevre, Karen Burke. Invention as a Social Act. Carbondale:
Southern Illinois UP, 1987.
Leff, Michael. "The Form of Reality in Plato’s Phaedrus.'' Rhetorical
Society Quarterly I (1981): 1-22.
Levin, Richard. "Silence is Consent, or Curse Ye Meroz!" College
E nglish 50 (1997): 171-190.
Lyotard, Jean-Francois. "Adrift." Trans. Roger McKeon. Driftworks.
By Lyotard. New York: Semiotext(e), 1984. 9-18. As quoted
in Victor Vitanza's "Three Countertheses: Or, A Critical
In(ter)vention into Composition Theories and Pedagogies."
Contending with Words: Composition and Rhetoric in a
Postmodern Age. Eds. Patricia Harkin and John Schilb. New
York: MLA, 1991. 139-172.
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans.
Geoff Benington and Brain Massumi. Minneapolis: U of
Minnesota P, 1984.
Lyotard, Jean-Francois, and Jean-Loup Thebaud. Just Gaming.
Wlad Godzich. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1985.

Trans.

Marback, Richard. "Rethinking Plato's Legacy: Neoplatonic Readings
of Plato's Sophist. Rhetoric Review 13 (1994): 30-48.
Masello, Robert. Fallen Angels. . .And Spirits o f the Dark.
Perigee, 1994.

New York:

Miller, James. The Passion o f Michel Foucault. New York: Anchor
Books, 1993.
Miller, Susan. Rescuing the Subject: A Critical Introduction to
Rhetoric and the Writer. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ.
Press, 1989.

254

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

. Textual Carnivals: The Politics o f Composition. Carbondale:
Southern Illinois UP, 1991.
.

"The Feminization of Composition. The Politics o f Writing
Instruction: Postsecondary. Eds. Richard Bullock and John
Trimbur. Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook, 1991. 39-53.

Morton, Donald. "On 'Hostile Pedagogy,' 'Supportive Pedagogy,' and
Political Correctness’: Letter to a Student Complaining of His
rade," Journal o f Urban and Cultural Studies 2.2 (1992): 75-81.
Morton, Donald, and Mas'ud Zavarzadeh. "Theory Pedagogy Politics:
The Crisis of 'The Subject' in the Humanities."
Theory/Pedagogy/Politics: Texts fo r Change. Eds. Donald
Morton and Mas'ud Zavarzadeh. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1991.
1- 2 0 .

Mortensen, Peter L. "Analyzing Talk About Writing." Methods and
Methodology in Composition Research. Eds. Gesa Kirsch and
Patricia A. Sullivan. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1992.
Moss, Roger. "The Rhetoric that Dare Not Speak Its Name."
13 (1992): 305-20.

P R E /TE X T

Nathan, Sendil. "Let Animals Be." India Discussion Digest. Sun. 31
Mar. 1996 22:03:24.
Nealon, Jeffery T. "The Ethics of Dialogue: Bakhtin and Levinas."
College English 59 (Feb. 1997): 129-48.
Neel, Jasper. "Dichotomy, Consubstantiality, Technical Writing,
Literary Theory: The Double Orthodox Curse." Journal o f
Advanced Composition 12 (Fall 1992): 305-320.
. Plato, Derrida, and Writing.
1988.
Newkirk, Thomas,
1989.

Carbondale:

more than stories.

Southern Illinois UP,

Portsmouth, N.H.:

Heineman.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth o f Tragedy. Trans. Clifton Fadiman.
Vol. V in The Philosophy o f Nietzsche. New York: Modern
Library Edition, 1937.
255

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

North, Stephen M. The Making o f Knowledge Composition: Portrait
o f an Emerging Field. Upper Montclair: Boynton, 1987.
Ohmann, Richard. English in America: A Radical View o f the
Profession. New York: Oxford UP, 1976.
Paine, Charles. "Relativism, Radical Pedagogy, and the Ideology of
Paralysis." College English 51 (Oct. 1989): 557-70.
Phelps, Louise W. Composition as a Human Science.
UP, 1988.

New York: Oxford

Plato. Gorgias or On Rhetoric; Reputative. Trans. W. R .M. Lamb.
The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the
Present. Eds. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg. Boston:
Bedford, 1990. 61-112.
. Phaedrus or On the Beautiful; Ethical. Trans. H. N. Fowler.
The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the
Present. Eds. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg. Boston:
Bedford, 1990. 113-43.
Porter, James E. "Intertextuality and the Discourse Community."
Rhetoric Review 5 (1986): 34-47.
Poster, Carol.
"Plato's
Unwritten Doctrines:AHermeneutic Problem
in Rhetorical Historiography." P R E /T E X T 14 (1993): 128-38.
Pratt, Mary Louise. "Arts of the Contact Zone."
(1991): 33-40.

Profession 91 MLA

Quandahl, Ellen. "What is Plato: Inference and Allusion in Plato’s
S o p h ist.” Rhetoric Review 7 (1989): 338-51.
Raghavan, Malathi. "Noam Chomsky & Caste." India Discussion Digest.
<http://india.bgsu.edu/index.html>. Tue. 2 Apr. 1996 21: 12: 42.
. "The Prevailing Caste Talk. . .(I)." India Discussion Digest.
<http://india.bgsu.edu/index.htm l>. Wed. 27
Mar. 1996
19: 07: 26.
. "The Prevailing Caste Talk. . .(II)." India Discussion Digest.
256

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

<http://india.bgsu.edu/index.html>.
16: 40.

Fri.

Ramamurthy, Uma. India Discussion Digest.
index.htm l>.

29

Mar. 1996 II:

<http://india. bgsu.edu/

Rassmussen, Terry. "Antifoundationalism: Can Believers Teach?"
Rhetoric Review 13 (1994): 150-63.
Rose, Mike. Lives on the Boundary: The Struggles and Achievements
o f America's Underprepared. New York: Free P, 1989.
. Writer's Block: The Cognitive Dimension. Carbondale and
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois UP, 1984.
Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain: the Making and Unmaking o f the
World. New York: Oxford UP, 1985.
Schilb, John. "Cultural Studies, Postmodernism, and Composition."
"The Postdisciplinary Politics of Lore." Contending with Words:
Composition and Rhetoric in a Postmodern Age. Eds. Patricia
Harkin and John Schilb. New York: MLA, 1991. 172-88.
Sciachitano, Marian. "Introduction: Feminist Sophistics Pedagogy
Group." College Composition and Communication 43 (1992):
2 9 7 -3 0 0 .
Shelton, Robert. As Cited in "Hate Groups in America." The AntiDefamation League of B'nai B’rith. New York, 1988. 12.
Shor, Ira. "Educating the Educators: A Freirean Approach to the Crisis
in Teacher Education." Freire fo r the Classroom. Ed. Ira Shor.
Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook, 1987. 7-32.
Smith, Paul.
1988.

Discerning the Subject.

Minneapolis:

U of Minnesota P,

Spellmeyer, Kurt. "Foucault and the Freshman Writer: Considering
the Self in Discourse." College English 51 (1989) 715-29.
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "Can the Sublatern Speak?" Marxism
and the Interpretation of Culture. Eds. Cary Nelson and
Leonard Grossberg. Urbana. IL: U of Illinois P. 1988. 217-313.
257

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Stewart, Donald C. "Collaborative Learning and Composition:
Bane." Rhetoric Review 7 (1988): 58-83.

Boon or

Strickland, Ronald. "Confrontational Pedagogy and Traditional
Literary Studies." College English 52 (March 1990): 291-300.
Sullivan, Patricia A., and Donna J. Quailey. "Introduction." P edagogy
in the Age o f Politics: Writing and Reading (in) the Academy .
Eds. Patricia A. Sullivan and Donna J. Quailey. Urbana: NCTE,
1994. Urbana: NCTE, 1994. vii-xxi.
Szkudlarek, Tomasz. The Problem o f Freedom in Postmodern
Education. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1993.
Trimbur, John. "Consensus and Difference in Collaborative Learning."
College English 51 (1989): 602-16.
.

"John Trimbur Responds—Comment and Response."
English 52 (Oct. 1990): 696-700.

College

"Taking the Social Turn: Teaching Writing Post-Process."
College Composition and Communication 45 (1994) 108-18.
Vitanza, Victor.
Rhetoric."

"Critical Sub/Versions of the History of Philosophical
Rhetoric Review 6 (Fall 1987): 4 1--65.

"'Notes’ Towards Historiographies of Rhetorics; or the Rhetorics
of the Histories of Rhetorics: Traditional, Revisionary, and
Sub/Versive." P R E /TE X T 8 (1987): 63-125.
.

"Three Countertheses: Or, A Critical In(ter)vention into
Composition Theories and Pedagogies." Contending with Words:
Composition and Rhetoric in a Postmodern Age. Eds. Patricia
Harkin and John Schilb. New York: MLA, 1991. 139-172.

Vopat, James. "U ptaught Rethought—Coming Back from the
Knockout." College English 40 (1978): 41-5.
Weiler, Kathleen. Women Teaching fo r Change:Gender, Class and
Power. South Hadley: Bergen, 1988.

258

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

West, Cornell. "Diverse New Worlds." Left Right and Center: Voices
from Across the Political Spectrum. Eds. Robert Atwan and Jon
Roberts. New York: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press.
4 6 -5 1 .
.

"Interview with Cornel West." Universal Abandon? The
Politics o f Postm odernism . Ed. Andrew Ross. Minneapolis:
of Minnesota P, 1988. 269-286.

White, David A. Rhetoric and Reality in Plato's Phaedrus.
SUNY P, 1993.

U

New York:

White, Edward. "Post-Structural Literary Criticism and the Response
to Student Writing." College Composition and Communication
35 (1984):
186-95.
Wolin, Sheldon S. "On the Theory and Practice of Power." After
Foucault:
Humanistic Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges. Ed.
Jonathan Arac.
New Brunswick and London: Rutgers U P.
1988.
179-201.
Worsham, Lynn. "Emotion and Pedagogic Violence."
(Winter 1992-93):
119-47.

D iscourse 15.2

Yagelski, Robert. "Who’s Afraid of Subjectivity?" Taking Stock: The
Writing Process Movement in the 90's. Eds. Lad Tobin and
Thomas Newkirk. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1994. 203-18.
Zavarzadeh, Mas'ud. "The Stupidity That Consumption Is Just as
Productive as Production: In the Shopping Mall of the Post-al
Left." College Literature 21.3 (Oct. 1994): 92-118. Special
issue: "The Politics of Teaching Literature 2."

259

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

